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Dear Members of the Environmental Law
Network International, dear Colleagues,
In this issue of the elni Newsletter you will find a
compilation of updated papers of our CAVA work-
shop on „The Integration of Voluntary Approaches
into Existing Legal Systems” which took place on
24-25 February 2000 in Brussels. CAVA is the
Concerted Action on Voluntary Approaches. The
project which is funded by the EU Commission
(DG Research) aims at developing a research net-
work on voluntary approaches for environmental
protection. The project is coordinated by CERNA ,
the Centre for Industrial Economics at the Ecole des
Mines de Paris (France). Associated research insti-
tutes are University College Dublin (Ireland),
University of Gent (Belgium), Öko-Institut (Ger-
many), Fundazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy), the
Institute of Local Government Studies (AKF)
(Denmark) and the Öko-Institut e.V./elni.
The 5th European Programme of Actions adopted in
1992 encouraged a new approach to environmental
policy, and namely, promoted the use of market-
based instruments and voluntary agreements. With
the use of more than 300 voluntary approaches
across the EU, this instrument has become an im-
portant factor in environmental policies. However,
compared to the widespread use of voluntary ap-
proaches, research remained underdeveloped.
CAVA is progressing to fill this gap. Several work-
shops were held within the past two years, bringing
together scholars and practitioners in law, politics,
public administration and economics to discuss
subjects such as the nature of voluntary approaches,
their efficiency and effectiveness, institutional as-
pects or questions of competition. The project will
be concluded with a final CAVA conference next
spring in Paris, grouping high-level policy-makers
and industrialists. This final conference will form
the basis for a handbook including a theoretical
overview and practical guidelines for policy rec-
ommendations related to voluntary approaches.
Within the CAVA project, the Öko-Institut and elni
have put their focus on legal aspects of Voluntary
Approaches. The research papers that were pre-
sented at our February workshop reveal that the
legal characteristics of voluntary approaches vary
widely. Therefore the workshop gave the partici-
pants the opportunity to scrutinise existing forms of
voluntary approaches within the EU. Topics such as
the legal function of voluntary approaches, their
legal status, enforcement options and liability, but
also constitutional questions with the possible lack
of parliamentary participation or the rights of third
parties were discussed. Another interesting aspect
was the comparison of the situation within the EU,
the United States and Japan. All countries have
made use of voluntary agreements in different
forms for years. The papers in this elni newsletter
cover parts of the discussion on the workshop and
will give you an overview of the international vari-
ety of voluntary agreements.Additional papers of
the CAVA workshops are available on the CAVA
website http://www.ensmp.fr/Fr/CERNA/CERNA/
Progeuropeens/CAVA/Index.html
Finally, on a personal note, we would like to inform
you at some changes in personnel have taken
plac  at the Öko-Institut in Darmstadt. Ralf Jülich,
coordinator of the Environmental Law Division and
elni, left the office in February 2000 to work for a
project in Tbilisi, Georgia. We would like to thank
him very much for his valuable work and wish him
all the best for his new challenge. His colleague,
Bir it Dette, who has been working at the Öko-
Institute since the beginning of 1999 has taken over
his position. A new lawyer, Regine Barth, has
joined our team and will support the work of the
Coordinating Bureau. We hope that we will suc-
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New book on polluter pays, prevention and
precautionary principles
Nicolas de Sadeleer, Director of the Environmental
Law Center (Cedre/Brussels), Senior Researcher
Fellow and Professor of environmental law at Saint-
Louis University, visiting Professor at Université
Paris-Sud and elni Board Member, has recently
published a book in French about the polluter pays,
prevention and precautionary principles.
The book considers the emergence of three funda-
mental principles of environmental law - the pol-
luter pays principle, the principle of prevention, and
the precautionary principle - which have implicity
or explicitly been sanctioned by international and
European Community law, as well as by several
national legal systems including those of France,
Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland. More specifi-
cally, it considers whether these principles represent
an important advance in environmental law or,
rather, interesting complementary elements of mi-
nor legal significance.
The book's first section sets out the origins, formu-
lations and applications of the polluter pays, pre-
vention and precautionary principles within the
contexts of international law, EC law and various
national laws. It specifically examines how legal
principles can alter the dynamics of public policy
and decision-making. Particular consideration will
be given to the difficulty in interpreting these prin-
ciples as they have evolved within various legal
regimes.
Each principle will be described individually, fol-
lowed by a comprehensive analysis of the close
links among them. The book aims to make clear to
the reader when and how these principles co-exist,
complement each other, enrich each other, and in
some cases contradict each other.
The analysis starts by considering the intellectual
foundations of environmental law and their rela-
tionship to science, technology and the evolving -
and increasingly important - concept of risk. The
approach taken is multidisciplinary, comprising
aspects of ecology, political science, legal theory
and positive law.
A second section looks at the legal nature of these
principles and then considers how they have altered
the dynamics of environmental law. Are these three
principles really legal rules, or are they merely
regulative concepts? In order to answer that ques-
tion, the book tests the three principles against the
generally accepted definitions of rules of law and
legal principles.
The section also adopts an empirical approach,
assessing various speculative analyses that form
part of the general theory of law against actual
instruments in place in various legal regimes.
A final section examines a number of recent legal
developments in order to identify whether these
principles have the potential to help create a new
type of environmental law. Widely used legal in-
struments such as the right to a clean environment,
proportionality, and codification of environmental
norms are specifically analysed, and then reconsid-
ered in the context of the polluter pays, prevention
and precautionary principles.
The book ends with reflections on future develop-
ments in this field, taking into account the dramatic
changes and contradictions that have thus far char-
acterised environmental law as a whole.
Nicolas de Sadeleer, Les principes du pollueur-
payeur, de prévention et de précaution, collection
Universités francophones, Bruxelles, Bruylant/
Agence universitaire francophone, 1999, 437 p,
ISBN 2-8027-1296-9; 300 french fr. for Europe,
North America and Japan; 60 french fr. for other
countries; Diffusion Hachette or Ellipses. The book
can be ordered from Bruylant publishing house,
Belgium/ e-mail : Bruylant@pophost.eunet.be
Missing footnotes in elni article
Unfortunately, most of the footnotes of the article
on EU Enlargement by Ingmar von Homeyer, An-
neke Klasing and Lena Kempmann (elni 1/1999)
were lost during formatting. We would like to
apologize for this fault. The complete article can be
downloaded as a PDF file from 
http://www.oeko.de/elni/index.htm.
ELNI NEWS
Environmental Law Network International elni 1/2000
3
Introduction
When the initial Treaty was enacted in 1958, alter-
native approaches such as environmental agree-
ments were as yet unknown. Although the revisions
brought about by the SEA, the Maastricht Treaty
and the Amsterdam Treaty have heightened the
need to incorporate environmental policy into all
aspects of Community decision-making, the Treaty
does not contain any specific provisions regarding
environmental agreements. The Commission’s
recent Communication on Environmental Agree-
ments (Commission, 1996) has however, made it
clear that these agreements are to be considered as
valid instruments of Community policy.
An analysis of the Treaty leads one to identify three
key areas with which environmental agreements
may have conflict: the rules regarding free trade
among the Member States; the competition rules;
and the rules for state aids. It is undisputed that an
environmental agreement must comply with these
provisions of the Treaty. However, the question
thus presented is to what extent an environmental
agreement’s goal of protecting the environment can
provide it exemptions or derogations from compli-
ance with the foregoing rules?
This paper begins with a look at the need for envi-
ronmental agreements to comply with the provi-
sions of the Treaty regarding free trade. The paper
then discusses the provisions of the Treaty con-
cerning competition policy and whether environ-
mental agreements can be entitled to exemptions
from them. Next, the role of competition rules for
semi-public authorities and how these rules affect
environmental agreements is discussed. Lastly, the
paper addresses the issue of environmental agree-
ments and state aids.
1 Compliance with the Provisions of the
Treaty Regarding Free Trade
Article 28 (former Article 30) et seq. are the articles
which prohibit the creation of tariffs or non-tariff
barriers among the Member States. An environ-
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mental agreement may lead to non-tariff barriers
where a certain technology or marketing symbol is
agreed upon by the majority of the members of a
national industry. Environmental agreements may
also lead to non-tariff barriers because environ-
mental agreements at the Member State level are
often promoted by and receive support from, na-
tional departments of industry (Lévêque, 1997).
Article 30 (former Article 36) provides the well-
known exemptions to the above restrictions, in-
cluding the exemption for measures designed to
protect the health and life of humans, animals or
plants. The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) has
held that the protection of the environment may be a
ground for an exemption where the restriction is
proportional to the goal sought and where the
measure is not arbitrary or a disguised restriction on
trade (Commission v. Denmark (Danish Bottles),
1988). Accordingly, because environmental agree-
ments are not permitted to create barriers to the
internal market, agreements for products that con-
tain any restrictions on the free movement of the
goods must base these restrictions on one of the
exemptions, typically the protection of the envi-
ronment.
It is important to note that Article 28 only forbids
barriers to trade in goods/products. Thus, environ-
mental agreements regarding only processing meth-
ods or for example, performance targets, cannot be
accused of violating Article 28, even where they
have anti-competitive aspects (Khalastchi and
Ward, 1998). These types of agreements must be
caught under the provisions of Articles 81 and 82.
Although environmental agreements can interfere
with free trade in the Community, they need not
necessarily do so. Thus, the Commission must co-
sider each agreement on a case-by-case basis. Ac-
cordingly, substantial discretion is granted to the
Commission in this regard (ELNI 1999). Yet, even
where an environmental agreement appears to cre-
ate a conflict with free trade (for example, the Ger-
man waste treatment programme, Dual s System
Deutschland), the Commission tends to be open to
discussion of an exception to the free trade rules
and will, as is customary, attempt to use political
dialogue before resorting to the ECJ.
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS AND THE TREATY
Environmental Agreements and Compliance with the Treaty: Issues of Free
Trade, Competition and State Aid
Patricia M. Bailey*
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A particular problem arises when environmental
agreements contain technical specifications for
products. As these specifications have such a strong
potential to disrupt the internal market, they must
first be screened by the Commission and then
communicated to the other Member States. (This
requirement equally applies to all environmental
agreements to which a public body is a party.) Both
the Commission and the Member States are given a
time period in which to reply and comment on the
proposed specifications. Lastly, it is worth remem-
bering that an environmental agreement must com-
ply with the rules of the WTO and in particular, the
principles of Article III of the GATT regarding the
equal treatment of domestic and imported goods
(Commission, 1996).
2 Environmental Agreements and Competi-
tion Law
As the EU Environment Commissioner has recently
indicated, in order for environmental agreements to
be accepted by the Commission, they must comply
with EU competition law (Moffet & Bregha, 1999).
From a political standpoint, one can interpret this
statement to mean that in general, DG XI will not
fight with DG IV over competition issues. How-
ever, the recent intra-Commission dispute regarding
the Duales System Deutschland system in Germany
suggests otherwise. Thus, it is important to take a
close look at the competition rules and what they
can signify for environmental agreements.
2.1 Compliance with Article 81 (Former Article
85)
2.1.1 General Principles
One area with which environmental agreements
may come into conflict is that of competition pol-
icy. Pursuant to Article 81(1), it is prohibited for
any environmental agreement to which a firm or
trade association is a party, to have as its “object or
effect, the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the common market”. While it is
doubtful that an environmental agreement would
ever have the objective of restraining competition, it
is clear that the effect of an environmental agre-
ment could be to prevent, restrict or distort the in-
ternal market. In such a case, the environmental
agreement would violate Article 81 and could thus
be declared invalid by the Commission (COWI,
1997). Fortunately, there are exceptions to Article
81(1) for particular circumstances.
2.1.2 Exceptions to Article 81(1)
Article 81(3) of the Treaty provides an exception to
Article 81(1) where the agreement either contrib-
utes to the improvement of the production or distri-
bution of goods, or promotes technical or economic
progress. However, the agreement must result in
consumers receiving a fair share of the benefit that
results. Furthermore, the restriction on competition:
1)  be indispensable to the attainment of the
obj ctives of the agreement; and 2) must not allow
the f rms to eliminate competition with regard to a
substantial part of the products affected by the envi-
ronmental agreement. Thus, in the event that an
environmental agreement restrains competition, the
question arises as to whether it could meet one of
th se exemptions.
A strict reading of Article 81(3) would find that
there are no specific exemptions for environmental
protection and thus, restrictive environmental
agreements would be forbidden (Rehbinder, 1997).
Fortunately for environmental agreements, national
and EU competition authorities have tended to
conclude otherwise. In its XXVth Report on Com-
petition Policy, the Commission stated that it
“weighs up the restrictions of competition arising
out of an agreement, and applies the principle of
proportionality in accordance with [Article 81(3)].
In particular, improving the environment is r-
garded as a factor which contributes to improving
production or distribution or to promoting economic
r technical progress” (para. 85). Accordingly, the
Commission applies the proportionality principle
and weighs the restrictions of competition that
would ensue from the agreement against the value
of the environmental goals of the agreement
(COWI, 1997; Steiner, 1998). This means that the
Commission examines the restrictions of the envi-
ronmental agreement to determine if they are truly
necessary and compares this with whether consum-
ers would in fact receive their fair share of the bene-
fits arising from the achievement of the agreement’s
goals. An example of this policy is the Phil-
ips/Osram decision, in which the Commission per-
mitted a joint venture because emissions reduction
equipment would be installed at the joint venture’s
factory.
A fundamental precept of environmental agree-
ments is that competing firms exchange informa-
tion; indeed, the co-operation and commitment to
the exchange of ideas and technological information
is a critical aspect of almost all voluntary ap-
proaches. Yet, this same exchange leads to ques-
tions regarding the possible distortion of competi-
tion or creation of non-tariff barriers. One should
however note that empirical evidence of this effect
has been quite limited and the number of com-
plaints filed with public authorities quite few. These
problems would most likely arise in an oligopolistic
market, with the small number of members making
collusion more feasible (Rehbinder, 1997). Indeed,
there exists a danger that environmental agreements
can end up serving as a sort of shield with which
Environmental Law Network International elni 1/2000
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companies can hide their actions regarding the
configuration of market-related activities that are
unrelated to the purpose of the agreement. With
regard to waste collection and treatment, environ-
mental agreements may encourage the concentra-
tion of markets (Lévêque, 1997).
While environmental agreements often require
firms to reach a consensus, it remains difficult to
motivate these companies, as they are naturally
reluctant to work with their competitors unless there
is a greater external threat to their survival or an
external benefit to be gained. Yet, this external gain
or threat may not be compatible with the concept of
the free market. Furthermore, the complexity of
having both traditional regulation and environ-
mental agreements makes the assurance of fair
competition even more difficult (Chrisalis, 1994).
For the firms themselves, it can be difficult to sepa-
rate the sharing of technology or decisions regard-
ing standards (which are made in an effort to im-
prove environmental performance) from attempts to
retain the firm’s share of the market.
Notwithstanding the fact that an environmental
agreement could arguably fall within an exception
of Article 81(3), it must be notified to the Commis-
sion for its review and comment. Procedurally, the
environmental agreement must be notified to Com-
petition Directorate of the Commission for its re-
view before the agreement is implemented, as the
Commission has the exclusive power to grant an
exemption under Article 81(3) (Commission, 1996).
When it is alleged in a case before a national court
that an environmental agreement is anti-
competitive, the national court would not be per-
mitted to conduct an analysis under 81(3) and
would have to refer the matter to the European
Court of Justice (Bongaerts, 1997; COWI, 1997).
Lastly, more than Article 81 may be involved. In a
hypothetical situation presented by the Commission
(1996), legislation enacted by a Member State
would delegate power to private firms that results in
an unfair restriction of competition. In this case,
there would be two separate infringements: first, the
Member State would be in violation of Article 3(g)
(regarding the establishment of a system to ensure
undistorted competition) and of Article 24 (former
Article 10, regarding policy on free movement of
goods); the firm itself would then be in violation of
Articles 81 and/or 82 (former Article 86). In this
example, the national court would again not have
authority to grant an exemption and the entire mat-
ter would be referred to the ECJ.
2.2 Compliance with Article 82 (Former Article
86)
Article 82 may also come into play with environ-
mental agreements where for example, the agree-
ment provides for the creation of an association or
undertaking in order to attain the goals of the
agreement. Article 82 prohibits an undertaking from
abusing its dominant position in the internal market
to the extent that it affects trade between the Mem-
ber States (it must be noted that the fact of domi-
nance is not enough; the dominant position must be
abused for Article 82 to come into play). If an envi-
ronmental agreement would permit the undertaking
to abuse its position, then the agreement could be
held invalid. An example of such an association
within the packaging waste context would be Dua-
les System Deutschland and Eco-Emballages in
Germany and France, respectively. These groups
are clearly undertakings in a dominant position, as
defined in Article 82; the question is whether their
conduct could constitute an abuse. Arguably, the
requirement that manufacturers who wish to sell
their products in the Member State become mem-
bers of the national waste treatment system would
be an abuse of the system’s dominant position in
waste collection. One can also argue that Article 82
is infringed because the requirement of the “Green
Dot” restricts the national market to those producers
and importers who comply with its regulations; as a
result, consumers are prejudiced because their
choices of products are restricted. Of course, the
defence of a national association would be that
manufacturers do not have to join its programme, as
they can assume individual responsibility for taking
back their packaging. But the realities of the mar-
ket-place and the near impossibility to stock a prod-
uct at major retailers has effectively resulted in the
Green Dot being required for all manufacturers in
those Member States where it is used (Bailey,
1999).
Of particular importance is the fact that Article 82
does not contain any provisions for exemptions, as
does Article 81. Thus, should the Commission de-
cide that an undertaking or an environmental
agreement is infringing Article 82, the fact that the
activity is being conducted for an environmental
purpose would not be a valid defence. Yet, while
Article 82 does not contain any exemptions, it sim-
ply would not be applied in the event that the
Commission decided not to pursue a matter (Bon-
gaerts, 1997). By way of illustration, the Commis-
sion has chosen not to pursue allegations of an
abuse of dominant position by Eco-Emballages or
Duales System Deutschland, which were created as
a result of environmental agreements. In another
example, an environmental agreement among firms
in an oligopolistic market regarding the use of a
particular technology, could arguably result in an
abuse of a dominant position. Again, it would be up
to the Commission to decide whether to pursue the
matter.
elni 1/2000 Environmental Law Network International
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Indeed the Commission has made it clear (in SPA
Monopole v. GDB) that when other competitors
(particularly those from other Member States) are
unable to enter a market due to an abuse of a domi-
nant position, the fact that the abusive behaviour
(requiring standardised refillable bottles and crates
for mineral waters) benefits the environment will
not be a sufficient defense (Khalastchi and Ward,
1998).
It is perhaps inevitable that exchanges of informa-
tion among competing firms would give rise to
allegations of collusive behaviour. Yet to date,
existing competition law appears adequate to handle
the problem, although the situation will need to be
monitored as the use of voluntary approaches in-
creases (Lévêque, 1997). It is not completely clear
that merely an environmental purpose will be suffi-
cient to obtain an exemption under Article 81(3) or
that the parameters of the particular marketplace
might not cause an environmental agreement to run
afoul of the market dominance prohibitions of Arti-
cle 82. Thus, all prospective and existing enviro-
mental agreements must be scrutinized for their
effect on competition within and exterior to, the
Member State where they are implemented.
2.3 The Application of Competition Law to Envi-
ronmental Agreements Involving Semi-Public
Authorities
Another interesting scenario is presented where
both private and public companies are parties to the
environmental agreement. One should first recog-
nise that state-owned firms (whether owned wholly
or in part) have greater bargaining power during the
negotiation of an environmental agreement because
these firms know that in the event of a financial
crisis, the State will likely subsidise them. These
firms are accordingly more likely to agree to such
an accord than a private firm, which must consider
the bottom line. While it is clear that an environ-
mental agreement that mandates an association to
complete a particular task would be subject to the
competition rules, it is not clear at first glance that
the quasi-public undertaking would itself be subject
to the rules. This question is addressed by Article
86(1) (former Article 90), which provides that:
1. In the case of public undertakings and under-
takings to which Member States grant special
or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither
enact nor maintain in force any measure con-
trary to the rules contained in this Treaty, in
particular to those rules provided for in Article
12 [nationality - former Article 6] and Articles
81 to 89 [competition and state aids - former
Articles 85 to 94].
Accordingly, Article 86 implies the application of
Articles 81 and 82 to undertakings that are given
quasi-public powers. However, Article 86 contains
an exception:
2. Undertakings entrusted with the operation of
services of general economic interest or having
the character of a revenue-producing monopoly
shall be subject to the rules contained in the
Treaty, in particular to the rules on competi-
tion, in so far as the application of such rules
does not obstruct the performance, in law or in
fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them.
The development of trade must not be affected
to such an extent as would be contrary to the
int rests of the Community (emphasis added).
Thus, it can be argued that this article would ex-
empt monopolies granted by Member States (for
waste collection and treatment, for example) be-
cause the application of the competition rules would
prevent the monopoly from completing its mandate.
Yet, even if Article 86(1) were applied to waste
treatment monopolies such as Germany’s Du les
System Deutschland or France’s Eco-Emballages so
that other waste treatment companies could enter
the market, it is not certain that these monopolies
would be obstructed from completing their tasks.
Moreover, the recent trend toward the globalisation
of waste treatment indicates that greater efficiencies
and reduced costs can result from competitive bid-
ding for packaging waste treatment contracts (Bai-
ley, 1999).
A more logical interpretation is that Article 86(2)
applies to those services that cannot be properly
provided by multiple undertakings in the market (as
was thought to be the situation until recently with
telecommunications). Indeed, Article 86(2) has
been narrowly interpreted, with the ECJ holding
that the competition rules would apply, regardless
of whether the undertaking (or the legal framework
within which an agreement or decision is made) is
classified as either public or private (Steiner, 1998).
Accordingly, one can conclude that public operators
given quasi-monopoly rights as the result of an
environmental agreement would nonetheless be
subject to the competition provisions of the Treaty.
2.4 Unresolved Competition Issues
Despite the progress that has been made with envi-
ronmental agreements, there remain several unr-
solved issues, including how environmental agree-
ments are to be used; problems caused by “free
riders”; and the effects of environmental agree-
ments on small to medium-sized enterprises.
2.4.1 The policy role of environmental agreements
It has been suggested that the use of environmental
agreement could be restricted to “those issues for
which clear policy objectives have already been
developed” so that the agreement would focus on
Environmental Law Network International elni 1/2000
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the logistics of implementation. A second idea is to
create a “policy document to guide the process and
content” of the agreement. For example, the Neth-
erlands government has issued a specific guide
regarding the use of environmental agreements. In
an extension of this idea, Denmark and Flanders in
Belgium have guidelines in their legislation as to
the content of the environmental agreements and
how they should be developed (Moffet & Bregha,
1999). However, one can also see that since the
enactment of such legislation, the number of envi-
ronmental agreements actually entered into has
dropped dramatically, suggesting a stifling effect on
initiative in this area (COWI, 1997). Thus, the
question is presented as to whether the public
authorities should prescribe the inner workings of
environmental agreements or leave them to the
parties to decide among themselves. The latter
model seems to be the more successful in the
Community, although it does appear that govern-
ment supervision and encouragement may be neces-
sary.
2.4.2 Free riders
One can argue that environmental agreements are
not as consistent and predictable as legislation and
that therefore, they affect the assurance of a level
playing field that is provided by the purely regula-
tory approach (Moffet & Bregha, 1999). Part of this
instability is certainly due to free riders, those com-
panies that reap the benefits of an environmental
agreement while failing to comply with its obliga-
tions. Both authorities and stakeholders view the
distortions of competition caused by free riders as a
serious barrier to undertaking self-commitments.
These groups also allege that free riders result in
price increases due to increased operating and
monitoring costs, although actual data in this area is
scarce (COWI, 1997). When free riders become a
serious threat to the success of an environmental
agreement, it may become necessary to enact un-
derlying legislation in order to trap those free riders
that are benefiting from their competitors’ partici-
pation in the environmental agreement. This action
is justified by the fact that such legislation is neces-
sary to preserve a level playing field. For example,
the Netherlands finally had to enact legislation to
support the Dutch packaging waste covenant, in
order to eliminate the distortions of competition
caused by free riders (Bailey, 1999).
2.4.3 Problems created for SMEs
It is true that not all companies will be of a size
and/or capacity to benefit from the advantages of-
fered by environmental agreements (Moffet &
Bregha, 1999). In these instances, special efforts are
needed to ensure that SMEs have both input into
negotiations and the right to benefit from the out-
comes of environmental agreements. These needs
can usually be met by facilitation by the govern-
men , possibly in the form of subsidies to ensure
compliance with the goals of the environmental
agreement. However, as noted below, such subsi-
die may need to comply with the state aid rules, in
order to avoid distortions of competition.
3 Environmental Agreements and State Aids
Sta e aid becomes an issue for environmental
agreements when participating firms are granted
financial assistance from public authorities in order
to attain the goals of the agreement. This aid may
occur in the form of financial subsidies, tax exemp-
tions or redistribution of funds collected from taxes,
among other methods (Commission, 1996). Moreo-
ver, b cause the environmental agreement typically
involves some type of financing from a public
aut ority (whether a positive financing such as a
grant, or a negative financing such as a waiver of an
eco-tax), the agreement must comply with the
Community Guidelines on State Aid for Environ-
mental Protection (Community Guidelines, 1994).
The Community Guidelines begin with Article
87(1) (former Article 92), which provides the gen-
eral rule regarding state aid:
Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any
aid granted by a Member State or through State
resources, in any form whatsoever, which dis-
torts or threatens to distort competition, by fa-
vouring certain undertakings or the production
of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects
trade between Member State, be incompatible
with the common market.
The Community Guidelines note that while state
aids such as subsidies and taxes can be helpful
where the polluter-pays principle is not yet fully
being applied, they can distort competition, create
trade barriers and jeopardize the single market.
Because all firms are expecting to internalize the
costs of complying with environmental regulations,
giving some firms aid can result in distortions of the
market by giving some firms an advantage over
other firms in the same market or in other Member
States (Community Guidelines, 1994).
State aid can take one of three forms, all of which
can be used in conjunction with environmental
agreements. The first type is investment aid, which
is commonly given to assist firms in purchasing
equipment to meet the targets of an environmental
agreement. The second type, horizontal support,
occurs when an environmental agreement calls for
specific research and development or an extensive
diffusion of information, for which funding is
needed. The third type of state aid is operating aid,
which can take the form of an exemption for a tax
or charge. Such an exemption might be given to a
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firm that would no longer be able to compete in the
marketplace because it would have to raise its
prices to cover the cost of environmentally sound
equipment. Such aid is important because many
smaller firms are not able to handle the additional
financial burdens of environmental regulation. An-
other example of operating aid is a grant to a waste
disposal or recycling facility, which may even be
run by semi-public authorities that are charging the
users for the service. These grants are often given
for an introductory or transition period (Community
Guidelines, 1994).
The state aid rules follow a procedure similar to that
of competition policy. The general rule is that Arti-
cle 87(1) prohibits government financial assistance
to enterprises or industries where that aid will result
in a distortion of competition or will affect trade
between the Member State. State aid for environ-
mental protection often meets this condition be-
cause it can both distort competition and affect
inter-state trade. However, as with competition
policy, Article 87 also provides that exemptions
may be allowed, if the state aid complies with the
provisions of Article 87 and if the aid complies with
other provisions of EU law, particularly those con-
cerning the single market (Community Guidelines,
1994).
While the complexities of the state aid rules are
beyond the scope of this paper, it will suffice to say
that the Member State must justify the state aid, i.e.,
demonstrate that the aid would result in improved
environmental protection or a substantial reduction
of pollution. However, in one interesting example,
the Community Guidelines emphasise that even if a
plant is relocated to a new site in the same area (for
environmental reasons), this is not automatic
grounds for aid, as it may conflict with competition
and cohesion policy. The Commission is currently
studying how to resolve this type of conflict. It is
thus indisputable that state aid, whether provided
pursuant to an environmental agreement or other
instrument, can easily create barriers and distort
competition. It is for this reason that the Commu-
nity Guidelines emphasise that, “State aid is nor-
mally only justified when adverse effects on com-
petition are outweighed by the benefits for the envi-
ronment” (Community Guidelines, 1994).
Conclusions
The role of environmental agreements as well as
other types of voluntary approaches has grown
substantially during the past decade. Despite the
fact that these agreements are not specifically ad-
dressed by the Treaty, they are certainly subject to
its rules and in fact, have a strong possibility of
running afoul of its provisions with respect to free
trade, competition policy and state aid. The area of
competition policy can become particularly compli-
cated by parallel efforts at the European Union and
Member State levels, with their diverging views as
to how environmental agreements are to be treated
with respect to the competition rules. Lastly, the
growth of environmental agreements has led to new
unresolved questions regarding their role in the
Community; how free riders are to be handled; and
the problems that environmental agreements can
cause for SMEs.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, a number of voluntary agreements in the
field of waste management, either at EC level or at
national level, are analysed. The aim is to try to draw
some conclusions as to whether these agreements
may indeed represent an alternative to binding
legislation or whether they are aimed at diverting the
attention of the legislator from the necessity to adopt
binding legislation and are conceived so to avoid the
adoption of specific environmental measures.
A number of cases are considered where voluntary
agreements have been signed by economic operators
and public authorities as well as cases where the
agreements are still at the stage of being proposed by
the concerned economic operators.
2 The legal and policy context
The Community aims at achieving a high level of
protection and improvement of the quality of the
environment. The high level of environmental
protection is to be the aim of specific community
measures based on Article 175. Moreover,
Community measures aimed at harmonising national
legislation in view of the smooth functioning of the
internal market shall also be based on a high level of
environmental protection.
It is notoriously difficult to judge on whether a certain
level of environmental protection is "high enough" in
order to comply with the above requirements.
Nevertheless, in the field of waste management, the
Community is often confronted with several options
for action and it can hardly be stated that such options
are all based on the same level of environmental
protection. In recent times, the debate on the possible
options to be followed in the frame of waste policy
has included discussion on possible agreements
instead of traditional 'command and control'
legislation.
The Community has developed a clear line in the field
of voluntary agreements. It is not the purpose of this
paper to describe and analyse such approach.
Nevertheless, it is useful to recall that Community
institutions have accepted that voluntary agreements
may in certain cases successfully replace legislation,
                                                          
* Waste Management Unit, Environment DG, European Commission. The
opinion expressed in this text are expressed on a personal basis and do
not engage the Commission.
provided a number of conditions are complied with.1
These conditions aim in particular at ensuring that in
the case of agreements, rights of individuals
(transparency, access to justice, and so on) are
sufficiently protected. The aim of the agreements
should be to reach a certain objective at a minor
administrative cost and not to reach a different
objective than the one which would be fixed by
legislation.
The main objective of Community waste legislation
and policy is the prevention of waste2. The generation
of waste (quantitative prevention) as well as the
hazardousness of waste (qualitative prevention)
should as far as possible be minimised. Once waste
are nevertheless generated, priority must be given to
their recovery, in particular the recycling of the
materials, followed by the recovery of energy and in
the last place by the final disposal (landfilling or
incineration).
Community waste legislation has developed and is
developing along two parallel lines, on the one hand
by setting out general principles and requirements (for
example: licensing, planning, controls)3; on the other
hand by establishing specific provisions and
initiatives for certain specific categories of products
(oils4, PCBs5, batteries6, packaging7, end of life
vehicles8, PVC, etc). This double action is justified by
the fact that waste are products which have reached a
specific phase of their life cycle, and taking action in
                                                          
1 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament on Environmental Agreements, COM (96) 561; Commis-
sion Recommendation of 9.12.1996 ([1996] OJ L 333 p. 59); European
Parliament resolution A4-0224/97 [1997] OJ C 286 p. 254); Council
Resolution 97/C 321/02 of 7 October 1997 [1997] OJC 321, p. 6).
2 See Communication from the Commission of 30 July 1996 on the Review
of the Community Strategy for Waste Management, COM (96) 399.
3 Council Directive (EEC) 75/442 on waste [1991] OJ L78/39 as last
amended by Commission Decision (EEC) 96/350 [1996] OJ L135/32;
Council Directive (EEC) 91/689 on hazardous waste [1991] OJ L377/20 as
last amended by Council Directive 94/31/EC [1994] L 168/28; Council
Regulation (EEC) 259/93 as amended on the supervision and control of
shipments of waste within, into and out of the European Community
[1993] OJ L30/1; [1994] OJ L228/36; [1996] OJ L304/15; [1997] OJ L22/14
4 Council Directive (EEC) 89/369 [1989] OJ L163/32; Council Directive
(EEC) 89/429 [1989] OJ L203/50; Council Directive (EC) 94/67 [1994] OJ
L365/34.
5 Council Directive (EEC) 96/59 [1996] OJ L 243.
6 Council Directive (EEC) 91/157 [1991] OJ L78/38, amended by Commis-
sion Directive (EEC) 93/86 [1993] OJ L264/51.
7 European Parliament and Council Directive (EC) 94/62 [1994] OJ
L365/10.
8 Common Position (EC) 39/1999 [1999] OJ C 317/19.
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order to limit the environmental damages that these
products may cause during their waste phase requires
by definition a product approach. Indeed, product
requirements, such as limitation on the use of
hazardous substances in products, are one of the basic
pillars of Community waste management legislation.
In summary, the main characters of waste
management legislation are the following:
1. Ladder principle (prevention, reuse, material
recycling, incineration, landfilling).
2. Product requirements, such as prohibition to use
certain substances (e.g. mercury in batteries) or
maximum concentration limits (e.g. heavy met-
als in packaging).
3. Polluter-pays principle and principle of pro-
ducer responsibility.
4. Quantified targets for reuse, recycling and re-
covery.
There is a close interrelationship between these
aspects, as for instance product requirements serve the
purpose of preventing the generation oh hazardous
waste; the producer responsibility principle aims at
decreasing the generation of waste; the quantified
targets aim at giving priority to recycling over energy
recovery. In short, all points 2, 3 and 4 are meant to
put into practice the general ladder principle
expressed in point 1.
These aspects are present to different extents in the
various pieces of legislation adopted so far. After the
adoption of the Review of the Community Strategy
for waste management in 1996, the concepts of
prevention, producer responsibility and quantified
targets have been given a higher profile and as a
consequence, these principles appear more clearly in
legislation proposed or adopted after 1996 (e.g. the
concept of producer responsibility has been
significantly strengthened in the 1997 Proposal on
end of life vehicles in comparison to the 1994
Directive of packaging and packaging waste).
3 Specific cases
This short description of Community waste
legislation and policy gives us an angle for
analysing the issue of voluntary agreements in the
field of waste management. For each selected case,
we will give a short description of the relevant
Community Policy and will then compare this
policy with the contents of the voluntary agreement
in question.
3.1 End of life vehicles
3.1.1 Agreements at national level
In the ELV sector, no specific Community measure
has been adopted so far. A proposal for a Directive
was adopted by the Commission in 1997. With the
exception of Sweden, at national level no initiative
had been taken until the early Nineties. Today,
nati nal initiatives, be it voluntary agreements or
legislative measures or a mix of the two, exist in
b ut half the Member States.
The main environmental problems relate to the
generation of a consistent volume of waste which are
very difficult to handle, given the complex mix of
materials of which the products consist. Up to 2
million tonnes of hazardous waste are generated every
year. A further problem consists of the abandonment
of vehicles in the environment. Moreover,
environmental pollution caused by recycling, mostly
due to the design of vehicles which disregards the
recovery phase, is also considered a major challenge
for the future.
A Community policy based on a high level of
environmental protection requires therefore:
· product requirements, such as restrictions on
substances which cause pollution during recov-
ery operations or which hamper recycling.
· producer responsibility, in particular with a
view to financial responsibility for the take-
back of waste and their recovery. This is seen
as an indispensable measure in order to push
producers to change the design of new vehicles.
· administrative requirements (e.g. a certificate
of destruction, which will be a preconditions
for deregistrating vehicles, so to prevent aban-
donment of ELVs).
· collection and recovery requirements, in par-
ticularly quantified targets applying the prefer-
ence to material recycling over energy recov-
ery.
Some of these aspects require by definition legislative
action. Product requirements as well as administrative
rules such as certificates of destruction cannot be
pursued by means of voluntary agreements, since
such issues constitute rights and obligations of
individuals, which in turn require full enforceability.
These aspects are therefore not considered here.
However, measures concerning take-back conditions
as well as quantified targets for recycling and
recovery may be also pursued by means of voluntary
agreements.
Table 1 gives a summary description of how the
existing voluntary agreements at national level have
dealt with the issues of quantified targets and take-
back responsibility.
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Table 1: Summary of the quantified targets of national initiatives and of ‘take-back’ rules
Country Short-term target Long-term target Take-back conditions
Francea
(1993)
Max. generation of final
waste: 15% by 2002
Max. generation of final






Max. generation of final
waste: 15% by 2002
Max. generation of final






86% recycling by 2000 Free of charge + scrap fee
Germanyb (1998) Max. 15% disposal by
2002
Max. 5% disposal by 2015Free of charge only for
vehicles less than 12 years




80% recovery (no year
indicated)
Voluntary free of charge








 85% recycling by 2010
Some producers promote
free of charge take-back




Max. 15% landfilling by
2002
Max. 5% landfilling by 2015Not addressed (market
conditions)
a = voluntary commitment 
b = voluntary commitment plus legislation
The following assessment of these national initia-
tives can be made: with the exception of the Neth-
erlands and Italy, no voluntary agreement applies
the Community ladder principle and gives prefer-
ence to material recycling over other recovery op-
erations. With the exception of the Netherlands, no
voluntary agreement gives consumers the certainty
of a free-of-charge take back of ELVs.
Doubts about the comparability of these national
initiatives with a Community approach arise when
the conditions included in the agreements are
considered. For example, French manufacturers
ensure that new models may be reprocessed to
generate a weight of final waste not exceeding 10
per cent...’while bearing in mind that compliance
with this recycling rate naturally depends on the
state of reprocessing techniques and their cost-
effectiveness when new models are marketed and
this rate is also based on the assumption that
sufficient progress will have been made in these
techniques at that time’9.
It could be argued that most of the considered
agreements were concluded before the Commission
                                                          
9 Source: Framework Agreement on the Reprocessing of Scrap Vehicles,
Paris, 10 March 1993.
adopted its Proposal and therefore made its objectives
for a Community Policy on end of life vehicles clear.
This would seem to be confirmed by the fact that the
Italian Agreement was amended in 1998 in order to
adapt it to the Community proposed quantified
targets. However, the principle of preference to
material recycling has been inserted into Community
policy since 1996. Furthermore, it is striking that none
of the other agreements were amended in order to
take into account of the common targets proposed by
the Commission.
The conclusion which can be drawn is that most of
the existing national agreements on end of life
vehicles do not conform neither with the principles of
the Community strategy for waste management nor
with a common structure such as the one proposed for
the EU by the Commission and supported by the
European Parliament and the Council10. Rather, they
tend o establish other kind of objectives, which
disregard this Community structure.
                                                          
10 On 23 May 2000 the European Parliament and the Council agreed on a
Joint Text in the context of the Conciliation procedure set out in Article 251
of the EC Treaty, in view of the adoption of the Directive on end of life
vehicles, expected for September 2000. The Joint Text is in line with the
Proposal of the Commission of 1997.
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3.1.2 Agreement on ELVs at EU level - proposal
by ACEA (European Association of Vehicle
Manufacturers)
Vehicle manufacturers, as well as many producers
of materials, were initially in favour of voluntary
agreements being implemented just at national level
(‘national implementation groups’)11. When it be-
came clear that leaving the matter entirely to na-
tional voluntary agreements would not have repre-
sented a valid solution to the problems in question,
some economic operators (particularly vehicle pro-
ducers) proposed a voluntary agreement at EC level
between themselves and the Commission12. This
voluntary agreement was to back the commitment
that, in July 1996, sixteen industrial associations,
representing mostly material and vehicle manufac-
turers, made in order to 'improve the environmen-
tally sound treatment of end of life vehicles’ which
called for action to be taken by industry in each
Member State in view of ‘common landfill targets,
the sharing of responsibilities between the parties
and building on present free-market conditions’.
Such general and vague declared objectives, stated
in the context of a declaration gathering only some
of the economic actors of the automotive chain
(excluding dismantlers associations as well as many
recycling associations), could not be considered as
something which could represent an alternative to a
Community measure. The intention of these indus-
tries was to leave only the establishment of a cer-
tificate of destruction, the necessary permitting
procedures and ‘implementation groups to develop
recovery actions and monitor progress’ to national
legislators. Nothing was said neither on quantified
targets nor on responsibilities for the take-back of
vehicles.
In any case, even among economic operators, wide-
spread disagreement existed with regard to the
voluntary approach. Economic operators other than
producers of vehicles and materials, such as dis-
mantlers and recycling associations, particularly
from sectors other than metal, were strongly against
the voluntary approach and preferred a mandatory
instrument at EC level13. There are both economic
and political reasons for this. Dismantlers and recy-
clers are in fact, to a certain extent, ‘paying’ the low
                                                          
11 Sources: Communication by the European Automobile Manufacturers
Association (ACEA) to the Commission of 30.7.1996, communications to
the Commission by the European plastic converters (EUPC), 31.5.1996
and by the Association of plastics manufacturers in Europe (APME),
4.10.1996.
12 Communication of ACEA to the Commission (9.9.1996).
13 E.g.: European Group of Automotive Recycling Associations (EGARA),
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Auto-Recyclingbetriebe GmbH (ADA),
Bundesverband Sekundärrohstoffe und Entsorgung e.V. (Bvse), Auto
Recycling Nederland BV (ARN).
recyclability of vehicles. Their business becomes
gradually more expensive and less profitable when
environmental requirements come about. But there
is no way that they can change the product they
work on (ELVs) in order to make their business
more profitable. In the political sphere, these busi-
nesses are less organised and represented than vehi-
cle and material manufacturers. They consist of a
very high number of small and medium-sized com-
panies - contrary to what happens in the material
and vehicle production sector. Dismantlers and
recyclers therefore fear that their point of view
would not be duly taken into account in a voluntary
agreement, and feel more ‘protected’ by legislative
measures.
The idea of a voluntary agreement between eco-
nomic operators and the Commission was therefore
not pursued. In this case, there was also a problem
of monitoring of the results achieved. The Commis-
sion could in fact endorse the commitment being
made by industry (through a Recommendation) but
it would not have been able to ensure the proper
monitoring and implementation of the agreement in
Member States. In other words, there was a signifi-
cant risk that the agreement would remain unen-
forced. The only way of ensuring that monitoring
and enforcement would have been to involve na-
tional administrations in the agreement. But this
would have meant that Governments would also be
involved in the negotiation and drafting of the
agreement. Therefore the Council would have
needed to be involved in the process. In addition, it
would have been politically very difficult not to
involve the European Parliament too. This would
have meant practically using one of the standard
legislative tools provided by the Treaty in Article
249 (formerly Article 189), which, in the Commis-
sion's view, excludes negotiated agreements. One
possible way of overcoming these difficulties would
be to adopt a Community binding instrument, but to
suspend its entry into force if economic operators
are able to prove that they have set up voluntary
measures which lead to the same objectives as those
envisaged in the binding instrument. A Directive
could have a suspensive clause, and its entry into
force could be triggered by a Commission decision
in case economic operators are unable to prove that
the objectives are being achieved. Mandatory leg-
islation would therefore be used as a ‘stick’ if the
‘carrot’ approach fails. However, this approach is
not problem-free either. It can again be argued that
in order for the Commission to formulate a proposal
for a Decision revoking or confirming the validity
of the suspensive clause, a monitoring procedure at
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national level is necessary14. A transparent and
binding monitoring instrument would therefore
need to be set up, or a transparent monitoring clause
would need to be inserted into the agreement. One
possibility would be to ensure that monitoring is
carried out by an independent third party (a research
centre or statistical institute). But in all these cases
the parties to the agreement would have to fully
agree on the monitoring instrument or on choosing
the independent third party. In an ideal world,
where the parties agree on both the contents of the
agreement and the procedure to verify compliance
with it, objective monitoring could possibly be
arranged.
However, a key question remains, what happens
when the parties to a potential agreement do not
agree on the contents of the agreement? In the ab-
sence of a common view on the objectives it is
difficult to keep alive the whole idea of an EC vol-
untary agreement. This is the main reason why this
idea was not pursued for ELVs: it was very clear
that material and vehicle producers do not agree
with the key objectives proposed by the Commis-
sion aimed at a high level of environmental protec-
tion in the ELV sector. It is therefore difficult to
imagine how a transparent monitoring system could
be set up in the agreement. It may even be neces-
sary to set up a binding Regulation for monitoring
the agreement, in which case the benefits of the
non-regulatory approach would be reduced. Fur-
thermore, one fundamental problem remains - that
many dismantlers and recyclers do not wish to enter
agreements with producers and are rather in favour
of binding legislation, since they feel more ‘pro-
tected’ by legislative measures. Finally, Member
States would also have to agree to such a system (if
a Member State does not agree, nothing would
prevent it from adopting binding legislation). This
seems very difficult given that some have already
introduced mandatory legislation (e.g. Sweden,
Germany, the Netherlands). Indeed, under these
conditions, seeking to achieve agreement between
the Commission and all the economic operators
involved in the ELV sector would probably only
delay the adoption of a common solution for the
European Union, with all the connected risks of not
achieving integration and harmonisation in this
sector of the internal market. One could also say
that, with an agreement in the ELV sector, it is
                                                          
14 It is useful to recall the ‘case-study’ carried out by the European Environ-
mental Agency on the French agreement on ELVs (‘Environmental
agreements - environmental effectiveness’, Environmental Issues Series n
3, 1997), which concludes that ‘quantitative assessment of environmental
effectiveness is not possible because of a lack of monitoring
data’...’monitoring arrangements are being improved’...’it is not possible,
however, to determine whether it is more cost-effective than alternative
policy measures’.
difficult to believe that economic operators, par-
ticularly vehicle producers, would commit them-
selves to achieve more (in environmental terms)
than what these economic operators would do any-
way under normal market forces15.
3.2 Waste paper: proposed Environmental
Agreement of the Confederation of the Euro-
pean Paper Industry (CEPI)
Another example of proposed environmental
agreement at Community level concerns the ma-
agement of paper waste.
Paper waste is a high-volume waste stream and is
found in both the municipal and commercial waste
stream. Paper consumption in the EU rose from
about 41 million tonnes in 1983 to 64 million ton-
nes in 1996 (+46%). The recycling rate has in-
creased from 36% in 1985 to 40% in 1990 and
43.8% in 1996. However, due to the growth in con-
sumption of paper and cardboard, the total amount
of paper waste incinerated or landfilled has in-
creased.
At present, there is no specific legislation on the
general waste management of paper. It should how-
ever be noted that about 40% of paper and paper
board is used as packaging. An important fraction
of the total paper waste stream falls therefore under
Directive 94/62/EC on packaging and packaging
waste. The implementation of this Directive has not
raised any considerable difficulties for packaging
made of paper and paper board. Recycling of this
type of packaging is higher than the required target
of the Packaging Directive, which, apart from a
general recycling target (between 25% and 45% by
weight of packaging waste must be recycled by
June 2001), fixes a minimum recycling target of
15% per type of packaging material. With an aver-
age recycling rate of about 44%, packaging made of
paper and paper board easily fulfils this require-
ment. However, this situation could change in the
context of the revision of the packaging Directive.
One of the key questions of this revision is the set-
ting of new recycling targets. One of the options
envisaged for the future recycling targets of pack-
aging waste is the implementation of distinctive
targets depending on the type of material. This
would mean that the mandatory recycling target for
paper and paper board packaging could be much
higher than the current 15%.
                                                          
15 This is also the conclusion reached by Rennings, Brockmann and Berg-
mann, of the Zentrum fïr Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), in their
‘Möglichkeiten und Grenzen von freiwilligen Umweltschutzmaßnahmen
der Wirtschaft unter ordnungspolitischen Aspekten’, study carried out for
the German Ministry of Economics (Manheim, 1996).
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It should also be noted that the Council adopted in
1981 a Recommendation related to the re-use of old
paper and the use of recycled paper16. This Recom-
mendation encourages as far as possible the use of
paper containing a high content of recycled fibres.
However, this Recommendation has not shown
practical consequences.
A Communication of the Commission of July 1998
on the competitiveness of the recycling industries
[COM(1998) 463 final] proposes possible new
regulatory measures including the requirements for
the content of recycled materials in specific prod-
ucts, in particular newsprints. The services of the
Commission then launched a study on the assess-
ment of the environmental and economic implica-
tions of the setting up of minimum quantity of recy-
cled material in certain paper and cardboard appli-
cations.
In this context, the Confederation of the European
Paper Industry (CEPI) presented in February 1999
to the services of the Commission a Proposal for a
“European Agreement on the recovery of Paper and
Board Products”. CEPI represents 13 national asso-
ciations manufacturing about 93% of the total
European paper production. CEPI prepared the
Proposal but had the intention to involve in the
discussion the main actors of the “pap r chain”
(mainly converters, printers, publishers, packers,
material suppliers, traders and retailers). Before
assessing the content of the proposed Agreement, it
should be noted that such a large number of actors
involved in this proposal would have made the
implementation and the monitoring of such an
agreement very difficult.
The core commitment of the CEPI proposal was to
achieve a minimum “recovery rate” of about 47.7%
in 2005. A number of other measures were pro-
posed by CEPI: promotion of the prevention of
waste, an information system for the optimisation of
collection systems, development of research pro-
grammes, information campaigns, monitoring pro-
grammes and the setting up of a European Council
for Paper Recovery.
According to CEPI, the proposal would “increase
the recovery of paper”. The commitment was there-
fore not to increase only the recycling of paper but
also the incineration with energy recovery. The
proposal also clearly states that this agreement
should prevent “potential threat such as avoiding
conflicting provisions such as minimum recycled
content requirement in certain products”. In addi-
tion, it is likely that CEPI wanted to avoid a revi-
sion of the Packaging Directive, which would result
                                                          
16 [1981] OJ L 355/56.
in higher recycling targets for paper and cardboard
packaging. The proposal sets European objectives
“leaving the economic operators the responsibility
and freedom to decide how to achieve them better.”
The objective seems therefore clear: avoid any new
or revised waste Community legislation affecting
the paper industry.
The objectives set in the proposed agreement were
not totally in line with the Community policy on
waste management. Recycling of paper waste was
ot presented as the objective of the agreement. In
addition, the proposed agreement should have dem-
nstrated a clear environmental added value as
regards the following main objectives: more recy-
cling than a “business as usual scenario”, more
separate collection of waste paper and the imple-
mentation of the producer responsibility principle.
None of these objectives were targeted by the pro-
posed agreement.
Following a number of discussions between the
services of the Commission and CEPI, the paper
industry decided to transform its proposal for an
environmental agreement into an unilateral com-
mitment made by this industry. Such a commitment
has not yet been published by CEPI.
This example illustrates that, beside all the difficul-
ties linked with the setting up of a voluntary ap-
proach (in particular the number of stakeholders
involved, the absence of sanctions), the objectives
presented by CEPI were not in line with the objec-
tives defined by the Commission in its policy on
waste management.
3.3 Nickel-Cadmium batteries: proposed Envi-
ronmental Commitment on the collection and
recycling of nickel-cadmium batteries pro-
posed by the cadmium industry
The waste management of nickel-cadmium batteries
raises a number of serious environmental issues.
About 70% of the cadmium produced (5500 tonnes
per year) in the EU are used in nickel-cadmium
batteries. About 80% of the cadmium in municipal
waste comes from nickel-cadmium batteries. Cad-
mium is a well-known hazardous heavy metal,
which is classified as harmful, toxic and carcino-
genic. Cadmium bioaccumulates in the human body
and specially in the kidneys, bones and blood. The
main reported health effects are renal dysfunction,
growth disturbances, skeletal damage and repro-
ductive deficiencies. Cadmium is also suspected to
cause liver, lung and prostate cancer. It is therefore
essential that cadmium does not enter the environ-
ment.
In light of all the above mentioned issues raised by
this waste stream, the services of DG Environment
launched in 1997 a consultation process with Mem-
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ber States and interested stakeholders in order to
develop a Directive aimed at banning the use of
cadmium in batteries. Due to technical develop-
ments during the last years, cadmium can be sub-
stituted in batteries in most of its applications.
In parallel with this initiative of DG Environment,
the International Cadmium Association (ICdA)
supported by other industrial associations presented
in December 1999 a “voluntary commitment” to the
services of the Commission. The main principles of
this commitment are “to reduce the environmental
exposure and to preserve the availability of nickel-
cadmium batteries and their related products”. The
main declared objective of this initiative is “to
increase the collection of nickel-cadmium batteries
year after year and to adequately treat the collected
batteries through appropriate recycling”.
The approach proposed by the International Cad-
mium Association does not address the main prob-
lems raised by the management of nickel-cadmium
batteries. The obligation to collect nickel-cadmium
batteries has existed since 1991 already (Council
Directive 91/157/EEC)17. For nine years, the cad-
mium industry has not shown initiatives on the
implementation of an effective collection system.
The collection results for portable nickel-cadmium
batteries are still very poor (5 to 35%). It is there-
fore unlikely that a voluntary approach would
achieve collection rates of around 100%, home
stored batteries included. Therefore, cadmium will
continue to be dispersed in the environment through
inappropriate landfilling and incineration together
with household waste.
The “environmental commitment” of the cadmium
industry was presented to the services of the Com-
mission exactly at the moment when discussions
were taking place within the Commission on a pro-
posal from DG Environmental to revise the existing
legislation and possibly ban nickel-cadmium bat-
teries.
In this context, it is to be noted that there is a clear
difference, in terms of preventing waste and waste
hazardousness, between a commitment to increase
the collection of waste and a measure restricting the
putting on the market of a hazardous substance.
Waste collection and recycling is an end-of-pipe
solution, whereas a market prohibition prevents the
problems at source. This is the reason, why, for
instance, mercury in batteries has been banned
already.
The cadmium industry presented in March and June
2000 to the services of the Commission a revised
proposal for a voluntary agreement. This new pro-
                                                          
17 See note 7.
posal does not add substantial elements to the
agreement and is still based on the objective to
co lect batteries instead of preventing at source the
use of cadmium. A number of Member States have
publicly declared that they favour the ban of cad-
mium, putting therefore additional pressure on the
industry. In this context, the Commission will have
to decide how to tackle this important enviro-
mental and health issue. The choice of the Commis-
sion will not be based on the type of instrument,
binding or voluntary, but on two different objec-
tives, preventive or end of the pipe.
3.4 One-way photo cameras in Italy
Another interesting case relates to the implementation
of waste legislation in Italy. General Community
waste legislation (Directives 75/442/EEC on waste
and 91/689/EEC on hazardous waste) has been
transposed in Italy by means of Decree 22/1997.
Waste management in Italy has been characterised for
a long time by a structural inability to fully comply
with the licensing requirements set out by Directive
75/442, which led first to interpretation of the notion
of waste as referring exclusively to disposable waste,
whereas recoverable waste were not considered to be
waste; at a later stage, this led to a very wide use of
the derogation to the licensing requirements set out by
Articles 9 and 10 of Directive 75/442/EEC and by
Article 3 of Directive 91/689 ('simplified procedure') .
This is in turn due to a structural deficit of
administrative resources, particularly at regional level,
allowing for a correct implementation of the licensing
requirements as well as to the chronic delay in
implementing Community waste legislation, which
made it very burdensome for industry to switch from
a 'laissez-faire' system to a system of licences (or - at
least - of 'simplified' procedures).
This explains why Articles 4(4) and 25(2) of Decree
22/1997 provide for the possibility for competent
authorities (Environment Ministry, in consultation
with industry Ministry), to conclude voluntary
agreements ('accordi di programma') for the take-back
of end of life products and for the stipulation of
simplified procedures for the collection and transport
of waste.
This Article has now been put in practice by a
voluntary agreement signed between public
authorities and the Federation of Chemical Industries,
on behalf of the business which produce and
distribute one-way photo-cameras.
The agreement concerns the organisation of a
collection, reuse and recycling system for such
products. The concerned industry committed:
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· to design photo-cameras which can be reused
· to promote and carry-out, at own expenses, the
collection of such photo-cameras by distribu-
tion and trade
· to provide data about the number of photo-
camera collected and treated
· to diffuse information about the agreement, so
to increase participation of shops in it
· to reuse, where feasible, the photo-cameras.
Where photo-cameras would not be reusable,
they would be treated as waste.
Under the condition that the cameras are destined to
their reuse for the original purpose, Public authorities
committed, in order to 'facilitate' the reuse of photo-
cameras 'in compliance with Community legislation',
to consider the storage of discarded one-way photo-
cameras, their transport, selection and take-back by
recycling companies as not falling under the scope of
waste legislation.
It is worth notice that the consignment note, which
must in all cases accompany shipment of wastes, may
be replaced by a notice informing that the transport of
waste is effected in the context of the present
voluntary agreement.
Community waste legislation on this point is clear:
the recovery (including collection, transport, reuse
and recycling) of waste as well as the disposal of
waste require an ad hoc authorisation which shall be
issued by competent authorities in compliance with
the other requirements set out by Directives
75/442/EEC and 91/689/EEC. In exceptional cases,
set out in Article 11(1) of Directive 75/442/EEC and
in Article 3(2) of Directive 91/689/EEC, the permit
may be replaced by a registration ('simplified
procedure'). But, in no cases, there is a possibility of
considering recoverable waste as 'non waste' and
therefore not subject to the requirements of the
relevant legislation.
In this context, one could well imagine a voluntary
agreement as a means which could complement the
necessary legal requirements, in order to make the
application of the legislation easier and more cost-
effective. For instance a voluntary agreement could
cover the collection by private business of specific
recoverable waste fractions, in order to speed up their
recovery without having to collect them via public
authorities, sorting and then destining them to
recovery. But such agreement could in no case have
the effect of waiving the minimum legal and
administrative requirements imposed by the
legislation.
However, this is not the case of the Italian agreement
in question, whose aim seems rather to 'suspend' the
application of a compulsory legal regime to a specific
waste stream. The objective of waste legislation is to
guarantee a high level of environmental protection
and equal conditions of competition across the EU by
imposing a permit requirement. The objective of the
Italian agreement in question seems not to be the
more cost-effective application of the legislation,
rather the non compliance with this legislation.
4 Conclusions
In light of the analysed cases, it seems very difficult
to consider that voluntary agreements have been
proposed with the aim of implementing waste
management measures in a more cost-effective
manner. The impression one gets is that it is not so
much a problem of form (binding legislation or
voluntary agreements), rather, a problem of
environmental objectives. If the concerned industry
agr es with the objectives set out by the legislator,
there does not seem to be a real conflict between the
type of measure. However, experience in the waste
sector shows that practically always, there is no
correspondence between the objectives seeked by
the public sector and those proposed by private
interests. The issue of voluntary agreements seems
to be a political tool in order to delay or avoid the
adoption of a certain measure, no matter what the
form of this measure would be.
The key question seems to be whether environ-
mental measures have always to be 'acceptable' to
the c ncerned industry or whether progress in view
of sustainable development implies that a number of
measures have to be adopted 'against the will' of the
concerned economic operators. In the first case, the
voluntary approach and legislation could be equally
valid alternatives. In the second case, it is quite
obvious that legislation is needed. The experience
in the waste sector shows that progressive environ-
mental measures are usually not well received by
industry, in particular when such measures touch on
product composition and design. This could explain
why, in such a sector, voluntary approaches which
could act as valid substitutes for legislative meas-
ures have not yet appeared.
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1 Introduction
A growing environmental awareness on the part of
industry and a conscious attempt by the government
to achieve voluntary co-operation with the private
sector have led to the implementation of environ-
mental policy agreements or covenants. These are
for the most part voluntary agreements between the
government and industry in which the latter under-
takes to make a determined effort to counteract
certain forms of pollution1. The use of environ-
mental covenants to supplement conventional envi-
ronmental policy instruments has in recent years
become widespread internationally. In Belgium, 16
such covenants were concluded in the period before
a legal framework existed (1988 – 1994), the first of
these on 1 January 1988. They cover such areas as
reducing the amount of mercury in primary batter-
ies, scaling down the use of CFCs, reductions in
emissions of SO2 and NOX in electricity generating
plants, phosphates in detergents, packaging waste,
and the recycling of aluminium waste2. Und r cer-
tain preconditions, environmental covenants can be
positively rated and can produce results3. In the
absence of a legal framework, however, the use of
such covenants gives rise to a number of problems,
both at the policy level and in legal terms4. Envi-
ronmental covenants could be used outside the
normal process of democratic control. Furthermore,
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1 Gedr.St., Flemish Council, 1992-93, no. 401/1, 11.
2 See on this subject: H. BOCKEN, J. BOUCKAERT, C. LAMBERT and G.
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mental Agreements in Environmental Policies, Cameron May, London,
1998, 21-192. For the results achieved with the various older environ-
mental covenants in Belgium, see: A. SEYAD, F. SENESAEL, M. DE
CLERCQ, l.c., 99-102.
4 H. BOCKEN, J. BOUCKAERT, C. LAMBERT and G. VAN HOORICK,
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Garant, Leuven, 1994, 727-737.
research has shown that the legal status of these
covenants contained a number of shortcomings and
weaknesses5. Belgium now has a legal framework
for the conclusion of environmental covenants at
both the regional and the federal level.
We will discuss this legal framework below, but
first we will shed some light on the division of
powers between the federal government and the
regions in the area of environmental policy.
2 Division of Powers in the Area of Environ-
mental Policy in Belgium
Powers relating to environmental policy in Belgium
have been divided between the federal government
and the three regions6, namely the Flemish Region,
the Walloon Region and the Brussels Metropolitan
Region.
In matters of environmental policy, the federal
overnment is responsible for protection against
ionizing radiation, management of radioactive
waste, transit of waste, protection of the marine
environment, product policy (product standards,
product levies, ecolabelling, environmental adver-
ti ing), civil defence (contingency plans) and cer-
tain aspects of scientific research. In addition, the
federal government is also responsible for certain
policy areas that are closely connected with envi-
onmental policy. Besides a set of powers related to
energy policy, these areas also cover certain aspects
of transport policy (national airport, railways, traffic
regulations, technical specifications for vehicles)
and agricultural policy (with certain exceptions). In
the light of the integration of environmental consid-
erations in other policy areas and the broadening of
the arsenal of environmental policy instruments, it
should be pointed out that macroeconomic policy
and a major part of taxation policy come within the
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federal remit, although in certain cases consultation
with, and even the consent of, the regions is re-
quired, and a substantial portion of the tax revenues
is allocated to the regions and communities. Other
important policy areas are foreign policy, overseas
development, social and employment policy, safety
and health in the workplace, and justice.
The bulk of the powers relating to environmental
policy, however, rests with the 3 regions. They are
responsible for environmental planning, protection
of the environment (water, air, soil, noise) (with the
exception of ionizing radiation), waste management
(with the exception of interstate transit), supervision
of dangerous, unhealthy or nuisance installations,
drinking water supply, nature conservation, and
certain aspects of scientific research. They include
both legislative and executive powers, and also
cover inspection. The instruments for criminal law
enforcement, however, are federal. In accordance
with their tax-levying powers, the regions are
authorized to introduce green taxes in so far as no
such tax already exists at the federal level (non bis
in idem principle). Taxes on effluent discharge and
waste disposal are reserved for the regions.
So far, one of the three regions has a legal fram-
work for the conclusion of environmental cove-
nants, namely the Flemish Region (III). Very re-
cently, the federal government has created such a
framework as well (IV).
3 Legal Framework in the Flemish Region –
Initial Experiences
3.1 Introduction
Since mid-1994, the Flemish Region has a legal
framework for the conclusion of environmental
covenants. The relevant Decree7 is based on pre-
paratory work carried out by the Interuniversity
Commission for the Revision of Environmental
Law in the Flemish Region8. The draft decree of the
Flemish Government was still very much in line
with the proposal of that Commission. When it was
discussed in Parliament, however, it was modified
fairly thoroughly on a number of points9.
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Zwolle, 1994, 44-76.
3.2 Field of application and scope
The Decree regulates environmental covenants
concluded after 8 July 1994, as well as the amend-
ment and extension of environmental covenants
concluded before that date (Art. 13). By the term
“environmental covenant” is meant “any agreement
between the Flemish Region, represented by the
Flemish Government, on the one hand, and one or
several umbrella organizations representing enter-
prises on the other, for the purpose of preventing
environmental pollution, limiting or removing the
consequences thereof, or of promoting effective
conservation of the environment” (Art. 2).
With this Decree, the regional legislator sought to
solve a number of technical legal problems and to
create a legal framework for the appropriate use of
these covenants in the future10. Th  mixed public
and private nature of environmental covenants ne-
cessitated certain departures from the common law
of contracts. For this reason, the provisions had to
have binding force11. In order to avoid any confu-
sion and to prevent the Flemish Region from being
able to enter into environmental covenants not gov-
erned by the Decree with organizations referred to
in Article 2, an amendment was adopted to the
effect that the provisions of the Decree are public
law and apply to every environmental covenant as
defined in Article 212. Environmental covenants that
depart from the Decree are absolutely null and void.
Judgments on such covenants fall within the juris-
diction of the courts13. Despite this clear stipulation,
the previous Flemish Minister for the Environment
entered into environmental covenants without hav-
ing followed the procedure stipulated by decree,
while initially no environmental covenants were
concluded in accordance with the provisions of the
Decree14. Covenants between other governments
and organizations referred to in Article 2 of the
Decree are not governed by the Decree and ther-
fore come under the common law of contracts, but
because of the public law nature of the Decree they
cannot be concluded under the term “environmental
covenant”. This also applies for covenants between
the Flemish Region or other governments and con-
tracting parties other than the organizations referred
to in Article 2 of the Decree, for instance individual
enterprises15.
Environmental covenants cannot replace the exist-
ing legislation or regulations nor depart from them
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in a less strict sense (Art. 3). This is obvious, since
a statute or decree and its implementing orders can
only be amended or repealed by a statute or decree,
a Royal Decree or a decree of the Flemish Govern-
ment16.
3.3 Particular validity requirements
a) Contracting parties
Only the Flemish Region can enter into an envi-
ronmental covenant within the meaning of the De-
cree. Here it is represented by the Flemish Govern-
ment. On the side of the private sector are one or
several umbrella organizations representing enter-
prises. Those organizations have to prove that they
a) have legal personality; b) represent enterprises
which either operate in the same line of business or
are faced with a particular environmental problem,
or are located in the same area; c) have been del-
gated by their members to enter into an environ-
mental covenant with the Flemish Region and to
bind them by this covenant as stipulated in Article 5
(Art. 2).
To assess the representativeness of the contracting
organizations, the Flemish Government enjoys a
certain degree of discretion, since the restrictive
enumeration under b) has been worded in fairly
general terms. Given the diversity of circumstances
in which environmental covenants can be co-
cluded, it was not possible to lay down general
criteria which the organizations must meet in order
to be considered representative. The representative-
ness of the contracting party, however, is of the
utmost importance if the covenant is to be effective.
It will therefore be up to the Flemish Government to
assess the representativeness of each individual
organization, taking into account the objectives of
the covenant, and to demand proof of that repre-
sentativeness if necessary17. Such covenants can
therefore be concluded with traditional trade fed-
erations, as well as with organizations specially set
up by enterprises not belonging to the same sector,
but confronted with a common environmental
problem18.
The requirement that the organization must be able
to demonstrate that it has been delegated by its
members to enter into an environmental covenant
with the Region and to bind each individual mem-
ber by it was included on the recommendation of
the Council of State. As Article 5 stipulates that the
covenant can be binding on the members of the
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organization or on a group of its members, defined
in general terms, this constituted a departure from
th  principle of the relative operation of the cove-
nant (Art. 1165 Civil Code). The Flemish Govern-
ment will have to make certain that the organiza-
tions with which it plans to enter into environmental
covenants have indeed been authorized by their
members to enter into obligations on their behalf
towards the Flemish Region in the form of such
covenants, which according to Article 5 of the de-
cree can be binding on the individual members of
the contracting organizations, even if they them-
selves are not to be considered as parties to the
covenant19.
Once the environmental covenant has been con-
cluded, other organizations of enterprises that meet
the conditions of Article 2 (legal personality, repre-
sentativeness, authorization) may accede to the
covenant. For this the consent of the Flemish Re-
gion is required (Art. 7).
b) Procedure
On the initiative of the Flemish Region, a summary
of the draft environmental covenant is published in
the Belgian Official Journal nd in any other me-
dium designated for this purpose by a decision of
the Flemish Government. This summary at least
describes the subject matter and the general purpose
of the environmental covenant. The full version of
the draft covenant is available for inspection for a
period of 30 days in the place designated in the
published version of the covenant (Art. 6, § 1).
Within 30 days after publication of the summary in
the Belgian Official Journal, any person may submit
his objections and observations in writing to the
competent departments of the Flemish Government,
designated for that purpose in the published sum-
mary. These departments examine the objections
and observations submitted and subsequently
transmit them to the other contracting party, namely
the organization (Art. 6, § 2). The draft environ-
mental covenant is communicated, at the latest at
the same time as the publication of the summary in
the Belgian Official Journal, to the Flemish Social
and Economic Council (SERV) and the Flemish
Council for the Environment and Nature (MiNa-
Raad), who then issue a well-reasoned opinion
within 30 days after receipt of the draft. This opin-
ion is not binding (Art. 6, § 3).
The draft is communicated to the President of the
Flemish Parliament together with the opinions of
the above-mentioned councils, at the latest 14 days
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after receipt of these opinions. If within 45 days
after receipt of the draft the Flemish Parliament
objects to the conclusion of the covenant by resolu-
tion or by a well-reasoned motion, the covenant will
not be concluded. This term is suspended during the
time that the Flemish Parliament is not in session
(Art. 6, § 4). Such parliamentary control was not
provided for in the proposal of the Interuniversity
Commission20.
If the draft environmental covenant is amended in
the light of the objections or opinions submitted, the
covenant may be concluded without this procedure
having to be repeated (Art. 6, § 5).
Environmental covenants are published in full in the
Belgian Official Journal following their signature
by the parties. If the covenant is concluded despite a
negative opinion of the SERV and/or MINA-Raad,
the Flemish Region must, in a report to be attached
to the published version of the covenant, justify its
decision to conclude the covenant (Art. 6, § 6).
Except as otherwise provided, environmental cove-
nants become effective ten days after publication in
the Belgian Official Journal (Art. 6, § 7).
Accession to an environmental covenant must pro-
ceed in accordance with the procedure determined
by a decision of the Flemish Government. Such
accession must be published in the Belgian Official
Journal (Art. 7).
3.4 Nature of the obligations and relation to the
regulations
As was said earlier, environmental covenants can-
not replace the existing legislation or regulations,
nor depart from them in a less strict sense (Art. 3).
The existing legislation is therefore the minimum
standard which the environmental covenant must
meet. For instance, an environmental covenant
cannot formulate less strict emission standards than
those formulated as a general rule in statutes, de-
crees or decisions. It also goes without saying that it
cannot depart in a less strict sense from the condi-
tions laid down in licences21.
The environmental covenant may incorporate obli-
gations for the Flemish Region. A number of obli-
gations are also contained in the Decree itself.
During the period of validity of the environmental
covenant, the Flemish Region cannot, in principle,
issue any regulations by means of an implementing
order which, in connection with subjects dealt with
by the covenant, impose more stringent requir-
ments than the latter (Art. 4, § 1, first paragraph).
This provision, which concerns only the Flemish
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Government and not the regional legislator, nor any
other authorities than the Flemish Region (Art. 4, §
2), is an application of the principles of good gov-
ernment and offers legal certainty to the enterprises
that are bound by the covenant22. The regional leg-
islat r did not adopt the proposal by the Flemish
Social and Economic Council to extend the gov-
nment’s obligation of abstention to not issuing
“regulations that conflict with the environmental
covenant”. This would indeed give rise to too many
problems of interpretation23 and legal uncertainty.
Article 4, § 1, first paragraph does not mean that the
Environment Minister, in his capacity as licensing
authority, cannot impose more stringent standards
in an individual licensing decision than those stipu-
lated in an environmental covenant24.
There are two exceptions to this obligatory absten-
tion of the Flemish Region. The Flemish Region
retains its power to issue regulations, either in cases
of urgency or in order to meet obligations imposed
by international or European law. Before making
use of this power, the Flemish Region must consult
with the other parties to the environmental covenant
(Art. 4, § 1, first paragraph). The term “urgency” is
not defined in the Decree on account of the multi-
plicity and diversity of the possible situations. In
particular when an emergency situation poses a
threat to man or the environment, the Flemish Gov-
ernment will be able to make use of this provision25.
If the Flemish Region issues more stringent regula-
tions without the said requirements having been
met, the other party may invoke exceptio non adim-
pleti contractus and may demand the dissolution of
the covenant by court order, with compensation26.
The Flemish Region is empowered to convert an
environmental covenant, either wholly or in part,
into regulations, even during the period of validity
of the covenant (Art. 4, § 1, second paragraph). This
power is intended to secure equal treatment of the
non-affiliated enterprises and the parties and their
members. Such regulations do not terminate the
covenant (Art. 11). Other sanctions, however, may
be imposed if the regulations are not observed than
when the provisions of the environmental covenant
are violated27.
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According to Article 5, first paragraph, environ-
mental covenants are binding on the parties, namely
the contracting organizations and the Flemish Re-
gion. The obligations that they have entered into on
a voluntary basis have statutory effect, in accor-
dance with Art. 1134 of the Civil Code28, from the
date of signature29. For acceding organizations,
environmental covenants become binding from the
date of publication of the accession in the Belgian
Official Journal (Art. 7).
Depending on what has been stipulated in the rele-
vant clauses, the covenant is also binding on all the
members of the organization or on a group of its
members defined in general terms (Art. 5, first
paragraph). The parties may modulate the binding
effect of the covenant for the individual members in
two respects. Firstly, the covenant will define which
obligations have to be met by the organization and
which by the affiliated members or by the members
and the organization. Secondly, it is also possible
that the obligations that the covenant imposes on
enterprises concerns only some of the enterprises
that are affiliated with the organization. In that case,
the covenant will specify which group of members
of the organization is bound by the covenant. This
group should be defined in abstract terms. Such a
general definition of the group is designed to pre-
vent one or several enterprises being exempted
individually from the binding effect of the cove-
nant30.
By amendment a second paragraph was added to
Article 5, stipulating that enterprises joining the
organization after the environmental covenant has
been concluded are bound ipso jure, and that me-
bers of an affiliated organization cannot evade their
obligations by leaving the organization31. Depend-
ing on what has been stipulated in the deed of ac-
cession, an environmental covenant is also binding
on all the members of the acceding organization or
on a group of its members defined in general terms
(Art. 7), as from the date of publication of the ac-
cession in the B lgian Official Journal32.
3.5 Duration, extension, amendment and termi-
nation
Article 8, § 1, stipulates that an environmental
covenant is concluded for a specified period that on
no account may exceed five years, and that an envi-
ronmental covenant cannot be extended tacitly. An
environmental covenant terminates either by com-
                                                          
28 Gedr.St., Flemish Council, 1992-1993, no. 401/1, 8.
29 G. VAN HOORICK and C. LAMBERT, l.c., 7.
30 Gedr.St., Flemish Council, 1992-1993, no. 401/1, 9.
31 Gedr.St., Flemish Council, 1992-1993, no. 401/1, 18.
32 G. VAN HOORICK and C. LAMBERT, l.c., 7.
m n agreement between the parties, or by the ex-
piry of the period, or by cancellation. The issuing of
regulations in accordance with Article 4 does not
have the effect of terminating the covenant (Art.
11).
The period of notice to be given is six months,
except as otherwise provided in the covenant. Any
period of notice exceeding one year is reduced ipso
jure to one year. Where the notice of termination is
not given by the Flemish Region, it must be given
by the other parties jointly. Notice of termination
must, on pain of nullity, be given either by regis-
tered letter or by writ. The period of notice begins
on the first day of the month following that in
which the notice is given (Art. 9).
Each year, the parties must report to the Flemish
Parliament on the implementation of the environ-
mental covenant. The formalities and conditions to
be observed in making these reports are laid down
by a decision of the Flemish Government (Art. 12, §
1). If within 45 days after receipt of the report r-
ferred to in § 1 the Flemish Parliament objects to
the environmental covenant by resolution or by a
well-reasoned motion, the Region will terminate the
covenant (Art. 12, § 2). This clause was inserted by
amendment33.
The Flemish Region and one or several of the affili-
ated organizations may agree to extend an environ-
mental covenant in unamended form. The Flemish
Government communicates the intention to extend
an environmental covenant, along with the rationale
for such an extension, to the SERV and MINA-
Raad at least three months before the period of
validity of the covenant expires. These advisory
bodies must submit an opinion within a time limit
of thirty days. This opinion has no binding effect. If
one of the aforementioned advisory bodies submits
a negative opinion on the extension of an environ-
mental covenant, the Region will justify its decision
nevertheless to extend the covenant in a report at-
tached to the publication of the extension. The
Flemish Government communicates the intended
extension, together with the opinions of the advi-
sory bodies, to the President of the Flemish Parlia-
ment at least two months before the period of valid-
ity of the covenant expires. If within 45 days after
receipt of this communication the Flemish Parlia-
ment objects to the extension of the covenant by
resolution or by a well-reasoned motion, the cove-
nant will not be extended. This term is suspended
during the time that the Flemish Parliament is not in
session. The extension of an environmental cov-
nant is published in the Belgian Official Journal,
                                                          
33 Gedr.St., Flemish Council, 1992-1993, no. 401/5, 23.
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where appropriate preceded by the aforementioned
report (Art. 8, § 2).
During its period of validity, the parties may agree
to amend an environmental covenant. In that case,
the provisions of Article 6 must be applied. The
amendments are published in the Belgian Official
Journal and are binding on all the parties who were
previously bound by the covenant (Art. 8, § 3)34.
3.6  Verification, sanctions and reporting
The proposal of the Interuniversity Commission did
not contain any provisions for the verification of the
observance of environmental covenants. An ar-
rangement to this effect was incorporated in the
draft decree on the recommendation of the SERV
and MINA-Raad35. Article 10, § 1, of the decree
stipulates that environmental covenants must lay
down procedures for verification of compliance
with the covenant’s regulations.
In the proposal of the Interuniversity Commission it
was the intention to rule out the dissolution of envi-
ronmental covenants by court order or by an ex-
press resolutive clause, due to the uncertainty as to
whether the government has regained full liberty to
issue regulations; this uncertainty continues until
the court has passed judgment36. The preliminary
draft of the Flemish Government provided for the
possibility for the parties to submit disputes to arbi-
tration37. The Council of State considered in its
opinion that such deviations from common law in
this matter could not be deemed necessary and that
they therefore exceed the authority of the Flemish
Region38. That is why Article 10, § 2, which stipu-
lates that, in the event that the regulations of an
environmental covenant are violated, any party
bound by the covenant can demand the compulsory
performance of the covenant in kind or equivalent
from the offending party, should be interpreted in
such a way that it does not exclude the other com-
mon law sanctions39.
Each year, the parties must report to the Flemish
Parliament on the implementation of the environ-
mental covenant (Art. 12).
3.7 Initial experiences
In the first years after the Decree became effective,
no environmental covenants have been concluded in
accordance with the Decree. The initial enthusiasm
that industry had displayed for the voluntary ap-
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35 Gedr.St., Flemish Council, 1992-1993, no. 401/1, 15.
36 Gedr.St., Flemish Council, 1992-1993, no. 401/1, 15-16.
37 Gedr.St., Flemish Council, 1992-93, no. 401/1, 22.
38 Gedr.St., Flemish Council, 1992-93, no. 401/1, 52-55.
39 G. VAN HOORICK and C. LAMBERT, l.c., 9.
proach quickly abated as soon as it turned out that
they were expected to enter into legally binding and
enforceable agreements. The fairly complicated
procedure and the observation that few business
federations were empowered under their by-laws to
negotiate covenants on behalf of their members had
an inhibiting effect. A change seems to have taken
place very recently in the context of the waste man-
agement policy. Since then, several environmental
covenants have been concluded in accordance with
the Decree, and several are currently being negoti-
ated. These are the main ones:
· Environmental Covenant for the Selective
Collection of Old and Expired Medicines
(Flemish Region and organizations of Pharma-
cists and the Pharmaceutical Industry), Belgian
Official Journal, 24 April 1998;
· Environmental Covenant for Paper I, B lgian
Official Journal, 24 April 1998;
· Environmental Covenant for Paper II (Flemish
Region and a number of sectors involved), Bel-
gian Official Journal, 10 February 1999, err.
Belgian Official Journal, 3 April 1999;
· Environmental Covenant for End-of-Life Vehi-
cles (Flemish Region and the motor industry),
Belgian Official Journal, 19 May 1999 and
Belgian Official Journal, 19 May 1999.
A number of draft environmental covenants are
under consideration:
· Environmental Covenant for Used Tyres;
· Environmental Covenant for Fertilizer Man-
agement.
4 Legal Framework at the Federal Level
4.1 Introduction
Environmental covenants were recently introduced
as policy instruments in federal law, more particu-
larly by the Act of 21 December 1998 concerning
product standards for the promotion of sustainable
production and consumption patterns and for the
protection of the environment and public health40,
in short, the Product Standards Act.
The Product Standards Act is aimed at promoting
sustainable consumption and production patterns
and protecting the environment and public health.
The objective of the Act is threefold: (a) to establish
a legal basis for an integrated, sustainable product
policy to protect the environment and public health;
                                                          
40 Belgian Official Journal, 11 February 1999; for a first discussion of this
Act, see: K. DEBEUCKELAERE, “De wet op de productnormen”, T.M.R.,
1999, 170-182; K. DE COCK, De kaderwet van 21 december 1998 inzake
ecologische productnormering (W.E.P.) geanalyseerd vanuit de inval-
shoek van de verpakkingen, Dissertation, GAS Company Lawyer, UG,
Academic Year 1998-99, 82 p.
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(b) to establish a legal basis for the implementation
of the European directives relating to substances
and preparations, products, biocides and packaging;
(c) to integrate the policy on dangerous substances
and preparations and biocides in a sustainable prod-
uct policy aimed at promoting sustainable produc-
tion and consumption patterns.
The Act contains, besides a number of general obli-
gations with direct effect that are incumbent on
manufacturers with regard to products and packag-
ing, an impressive series of powers that are dele-
gated to the King in order to realize the objectives
of the Act by regulation.
The objectives of the Act, however, can also be
realized through sectoral covenants (Art. 6). The
status of these covenants shows many similarities,
but also a few differences, with the environmental
covenants as regulated by the Decree of the Flemish
Region of 15 June 1994.
4.2 Sectoral covenants
According to the Act, a sectoral covenant is an
agreement:
· concerning the marketing of a product or prod-
uct group;
· concluded between the State and enterprises or
organizations of enterprises involved in the
marketing of the same product or product
group;
· with a view to realizing the objectives of the
Act, in particular its Article 4.
Organizations that wish to conclude a sectoral
covenant must meet a number of conditions:
· they must have legal personality;
· they must represent enterprises belonging to the
same sector and involved in the marketing of
the same product or product group;
· they must be empowered under their by-laws to
conclude such a covenant, or they must have
been authorized to do so by at least three quar-
ters of their members (Art. 6, § 1).
The enterprises and organizations in question may,
with the consent of the State, also accede to an
existing sectoral covenant (Art. 6, § 2).
Sectoral covenants cannot replace the existing leg-
islation or regulations, nor depart from them in a
less strict sense. During the period of validity of a
sectoral covenant, the King will not issue any regu-
lations under the Product Standards Act which lay
down more stringent requirements than those
stipulated in the covenant with respect to the prod-
ucts and matters dealt with in the sectoral covenant,
unless this should be necessary in order to meet
international obligations (Art. 6, § 3).
A sectoral covenant is legally binding on the parties
from the moment it has been signed by all the par-
ties involved. Depending on what has been stipu-
lated in the sectoral covenant, it is also binding on
all the members of the organization or on a group of
its members defined in general terms. Enterprises
joining the organization after the sectoral covenant
has been concluded and, if the case arises, belong-
ing to a group of its members defined in general
terms in the sectoral covenant are bound ipso jure.
Members of the affiliated organization cannot evade
their obligations by leaving the organization (Art. 6,
§ 4, 1°).
Sectoral covenants are concluded for a specified
period not exceeding 10 years. They cannot be
extended tacitly. The State and one or several of the
affiliated organizations may agree to extend a secto-
ral covenant in unamended form (Art. 6, § 4, 2°).
A sectoral covenant can be terminated by the expiry
of the period for which it was concluded, by can-
cellation by one of the parties, subject to – in prin-
ciple – six months’ notice, or by agreement between
the parties (Art. 6 § 4, 3°).
All the above-mentioned provisions are public law
and apply to all sectoral covenants concluded after
th  effective date of the Act, i.e. 21 February 1999.
Sectoral covenants concluded before that date can
only be amended or extended in accordance with
the provisions of the Act. They remain valid for a
maximum period of five years after the effective
date of the Act (Art. 6, § 5).
4.3 Procedure
The Act also lays down the procedure to be fol-
lowed when concluding sectoral covenants. First a
summary of the draft sectoral covenant has to be
published in the B lgian Official Journal as well as
in any other media to be designated in an imple-
menting order. The full text of the covenant must be
available for inspection for 30 days. The full ver-
sion must also be communicated to the Federal
Council for Sustainable Development, the Health
High Council, the Consumer Affairs Council, the
Central Council of Industry, and the regional gov-
ernments. These councils and governments, and
anyone else who so wishes, can submit objections
and observations to the federal government. The
Minister examines these objections and observa-
tions and passes them on for information to the
organizations or enterprises concerned (Art. 6 § 7).
Once the sectoral covenant has been concluded, the
full version of the covenant and also any subsequent
amendment, extension, cancellation or accession
must be published in the Belgian Official Journal.
Any early termination of the sectoral covenant by
common consent must be published as well (Art. 6,
§ 6).
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4.4 Initial experiences
There has been no experience yet with this new
environmental policy instrument at the federal level.
5 Conclusion
Belgium now has a legal framework for the conclu-
sion of environmental covenants at both the federal
level and at the level of the Flemish Region, which
means that any criticisms that had been levelled
against this instrument in the past (lack of consulta-
tion, vagueness regarding the parties bound by the
covenant, inadequate reporting and enforcement)
should now be removed. The federal legal frame-
work is clearly inspired by the Flemish model,
without having adopted some of its shortcomings.
For example, at the federal level an authorization
given by a three-quarters majority of the members
suffices to allow a representative organization to
conclude a sectoral covenant which binds its mem-
bers, whereas at the Flemish level such an authori-
zation has to be given by all the members, which in
practice can be a problem. At the federal level, the
procedure has been kept somewhat simpler, and the
Parliament did not demand a thoroughgoing verifi-
cation of the use of this instrument. Furthermore,
the initial period of validity of the covenant can be
longer.
Seeing that environmental covenants do indeed
entail legally binding arrangements, industry’s
nthusiasm for entering into such covenants has
so ewhat abated. Nevertheless, interest seems to
have picked up again recently. It is still too early to
evaluate the individual covenants on their practical
merits. The same applies for the legal framework as
such.
Introduction
In June 1999 the Covenant Benchmarking energy-
efficiency was signed by the Minister of Housing,
Spatial Planning and Environment, the Minister of
Economic Affairs and the provinces on the one side
and the organization of energy-intensive industries
such as electricity companies and refineries, on the
other side. A draft of the Covenant was sent to
Parliament which had no objections to signing by
the Ministers. The Benchmarking Covenant was
drawn up as a consequence of the Policy Paper on
Environment and Economy and of the obligations
resulting from the Kyoto Conference (December
1997) to reduce CO2 emissions.
In this paper I shall describe this Covenant and
compare it to previous covenants; then its legal
nature will be analysed and again be compared to
the legal nature of previous covenants and the
concordance of this covenant and others with public
law will be explored. Lastly, I shall consider
whether covenants are integrated into the Dutch
legal system.
Contents of the Covenant Benchmarking
The overall goal of the covenant is that as many
energy-intensive process-installations as possible
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will belong to the „best of the world“ in the area of
energy efficiency, as fast as possible but at the latest
in 2012; this way the companies will contribute to
the Dutch CO2 reduction aims. Benchmarking in
this case means a comparison of industries to the
“best of the world” in the area of efficient use of
energy as it is expected to be in the year 2012; the
80 participating companies have agreed to reach
that target by 2012 at the latest.
Parties to the Covenant are the two Ministers for
Economic Affairs and the Environment (VROM),
the IPO - the organisation of the 12 provinces -,
VNO-NCW - the general employers’ organisation
and branch organisations (chemicals, steel, non-
ferrous, petroleum, paper and electricity).
Individual companies adhere to the Covenant by
means of a Declaration of Participation either at the
time of the signing of the Covenant or at a later
date. If they do so, they will be called Companies.
All installations of a company using at least 0,5 PJ
per year (comparable to 15 million cubic metres of
natural gas) can participate. The Covenant will last
until 2012; evaluation will take place by April 2004
at the latest.
Two methods are described to measure what the
“best of the world” consists of for a specific
company. Companies commit themselves to find
out what their distance to the „best of the world“ is;
the results have to be verified by an independent
committee.
The Integration of Covenants in the Dutch Legal System
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The obligations of the Companies are specified in
detail; two obligations are defined as ‘result-
obligations’: 1) a company will draw up an energy-
efficiency plan within one and a half year after the
date of commencement of the Covenant and 2) in
this plan a company determines when it shall reach
the „best of the world“, together with interim
targets. A company may choose its own methods
whereby it intends to achieve the results set forth in
the plan. The plan is accessible to the public with
the exception of confidential information.
The general employers' organisation and the branch
organisations shall stimulate their members to
participate, and shall take part in the activities of the
Benchmarking Commission - this Commission
consists of representatives of the two departments,
the provinces and the branch organisations. Its main
task is coordinating the realisation of the Covenant.
The obligations of the central government are
spelled out also: the Ministers, binding the State,
will see to it that no additional specific measures as
to further energy saving or CO2 eduction shall be
taken with regard to Companies; in this covenant
this means that no specific energy tax will be
levied, no obligatory CO2 emission-ceiling will be
set, no additional energy efficiency- or CO2 ta gets
will be established and no additional energy savings
will be demanded.
The term ‘see to it’ (in Dutch ‘bevorderen’) refers
to the Guidelines for covenants; in this case it
means that the Ministers will not propose legislation
in these matters. It is stipulated however that
general energy taxes may be levied; if that will be
the case, the government shall consider the
consequences for the Companies. Furthermore, the
ministers shall attempt to realise that European or
national measures will not interfere with this
Covenant. Where possible they will support its
contents.
Parties to the Covenant shall enter into consultation
with each other when the following changes of
circumstances occur: a) decrease in the number of
Companies in such a way that continuation of the
Covenant cannot be demanded, b) essential changes
in policy in the area of energy, the environment and
technology, c) legal changes, especially in regard to
environmental taxes, and d) changes in economic
growth, international competitive position and in
company results, and as a catchall: e) unforeseen
circumstances.
A company may terminate the Covenant if it does
not want to formulate a first energy-efficiency plan,
if such a plan is not approved by the competent
authority or if a license is given that conflicts with
an approved energy-efficiency plan.
The Covenant contains sanctions for a company that
does not fulfil its obligations - in that case the
competent authority, usually a provincial authority,
shall unilaterally revise the license for the
company's installation (i.e. add stricter rules) or use
other instruments. First though, consultation is
called for and a reasonable period of time should be
given wherein a company may yet fulfil its
obligations.
The Covenant is a civil law-contract and the
obligations mentioned in it are ‘effort-obligations’,
unless they are explicitly called ‘result-obligations’;
the Covenant does not infringe upon the rights and
obligations from the Environmental Management
Act.
The legal nature of the Benchmarking
Covenant
According to Article 25 of the Covenant this
covenant is a contract by private law. The
obligations therein are obligations whereby parties
will try to reach a certain target (‘inspannings-
verplichtingen’) unless the obligations are explicitly
called obligations whereby parties commit
themselves to reach a target (‘resultaats-
verplichtingen’).
What does it mean that the Covenant is a contract
by private law? Generally a contract binds parties to
fulfil their obligations (payment of a certain sum
versus delivery of a certain item, for example).
Private law has provisions in case a party does not
fulfil its obligation: compliance can be demanded
and if a party will not or cannot comply, it has to
pay damages; sometimes a sanction is part of the
contract: for example a party has to pay a fine if it
fails to deliver.
In the case of covenants, despite their being called
contracts by private law, enforcement of the
covenant is different: the competent authority will
issue a stricter license if a company fails to comply
while a company can only claim damages if the
government fails to comply. This has not happened
yet and it is not likely to occur either given the
necessity to consult.
Thus, because the sanction the government can
impose is only found in the sphere of public law -
no normal contracting party has the authority to
issue licenses - a covenant is not an ordinary
contract but has a public law-aspect. Dutch doctrine
calls such contracts competence contracts or policy
contracts.
It is doubtful however whether this clarifies the
legal nature of covenants and the way they can be
enforced. As no party to any covenant has ever
gone to court to enforce compliance, it cannot be
said with any certainty what the legal nature of a
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covenant is according to the courts - for example, is
the civil or the administrative judge the competent
court1, can a company or a branch organisation
successfully sue for damages if a law is enacted
contrary to the content of a covenant? What if such
an act is not proposed by the government but by
parliament? What if after the next election the
Green party gets a majority?2
As said, not only has no party to a covenant ever
gone to court to enforce compliance, also (as far as I
know) only once has a government authority taken
steps to enforce compliance: when producers and
importers of batteries failed to meet their
obligations arising out of the Batteries Covenant
signed in 1989, (then) minister Alders threatened to
propose legislation whereupon the branch
organisation exhorted its members to comply with
the covenant. The packaging industries, parties to
the Packaging Covenant, for example have not
reached the targets agreed upon but this has not led
to a conflict to be solved by the Arbitration
Commission as foreseen in the covenant. Of course,
the contracting parties never intended to do so;
given the Dutch culture of consultation and
cooperation (the ‘polder model’), any conflict
arising out of a covenant will be solved before it has
grown to such proportions that only a judge or an
arbiter can settle it.
Enforcing a covenant
It is often said that a ‘real’ contract can be enforced
and other agreements like gentlemen's agreements,
declarations of intent etc. cannot and are not meant
to be enforced. So the possibility of enforcement
distinguishes a contract from other agreements. As
stated, no party to any covenant has yet tried to
enforce it. I will nevertheless try to consider the
possibility of it.
Firstly, a covenant has to be clear about the
obligations agreed upon; this may seem evident, yet
many covenants, especially those drawn up in the
1980's, contain rather vaguely worded obligations
to make a (serious) effort or an obligation for a
whole branch of companies to reach a certain target
in a certain year, without interim results or interim
evaluations. The Beverages Packaging Covenant of
1985 for instance, mentions that parties shall try to
keep the total volume of packaging waste under
control and not to surpass the total of 1984 as to
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2 Given the Dutch political system and the election system, this is very
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weight and - if possible - as to volume; the Code of
Conduct (an addendum to the covenant) says that
parties will try to expand and improve systems of
re ycling of packaging.
Secondly, it has to be clear which party is bound by
the agreement. It is from an enforcement point of
view fruitless to oblige the whole packaging
industry to reduce waste. If one company does not
comply, can the branch organisation be held
responsible?
Thirdly, a covenant must be valid. This means,
according to the Civil Code (article 3:40 BW), that
the content or purpose of a contract may not be
contrary to morality, public order or the law. A
covenant in which the government agrees on actions
contra legem is therefore void: if for example an
authority agrees not to use its powers of
enforcement permanently, such a contract is void
because it conflicts with the public order; if
however an authority reserves its enforcing powers
in case the other side does not comply with its
obligations, then the covenant is valid provided that
legal guarantees (for third parties for instance) are
observed.
It is hardly possible to describe in general how
covenants can be enforced, because no covenant is
the same and, while in the last decade most
covenants have an article describing it as a contract
by private law, the obligations the parties agree to,
are not similar nor always clear.
The Benchmarking Covenant and the
Environmental Management Act
As said before, the Benchmarking Covenant does
not infringe upon the rights and obligations
resulting from the Environmental Management Act
(EMA); this Act knows a licensing system. In the
case a regulatory system already exists, a covenant
is only permissible if it is used to implement or to
support the law without conflicting with it. The
Benchmarking Covenant obliges the Companies to
set up an energy-efficiency plan, which does not
replace a license. The plan may only be approved if
the demands of the EMA are met. The licensing
authority (for large-scale industries it is the
provincial authority, for smaller industries the
municipality) keeps its powers to hold the energy-
intensive industries to their obligations stemming
from their licenses. The obligation which the
Ministers have agreed upon - not to levy a specific
energy tax - does not conflict with the EMA
because it does not provide for such a tax. Another
law (The Taxes on Environmental Basis Act)
regulates general energy taxes but not a specific,
company-based tax. Also, the EMA does not
automatically call for inclusion of energy levels in
the license; it does demand though that the
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authority, when issuing an environmental license,
takes into consideration the effect of energy
consumption on the environment and, if necessary,
adds norms regarding the use of energy to the
license which are needed for the protection of the
environment. In a case where a municipality had
omitted to add such energy-saving norms to a
license for a greenhouse because the Multi-years
Agreement between the central government and the
greenhouse branch included an energy-saving
target, the administrative court quashed the decision
because the energy-saving target of the Multi-years
Agreement was meant to be concretized for
individual enterprises via norms added to the
license, if possible and effective.3 I  does not seem
likely that the court will reach the same judgment in
regard to the Benchmarking Covenant because now
individual companies have signed the covenant; if
their energy saving plan is approved, then the need
to concretize norms on energy reduction in their
environmental licenses does no longer exist - this
need will revive if an energy reduction-plan is not
approved or if a company fails to realize the plan.
That is also the reason the provincial authorities,
being empowered to issue and revise licenses, have
signed the Covenant too.
The relation between the agreements made in a
covenant and the norms to be added to
environmental licenses used to be complicated,
because in the agreement a branch organisation
committed itself to realize, for example a certain
reduction of emission while a single company was
able to reach a better result. The Hydrocarbons
Reduction Plan 2000 (KWS 2000) of 1986 was
drawn up by the central government together with a
few organisations of companies emitting
hydrocarbons; in the year 2000 a general reduction
of 50 % compared to 1981 should be accomplished
while this percentage varied per branch. In one case
the municipal government had obliged a chemicals
factory to reduce its hydrocarbons emission with
90 % while the agreed upon reduction percentage
for the branche was 75 %. The administrative
judge4 decided that the higher reduction norm was
legally acceptable because KWS 2000 formulated a
general aim, whereas the licensing authority has its
own responsibility - the municipality can, in case a
company is able to reach a higher target and the
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stricter norm is necessary for the protection of the
environment, add such a norm to the license.
One drawback to the covenant is that third parties,
like various environmental NGO's, have not
participated in its realization. In other cases they
had a say in the drawing up of a covenant and in
some cases a representative is member of the
arbitration committee set up to settle conflicts. In
the case of the Benchmarking Covenant third
parties have not only not taken part, information
about a company's distance to the „best of the
world“ is not made public in so far as that
information contains confidential data. Actually, the
Environment Act has a similar clause about
withholding information regarding company secrets
and safety data from the public; that means that
third parties are not worse off due to this Covenant.
The B nchmarking Covenant in comparison to
previous covenants
In the 1980's it became gradually clear that public
law-instruments to improve the environment were
hardly effective. At the same time it became clear
that the old-fashioned vertical way of governing
was being replaced by a more horizontal way of
governing: self-regulation, interdependence, two-
sided relations, reciprocity became the catchwords
of the late 1980's and 1990's. This was reflected in
the increasing use of covenants, not only in the area
of the environment. At first, covenants were thought
to be useful while awaiting pending regulation.
Later, covenants were considered a necessary and
substantial element of the so-called target group-
policy of the Department of the Environment; target
groups themselves must realize the need for change
and look for ways to integrate environmental goals
in their normal work (this was called
‘internalization’). These covenants were often
called ‘declarations of intent’; parties to it were one
or more government authorities and a branch
organisation which promised to stimulate its
members to effectuate a certain emission or waste
reduction. To that end, implementation plans for the
branch were set up which then were taken over by
individual companies in their company
environmental plans.
In 1991 the First Packaging Covenant was drawn
up. It was the first covenant which declared itself to
be a contract by private law and which explicitly
spelled out the obligations the Minister of the
Environment had to fulfill. Since that time most
covenants contain such clauses. To improve the
quality of covenants, ‘Guidelines for the use of
covenants’ were published by the Prime Minister in
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1995 (see below).5 These Guidelines are not
binding; they were drawn up by a interdepartmental
working group and have the same format as the
(more detailed) ‘Guidelines for legislation’. Recent
covenants have followed these guidelines for the
most part.
The Benchmarking Covenant may be the first of a
new generation: for the first time individual
companies instead of a branch organisation are
named and considered to be party to the Covenant.
They are held responsible for reaching their targets
as laid down in their energy-efficiency plans. This
means that enforcement of the obligations to which
a company has committed itself, is possible,
whereas to date this seemed to be doubtful. Whether
enforcement will indeed take place remains to be
seen.
The Guidelines for covenants
The Guidelines apply to covenants to which the
central government is a party. A decision to draw
up a covenant is only taken after considering
whether government activities are necessary and, if
so, whether other instruments are to be preferred.
Furthermore, when the choice is between a
covenant or regulation, regulation has preference. If
it is to be expected that a covenant is more
effective, then a covenant can be used a) in
anticipation of regulation b) when regulation will
soon be superfluous c) to explore the possible
format of regulation or d) in support of regulation.
In principle covenants may not be used to
implement EC decisions.
It should be clear who the parties to the covenant
are and what the rights and obligations of the
signatory parties are. If parties do not intend to
create enforceable obligations then this should be
mentioned. If they do intend to, then the covenant
should stipulate how conflicts will be settled (by a
judge, an arbiter, a settlement committee or in other
ways).
Other guidelines deal with duration, evaluation,
termination, involvement of the cabinet and
parliament, and accessibility of information to the
public.
Are covenants integrated in the Dutch legal
system?
Covenants are, in my opinion, quite normal
contracts, certainly the covenants concluded since
publication of the Guidelines. They are designated
as contracts under private law, they are binding and
                                                          
5 Aanwijzingen voor convenanten van de Minister-President, Circular of
December 18, 1995, Stcrt. 249.
as regards the ‘result obligations’ in them they can
be enforced. As there always is a public-law
elem nt in them - the government agrees not to
nac  a law in a certain policy area or to use its
powers in a certain way, for example - Dutch
doctrine calls them
‘bevoegdhedenovereenkomsten’, contracts about
using government powers. They all have two
characteristics in common:
a) the object of the contract is, on the part of the
contracting government authority, the way a
public-law competence shall (not) be used;
b) party to the contract, on the government side, is
an administrative authority (or more than one)
binding the legal person it belongs to, while the
other party is either a private party or another
administrative authority.
Norms to be applied to such contracts are the norms
in the Dutch Civil Code (Books 3 and 6 BW) and
unwritten general contract law; they can be summed
up in Roman law terminology:
I. Pacta sunt servanda - contracts should be
complied with.
II. The exceptio non adimpleti contractus ule - if
one party fails to carry out its obligations then
the other party does not have to comply either.
III. The bona fides rule - contracts should be
concluded, interpreted and carried out in good
faith.
The administration, binding the state, a province or
a municipality, may contract about buying desks,
hiring personnel or the sale of land. The same goes,
within limits, for using its competences to issue a
license, to enact a law etc. Those limits6 are:
a) there must be freedom to decide for the
government authority (‘freies Ermessen’ as the
Germans call it); Dutch law has only a few rules
w eby the government is not given more or
less discretionary power.
b) a competence someone has on the basis of
private law, may not be used or executed in
conflict with written or unwritten public law
(article 3:14 BW) .
c) the so-called ‘two ways’-doctrine may pose an
obstacle for using private law. The ‘two ways’-
doctrine can be summarized as follows: if a
procedure by public law exists with safeguards
for the interest of citizens or other private parties
in which the government can reach the same
                                                          
6 European law has its own limits: a covenant may normally not be used to
implement an EC Directive, unless the Directive mentions the possibility.
A covenant may conflict with the EC competition rules and with the
prohibition of barriers to import or export.
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result as when it were to use private law, then
the private way is - in principle - closed. This is
different only if not using the private way would
have unacceptable social consequences or if
according to the intentions of the legislator the
public way was not meant to be exclusive. The
‘two-ways’ doctrine was spelled out and
clarified in a number of judgments by the Dutch
Supreme Court7 in the early 90’s and is part of
the Dutch legal system by now.
The conclusion is evident: covenants have been
integrated in the Dutch legal system - a modern
covenant is a kind of contract under private law and
private-law norms apply to it. The only
distinguishing aspect is that the party on the side of
the government is not in all cases free to conclude a
covenant.
It has been suggested that either the Civil Code or
the General Administrative Law should have a
paragraph about covenants, especially in regard to
safeguards for interested third parties.8 Other
                                                          
7 HR January 26, 1990, NJ 1991, 393 (Windmill): the State as owner of a
river wanted payment for the discharge of waste in it; the Law on Pollution
of Water however regulates such discharges by way of a tax ordinance
and contains procedural guarantees as to the basis and the tariff of the tax
- therefore it was deemed that by using private law the State thwarted the
public law in an unacceptable way. HR July 9, 1990, NJ 1991, 394
(Helmond/De Pina) confirms the Windmill judgment: a city as owner of the
land used its power to remove a gypsy's caravan whereas the Law on
Housetrailers (Woonwagenwet) has several safeguards in regard to such
removals.
In HR July 8, 1991, NJ 1991, 691 (Lelystad) the Supreme Court gave the
government more leeway in using private law when the same result can
be reached via public law. The city of Lelystad had leased land with a
provision that the city government has to approve the establishment of
commercial activities on that land, while the city could realize the same
goal, i.e. a sensible and fair distribution of stores in the area, by means of
a local zoning plan. This time the court accepted the city's use of civil law
because the Planning Act did not forbid such use while it had been
recently revised and because it was a widespread and age-old practice
the termination of which was a task of Parliament.
8 In fact, Title 4.4 of the General Administrative Law has been reserved for
rules regarding contracts with the government. However, no legislative
proposals are foreseen in the near future.
authors propose to include a section about
environmental covenants in the EMA: that would
guarantee a say for third parties in the drafting of a
c venant, it would make sure that its content is
publicly available, and it might solve the free-rider
problem by the introduction of the possibility for
the Minister of the Environment to make the
covenant binding for all relevant companies.
Strict legalists (the ‘Maastricht school’9) criticize
the absence of a basis in public law to conclude
cov ants. They assert that government and society
are legally two separate worlds with their own legal
regime. The government must pursue the general
i terest with the instruments given by
(dem cratically established) public law; relations
between the government and the citizens are
therefore always relations governed by public law,
even if they have the shape of a civil-law relation.
Furthermore, the government can never negotiate
about its public-law powers because the public law
does not have a basis for doing so. Actually, the
whole idea of reciprocity horrifies these writers.
Since the publication of the Guidelines for
covenants however, these views are heard less
often. The general attitude is that in a more or less
informal way better results can be achieved than via
a formalized procedure. The majority of
administrative lawyers decline the fundamental
Maastricht views. The so-called ‘mixed-law
doctrine’ (gemengde rechtsleer) is the commonly
held theory regarding actions of government on the
basis of civil law: government may, within
aforemntioned limits, use civil law to reach its
goals, but every legal relation to which the
government is a party, is partly influenced by the
duty to pursue the general interest and therefore by
(principles of) public law.
                                                          
9 This school of thought is led by professor A.Q.C. Tak.
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1 Introduction
At Italian level the public administration system is
decentralising its functions applying the principles
of "subsidiarity", flexibility and administrative
simplification. This decentralisation activity is
also resulting in a series of voluntary agreements,
signed both at the national and at the local level.
The purpose of this research is to analyse the
existing Italian regulation regarding the so-called
"administration by agreements" and the possibil-
ity to adapt the existing legal system to voluntary
agreements in the environmental field in the light
of the European guidelines on this issue.
The first part of the paper presents a comparison
of the relevant laws, and the second part is aimed
at highlighting the results of an empirical study of
some selected voluntary agreements signed by the
Italian local administration with the private sector.
2 Voluntary agreements in the European
Community legislation
The concept of voluntary agreements (hereinafter
VAs) was explicitly introduced at European level
with the Fifth Environmental Action Programme
in an attempt to encourage the use of economic
and voluntary instruments to complement tradi-
tional „command & control“ legislation. The
legitimisation and formalisation of these agre-
ments is still on-going within European institu-
tions. This process is based largely on four fu-
damental documents:
· the Communication of the European Com-
mission of 27 November 1996 (COM(96)
561 final);
· the Recommendation  of the European Com-
mission of 21 December 1996 (O.J.E.C. No.
L. 333/59);
· the Opinion of the Economic and Social
Committee of 19-20 May 1997;
· the Resolution of the European Council of
19-20 October 1997.
The Communication defines voluntary agree-
ments as „agreements between industry and pub-
lic authorities on the achievement of environ-
mental objectives“. This definition is employed
for the purposes of this paper. The Communica-
                                                          
* Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano, Italy
tion also introduces the term „environmental
agreements“, these being more appropriate1 and
having a stronger relation to environmental pol-
icy. In addition to a general definition of VAs, the
Communication describes the different types of
agreements to be introduced in the European
context (i.e. those implementing certain provi-
sions of Community Directives and those negoti-
ated at Community level). Furthermore, a check-
ist covering the main contents of VAs is given in
point 5 of the Communication. These elements
re as follows:
1. Parties of the agreement (associations
and/or individual firms)
2. Subject
3. Definition of terms
4. Quantified objectives
5. Staged approach
6. Specification of obligations
7. Monitoring of results
8. Periodic reporting
9. Access to information
10. Arrangements for collection/
evaluation/verification of results
11. Sanctions




16. Legal nature of the agreement
17. Jurisdiction
The Recommendation basically confirms the
content of the Communication, but in particular
stresses the importance for VAs to use the binding
form of a contract.
The Opinion of the Economic and Social Com-
mittee reaffirms the principle of „shared responsi-
bility“ between the parties of an agreement and
draws attention to the need for benefits and in-
centives to all parties of the VA, in order to dis-
courage „free riders“. Moreover, this document
stresses the importance of defining a legal frame-
work for environmental voluntary agreements.
Finally, the Resolution of the Council acknowl-
edges that most Member States are adopting VAs
                                                          
1 The Commission employs a series of terms, such as „Voluntary
agreement“, „Negotiated agreeement“ and „Environmental agreement“.
In Italy the term „Voluntary agreement“ has prevailed despite its ambi-
guity since this implies the willingness of parties.
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in the environmental field as internal policy tools
and highlights the conditions for ensuring trans-
parency and credibility vis-à-vis citizens, as well
as effectiveness. These conditions include speci-
fying quantified and staged objectives, monitoring
of results and publishing the agreement together
with any results achieved.
Based on the above it can be concluded that al-
though at Community level there is no univocal
and binding legislation in relation to VAs, there is
a strong interest in promoting these instruments in
environmental policy. Therefore, we would hope
for the Commission to issue a binding framework
of VAs, in order to enhance their credibility and
transparency.
3 Evolution of the Institutional and Legal
Framework in Italy2
No specific framework exists in Italy concerning
internal VAs. However, there is a general trend in
environmental policy towards shared responsibil-
ity, decentralisation and flexibility.
Clear evidence of this trend can be highlighted in
terms of the recent evolution of environmental
policy and regulation, which has developed in
Italy in three distinct phases, as illustrated by
Lewanski (1997), from the Seventies to the early
Nineties. The first phase began with law 615 of
13/7 1966, the «Anti-smog» law in which steps
were taken to limit emissions, mainly in response
to apparent harm to human health. The second
phase known as „completing the tools“ occurred
between 1976-85. This phase is said to have be-
gun with the Legge Merli for wastewater control
in 1976 and to have finished prior to the estab-
lishment of the Ministry of Environment. Fol-
lowing this, a series of environmental statutes
were introduced during the early eighties con-
cerning air and water pollution, industrial and
urban waste and nuclear energy. Environmental
monitoring and protection became the responsi-
bility of local health units (USLs), whose inter-
pretation of the environment was biased in terms
of a prevailing accent on health and sanitation
issues. This phase was characterised by growing
environmental awareness, not least because of the
Seveso disaster in 1976. At the same time the
growing number of non governmental environ-
mental associations resulted in an increase in
tension between industry and the public. The
available policy instruments during this phase
were mainly of the "command & control" type,
                                                          
2 This section has been partially taken from the work prepared for the
NEAPOL project case studies (Wallace-Jones, J. and Vicini, G. (1999),
Draft case studies) to be published in the near future.
and the proposed solutions for pollution control
were almost exclusively end-of-pipe (Pesaro,
1999).
The third phase began with the establishment of
the Ministry of Environment in 1986. This Min-
istry emanated a variety of regulations regarding
waste disposal, the establishment of national
parks, the handling and disposal of dangerous
substances and controls regarding noise pollution
(Lewanski 1997). Politicians, and thus central
government, were placed under pressure due to
the growing increase in domestic concern over
environmental issues and, more importantly, the
need to implement European Directives. National
environmental policy therefore became known as
the «politics of emergency» resulting in a frame-
work that was generally fragmented and incom-
plete.
A new phase can be said to have started in the
mid-Nineties when the institutional capacity was
upgraded through a strengthening of the Ministry
itself in terms of power and financial resources,
but also thanks to the creation of new technical
agencies - such as ANPA, the Italian National
Environment Agency. Following the creation of
ANPA in 1994, each region in Italy was required
to set up its own branch (ARPA), replacing the
l cal health units (USL) in dealing with environ-
mental issues. This process is still on-going,
th reby causing confusion in the attribution of
e vironmental competencies. Moreover, in cur-
r nt phase the Italian legislation is subject to an
increased flexibility in the form of reduced reg-
latory burdens and simplified administrative pro-
cedures for industry, allowing improved co-
operation between public administration and
companies. This process has been enhanced by
the so-called «Bassanini» reform, initiated in
1997, which so far includes three regulations : law
59/1997, Law 127/97, legislative decree
112/1998. These aim to promote a re-organisation
of the public system at both national and local
levels. In fact, according to article 1 of law
59/1997, the Government will issue decrees to
transfer functions and administrative tasks to the
Regions and the local public authorities according
to principles and criteria contained by the law
itself. One aspect of the Bassanini reform is that it
integrates the principle of shared responsibility
among public administration, industry and citi-
z ns, promoted by the European Fifth Action
Programme. In fact, a stronger co-operation
amongst parties calls implicitly for a broader use
of voluntary regulations. The use of voluntary
approaches is seen in many areas, such as the
Ronchi Decree for waste management, of which
Article 4 encourages the use of agreements b-
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tween public and private spheres in order to in-
crease the re-use and recycling of waste. In order
to achieve this, companies will benefit from re-
duced administrative burdens as well as economic
instruments. This is illustrated, for example, in a
recent negotiated agreement signed by the Region
Emilia Romagna, in which companies producing
specific types of waste in small quantities will
benefit from simplified procedures.
However, as a consequence of the traditional
«command & control» policy, environmental
«administrative burdens» on companies still re-
main significant, since standard procedures and
competencies are often unclear and overlapping.
Hence, companies usually identify the simplifica-
tion of administrative burdens as a major advan-
tage arising from the application of voluntary
instruments. In fact in Italy, administrative «bu-
reaucracy» on companies represents by far a
much greater threat than the actual controls on
pollution carried out by the public administration.
In fact, administrative costs and sanctions linked
to minor administrative procedural failures (mis-
takes in compiling forms and in identifying the
competent authority etc.) appear to be a major
economic burden in the firms' accounts.
4 Voluntary agreements in the Italian leg-
islation
4.1 The origins of the „administration by
agreements“
In Italy the debate on VAs does not originate in
the environmental field, but in the broader context
of the restructuring of the administrative and
bureaucratic system.
Therefore, from the point of view of a reform of
the public administration, VAs represent a new
form of co-operation between public and private
subjects to supplement the traditional strict
„command & control“ approach.
The Italian legislator has recently introduced the
concept of „administration by agreements“ with
Law n. 142/90 on the administrative system (Or-
dinamento delle autonomie locali). In fact, article
27 of Law 142/90 introduces the possibility to
stipulate programme agreements („accordi di
programma“) between different levels of the pub-
lic administration, such as municipalities, prov-
inces, regions and so on.
The most important law in the Italian legal system
in relation to administrative agreements is Law
241/90 on the administrative process („Nuove
norme in materia di procedimento amministrativo
e di diritto di accesso ai documenti amministra-
tivi“). Article 11 provides that, within an admin-
istrative process, private subjects are entitled to
negotiate an agreement with the public authority.
In particular, this agreement can either better
specify the discretionary content of the final
easure, i.e. the official administrative act (sup-
plementary agreement), or it can substitute the
final measure itself (substitutive agreement). In
this case, the act is replaced by the agreement.
Both types of negotiated agreements must contain
the following fundamental features:
· to pursue a public interest;
· to be written;
· to be subjected to the Civil Code rules;
· to allow the public administration for resolv-
ing the agreement in case prevailing public
interests occur;
· to provide an indemnity to the private party
in case of breach of the agreement by the
public authority;
· all disputes are under the administrative ju-
risdiction.
This first process of deregulation and simplifica-
tion of the national administrative system is fol-
lowed and implemented also by the recent laws of
r form of the public administration: Law n. 59/97,
Law n. 127/97 and Legislative Decree n. 112/98,
known as „Bassanini reform“ (after the Minister
who promoted them).
In particular, the Legislative Decree n. 112/98
promotes the conclusion of substitutive agree-
ments, according to article 11 Law 241/90, in case
of „administrative process for the authorisation of
production plants“ (known as „sportello unico per
le attività produttive“).
For our purposes it is important to stress that
substitutive negotiated agreements regulated by
article 11 Law 241/90 could represent an impor-
tant legal tool for the development of environ-
mental voluntary agreements in Italy.
4.2 Further development of the „administration
by agreements“: Financial Law No. 662/96
The Financial Law No. 662/96, article 2 provides
new forms of co-operation between public and
private subjects3. The forms of negotiation are the
following:
a) negotiated planning (programmazione ne-
goziata): it is an agreed regulation between
public and private subjects;
b) institutional intent of planning (intesa istituzi-
onale di programma): it is an agreement only
                                                          
3 The content of the financial law no. 662/96 is completed by the resolu-
tion of the inter-ministerial Committee of economic planning (CIPE,
Comitato Interministeriale per la Programmazione Economica) of
March 1997.
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between public administrations (central or lo-
cal) on the implementation of long-term plan-
ning;
c) framework planning agreement (accordo di
programma quadro): it is an agreement b-
tween local authorities and private parties to
implement the institutional intent of planning,
it has to be promoted by a central or a local
(regional or provincial) authority;
d) territorial pact (patto territoriale): it is an
agreement between local authorities and other
public or private subjects to implement the
promotion of local development projects; both
public and private subjects can take the initia-
tive;
e) programme contract (contratto di programma):
it is a contract among the competent central
public authority, companies, SMEs consortia,
and representative bodies to implement projects
identified by the negotiated planning;
f) area contract (contratto d’area): it is a contract
between public administrations (central or lo-
cal) and representatives of workers and em-
ployers, to promote development projects in
less developed areas.
Environmental VAs can only be applied to the
following forms: negotiated planning, framework
planning agreements, territorial pacts and pro-
gramme contracts, as these involve the participa-
tion of at least one private party and one public
party.
In recent studies on VAs (Croci et al., 1998, Baga
et al.,1998) it has been made apparent that „terri-
torial pacts“ are considered the most suitable form
for environmental agreements, as described by the
Communication of 1996, because they present
similar characteristics, such as the right of initia-
tive both by public and private subjects; the
binding character of the obligations, the specifi-
cation of the procedures for monitoring and veri-
fication of results. Indeed, in the Italian context
territorial pacts could be suitable legal tools for
stipulating VAs also thanks to the CIPE Commit-
tee resolution, which states that territorial pacts
should enhance local development in accordance
with the principle of sustainable development.
However, territorial pacts present some limita-
tions. The first one is its linkage with the territo-
rial context, which limits the scope of applicabil-
ity to the national level. The second one is that all
territorial pacts must be verified and approved by
the Minister of the Treasury to come into force
and this would jeopardise the parties’ independ-
ence.
4.3 Recent sectoral legislation: waste and wa-
ter
In the Italian legal system the term „voluntary
agreement“ as such (article No. 35) appears for
the first time in the Legislative Decree No. 22/974
on waste disposal (known as Ronchi Decree from
the name of the Minister who promoted it). The
decree promotes the co-operation between public
and economic private subjects for waste recy-
cling.
Article No. 4 establishes that public competent
authorities have to promote and stipulate agree-
ments and programme contracts with economic
private parties to support waste recycling. More
specifically, article No. 25 establishes that the
Minister of the Environment can stipulate agree-
ments and programme contracts with public bod-
ies, large enterprises or sectoral associations.
Finally, article No. 35 gives the specific definition
of „voluntary agreement“ as „an official agree-
ment signed between the public competent
authorities and the interested economic sectors,
open to all stakeholders, which regard the re-
sources, the instruments and the actions aimed at
attaining the objectives of waste recycling and re-
use“.
Because the Ronchi Decree is applicable only to
waste disposal, only VAs related to this issue are
expected to follow the guidelines of the above
mentioned articles.
Following the Ronchi decree, the recent Legisla-
tive decree No. 152 of 11th May 1999 on water
p otection (the so-called "Testo Unico delle Ac-
que5 ") introduces the use of voluntary instru-
ments in the water sector. In fact, article 28 fore-
sees that competent authorities promote and
stipulate agreements and programme contracts
with private subjects for the improvement of
water pollution and the reduction in water use.
According to article 28, the realisation of these
objectives can also be enhanced by the simplifi-
cation of administrative burdens and economic
incentives.
                                                          
4 The Ronchi Decree implements the European Directives: 91/156/EEC
on wastes, 91/689/EEC on dangerous wastes, 94/62/EEC on packag-
ing and waste packaging.
5 The Legislative decree 152/99 implements the European Directives:
91/271EEC on urban waste water treatment and Directive No.
91/676/EEC on water protection against Nitrates emission of agricul-
ture.
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5 The empirical analysis of Local Voluntary
Agreements
5.1 Relevant Results of the Italian Survey Car-
ried out by FEEM
In 1998-99 FEEM carried out a survey based on
questionnaires aimed at gathering information
both from public authorities and industrial asso-
ciations (and a restricted sample of companies) on
the perception and the actual use of voluntary
agreements in Italy. This survey revealed that a
small number of Provinces, Regions and ARPA
(Regional branches of the National Environmental
Agency) have already negotiated or signed vol-
untary agreements. In fact, only 11 public
authorities out of a total of 90 administrations
responded that they had already negotiated or
signed an agreement with a private party. This
indicates that the use of voluntary instruments by
public authorities is not considered yet as an es-
sential part of their policy tools. Furthermore, it
was revealed that only those administrations
which already have experience in negotiating with
companies are keen to use these instruments. Of
particular interest is the Region Emilia Romagna,
in which the application of the EMAS Regulation
and the use of voluntary agreements are strongly
encouraged.
Approximately thirty agreements signed between
1977-1998 were received in response to the sur-
vey. Fifteen of these were selected and analysed
in greater detail. Those selected were considered
to be the most significant and recent examples of
VAs at local and regional level signed between
1991 and 1998.
5.2 The Analysis of Local Voluntary Agree-
ments
The VAs selected for deeper analysis regard:
waste recycling, air emissions, waste water, soil
contamination, and the implementation of envi-
ronmental Management Systems.
As Table 1 illustrates, ten VAs deal with waste
recycling. In particular, three of them deal with
paper recycling, while two of them (signed by the
Province of Ravenna) set environmental protec-
tion objectives not only for waste, but also for air
and water. One of these concerns waste monitor-
ing. The rest of the VAs regard electronic equip-
ment, pneumatic and biological wastes recycling.
Three of them regard air emissions and only one
agreement addresses the question of soil decon-
tamination. Finally, three agreements deal with
the implementation of Environmental Manage-
ment System (EMS), but only one of them in-
cludes actions and measures by each party,
whereas the others set general principles for the
dissemination of EMS, as well as the encourage-
ment in using Best Available Technologies (BAT)
and eco-products.
Table 1: Sectors addressed by the Italian local
agreements
Sectors Number of agreements6
Waste 10 (3 on paper waste, 1 on elec-
tronic equipment, 1 on biological








3 (one of them is more general
and also refers to BAT)
Source: Survey of the Use and Perception of Ne-
gotiated Agreements as Environmental Policy
Instruments in Italy
Table 2 shows that signatories of the public sector
are representatives of Municipalities, Provinces
an  Regions or in some recent agreements also
ARPA (the regional branches of the National
Environmental Agency). In some agreements the
Chamber of Commerce and Local Health Units
(now replaced by ARPA) are also present as sig-
natories. In the private sector, signatories can be
either industrial associations or individual compa-
nies. One interesting finding is that individual
companies tend to negotiate with Provinces and
Municipalities rather than with Regions or ARPA
and conversely industrial associations tend to
negotiate with Regions.
                                                          
6 The total number is more than 15 because two of the VAs analysed
address more than one environmental sector.
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Table 2: Signatories of the Italian local agrements
No. of reference of
the  VA








1 X X X X X






8 X X X
9 X X
10 X X X
11 X X X
12 X X
13 X X X
14 X X
15 X X X X
Source: Survey of the Use and Perception of Negotiated Agreements as Environmental Policy Instruments in
Italy
There is no single formal name used for the agree-
ments. However, two broad categories can be iden-
tified within this array of terminology: the Protocol
of intent (or intent) and the agreements ("accordo
volontario", "accordo ambientale", "accordo
quadro", "accordo" and "convenzione"). In our
sample the most widely used term is Protocol of
intent (9 out of them). It is worthwhile noting that
only two of the VAs obtained from the survey are
relevant in terms of regulation. The first one is the
voluntary agreement signed in 1998 for the moni-
toring of the waste thermo-valorisation system of
the Province of Bologna with the local waste treat-
ment company, implementing article No. 5 of the
Ronchi decree, the other is the VA signed by the
Municipality of Faenza with some local companies
on air emissions, implementing a substitutive
agreement according to article 11 of Law 241/90.
The wide use of the term "Protocol of intent" illus-
trates that the Italian administrations tend to sign
"obligations" of political rather than juridical char-
acter.
The duration of the agreement is specified in only
eight of the selected VAs. Duration is in the range
of 3 month – 3 years, but is typically of 1-2 years.
In some cases the fixed deadline is subordinated to
the attainment of the objectives, therefore the dura-
tion can be automatically extended.
As indicated in the Communication of the Commis-
sion, obligations in the text of the agreement are
expected to be specified for both parties. This was
verified in the course of our analysis, and it was
found that most agreements include obligations for
both parties, although in two cases obligations are
only specified for the private party. In these two
agreements the authoritative role of the public ad-
ministration is predominant, as is the case for the
"c mmand & control" approach. Moreover, in some
ases where obligations are specified, there remains
some ambiguity as to the specific content of this. In
fact, only seven cases include specified objectives,
in erms of targets to be achieved for enhancing
environmental protection.
Not all agreements include economic incentives for
supporting their implementation. Incentives offered
to the private sector include: financial support,
reductions in eco-taxes and in insurance premia. In
addition, non-economic incentives may also be
offered, such as the simplification of administrative
procedures over companies.
5.3 Elements of Environmental Agreements Ac-
cording to the Check-list of the Communication
of the Commission
The analysis of the agreements was based on the
elements of the check-list provided by the Commis-
sion. In general, Italian agreements at the local level
do not appear to be based upon a defined structure.
This is due largely to the fact that seven of the VAs
analysed were signed prior to the Commission
Communication. The others do not seem to take the
check-list into consideration, with the exception of
one case, i.e. the VA signed in 1998 by the Region
Liguria, the Province of Savona, ARPA Liguria, the
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Regional Industrial Association and INAIL (Italian
insurance for workers).
The following elements of the check-list were con-
sidered in over half of the VAs studied: parties,
subject, specification of obligations, periodic r-
porting, monitoring, access to information, revision,
duration.
In particular, monitoring and periodic reporting
appear to be closely linked. Monitoring activities
are usually the responsibility of the public party
(ARPA, Provinces etc.) or of an "ad hoc" commit-
tee, constituted by representatives of all signatories.
In some cases, the procedures for the collection and
the verification of results are also outlined in the
agreement.
In many cases (9) the free access to information is
explicitly required. This is rarely provided through
the publication of the agreement in official sources.
Only in one case the agreement and periodic re-
porting are published by the Provincial waste ob-
servatory (Province of Bologna). In the majority of
cases, free access to information is required as part
of the agreement, however there may be no indica-
tion of how this should be achieved. Finally a large
number (8) of agreements specify the period of their
duration and the possibility of revision either within
the duration of the agreement or after the expiry
date.
As for the other elements of the Commission's
check-list, the possibility of accession of third par-
ties to the agreement is explicitly regulated in five
cases, while sanctions for the defaulting party are
foreseen only in one agreement. This is the case of
the agreement signed in 1998 on waste selection
between the Province of Bergamo and some com-
panies working in composting and waste recycling,
enabling the Province to expel any signatories not
respecting the provisions of the agreement.
Concerning the legal nature only two agreements
have an explicit reference to specific regulations:
the VA of the Province of Bologna on waste ac-
cording to article 5 of the Ronchi Decree and the
VA of the Municipality of Faenza with some local
companies on air emissions according to article 11
of Law 241/90. In the latter case, jurisdiction is
expected to be under the administrative judge, as
required by law.
6 Conclusions
The analysis shows that in Italy there is no univocal
juridical definition of voluntary agreements. In fact,
the definition of „voluntary agreement“ provided in
the Ronchi Decree is specifically related to the
waste sector and other types of agreements are not
specifically designed for environmental policy.
Among these types, two forms of agreements need
to be considered: the territorial pact and the substi-
tutive negotiated agreement under article 11 of Law
241/90 (strengthened by the legislative decree
112/98 introducing the „sportello unico“), if we
consider the broader interpretation of the article by
the case law. Both are relatively quite new. In fact,
in our sample there is only one VA based on the
Ronchi decree, signed in 1998 by the Province of
Bologna and one case, applying article 11 of Law
241/90, signed in 1997 by the Province f Ravenna.
Although no „ad hoc“ legal framework for regulat-
ing VAs exist, from a political and economic point
of view voluntary agreements are considered to be
suitable instruments for managing the environment.
For this reason, nowadays, a large number of the
existing environmental agreements have the form of
„protocol of intent“, which is a common policy
instrument, instead of the other forms of agreements
which present a binding juridical structure. The
"protocol of intent" aims to enounce mutual needs
and political strategies, instead of promoting an
effective mandatory agreement. In fact, the respon-
sibility of the signatories of a "protocol of intent"
seems to be rather pre-contractual and the only
actual duty for the parties is to behave "in good
faith".
However, it is now recognised by public authorities
which have a tradition in negotiating with private
actors (specially regional and local authorities of the
Region Emilia Romagna and Liguria), as well as by
some large companies that the instrument of volun-
tary agreement needs a more formal structure in
order to ensure transparency and greater effective-
ness and to become a policy instrument comple-
ting the "command and control" regulation.
This is also reflected in the law project proposed in
1999 at the Italian Chamber of Deputies7, wh ch
strongly encourages the use of territorial pacts (Law
662/96) and substitutive agreements according to
article 11 of Law 241/90 for environmental pur-
poses. These instruments are likely to be particu-
larly promising for the achievement of the targets of
the Kyoto Protocol.
                                                          
7 The proposal has been presented by a Member of Parliament of the
"Greens" (Mr De Benedetti) as Chamber Act No. 6122 (A.C. N. 6122).
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1 Introduction
We can define VEAs as those commitments signed
among human or legal people (generally firms or
sectors of firms) needful of Administrative authori-
sation, or between a public and private law people
or among public people in order to improve or to go
deeply into the protection of the environment.
By means of this definition, we introduce the three
most important existing VEAs (Carraro and
Lévêque, 1999) although we must advance that
those we consider the main ones for our study are
the agreed between the private and Administrations.
Few VEAs have been signed in Spain. The last
European Commission Inventory of Environmental
Agreements in Europe reveals that just 6 Voluntary
Agreements have been approved in Spain for the
protection of the environment, all of them located in
the field of Industry. About 20% of these agre-
ments concern waste management (Ingram, 1999).
This figure is only valid on a nation-wide scale, as
that official Inventory does not take the Agreements
celebrated on the local and regional sphere into
consideration. This number, low from all perspec-
tives, in not such a low cipher if we consider that, in
the Europe-wide scale there are countries which
find themselves even more behind than Spain in the
adoption of Agreements. For instance, Finland, with
two, Ireland with one and Luxembourg with five are
examples of this fact. And, what is more, except for
Holland and Germany (with 93 and 103 Agree-
ments respectively) the rest of the countries have a
similar number of VEAs like Spain. So we have
France with 8, Greece with 7 Italy with eleven...
2 Context in which Voluntary Agreements
Concerning Waste are born in Spain
The increase that the amount of waste has experi-
enced for the last years in Spain is not but a prime
example of a common phenomenon in all industri-
alised countries. Three are the major causes of this
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spectacular rise: the population growth, the ten-
dency to the urban concentration of the same, and
the demands imposed by the modern consume soci-
ety (Alenza, 1997). Thus, in Spain, from 1986 to
1995, an increase of 39% has taken place on the
local production of waste, whereas the population
has only been 1, 4% up.
Regarding the waste, VEAs are specially useful, as
they are preventive instruments. As an example, we
can quote the agreements signed by the local
authorities together with merchants and consumers
in order to reduce the amount of plastic bags which
are usually given as a present in the shops in an
indiscriminate way. These bags, made up of low
density polythene, are representative of up to a 15%
of the whole plastic production and complicate the
p ocesses of later treatment very much (CEIA,
1998).
Some possible reasons which can explain the scarce
use that has been made of VEAs till now in Spain
may be the following:
· The constitutional doubts remaining behind the
legitimacy of Voluntary Agreements, to which
can be added the delay in the establishment of a
democratic Spanish Constitution in Spain
(1978), understood as a legal support of VEAs
in Spanish legal System.
· The lack of clearness about the distribution of
the powers between the State, the Regions and
the local authorities to the approval of Envi-
ronmental Agreements, what has highlighted
the outstanding shyness of the Regions when
implementing VEAs.
· The ignorance of the technical content and the
true legal status of the Voluntary Agreement as
a means to protect the environment.
Acco ding to the terminology used by the Fifth
Eu op an Program, Spanish Voluntary Agreements
are included in four great subsections: continental
water resources, waste management, pollution and
air quality and ozone layer depletion (European
Commission, 1996).
The signing parties are generally on the one hand, a
Ministry, and on the other, the associations or the
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branches of companies. So, the Ministry of Envi-
ronment or that of Public Works or some Autono-
mous Government, on the part of the Administra-
tion. On the private part, agreements have been
signed with the stationery, the energy, the engine
and transport sectors.
Spanish VEAs have not supposed until now an
alternative to the classic environmental regulation,
but rather they link with the development of the
international set of rules (progressive decrease of
CFCs in accordance with the Montreal Protocol)
and the national (National Plan of Waste Decrease)
(EEA, 1998). Therefore, it is not discussed in
Spanish Law the lawfulness of those typical VEAs
belonging to other countries (Holland, for example)
whose application is imposed in exchange for the
inhibition of the Government, which avoids giving
norms unilaterally in the matter. VEAs suppose a
temporarily intermediate step between the "com-
mand and control" classic regulations and the free-
dom of pacts as a final environmental aim
(Lascoumes, 1994).
In this paper we are going to clear the first and third
reasons aforementioned, which can explain the
lethargy of the Environmental Agreement as an
instrument in Spanish Environmental policy, de-
coding the keys that prevent us from a more open
approach to the Environmental Agreements. So, it is
a question of concreting its constitutional legiti-
macy and its legal nature.
3 Constitutional Relevance of VEAs in Spain
3.1 Constitutional Background of VEAs in Spain
The subject we now face is not a trivial one, taking
into account that there are several States of the
European Union which are warned of a possible
violation of their Constitutional principles by
VEAs, like those related to public participation,
human rights to a healthy environment, or the pro-
hibition to entail the powers of the Administration
(for instance, the power of regulation, as a proto-
type) in respect to individual contracts (Jülich and
Falk, 1999).
In our case, considering that VEAs are included
within the figure of the collaboration agreement
(CA from now one), and that this, at the same time,
is a category inside the agreement genre, there is
little to oppose to the capability of Spanish Laws to
accept pacts signed between the Administration and
the private with the purpose of protecting the envi-
ronment (Sánchez Sáez). From this angle, the pos-
sible constitutional drawbacks when approving this
type of agreements are the same that the contracts
of Administration, that is to say, none. The attribu-
tion to the State of his conventional capability is
placed in the section art. 149. 1. 18ª of Spanish
Constitution.
We are studying the contractual subject, over
which, on the one hand, the State has competence
on basic legislation, and, on the other, the Autono-
mous Communities over the development of that
legislation.
Thanks to this capability, the Act 13/1995, 18th
May, regarding Contracts of Public Administra-
tions, was passed. In this Act we find the essential
key that allows the use of VEAs. To be exact, in its
section 3. 1. d), the figure of collaboration agree-
ments (CAs) between the Public Authorities and the
Private is described. This rule will be developed
later when referring to the legal nature of VEAs in
Spain. In addition to this, the section 4 of this Act
grants a large freedom to the Administration to
accord every type of agreements, pacts or contrac-
tual conditions with people.
Clearly, it is about a rule inscribed inside the Act on
Contracts of Public Administrations, which gives
validity to those agreements of public or private
nature. Anyway, the boundaries established by the
section 4 of the Act 13/1995 for the Administration
are more rigid than those set by the section 1255 of
the Civil Code for the private.
Other constitutional support, this in relation with
interadministrative VEAs can be found in the ability
that Spanish Constitution attributes to the approval
of cooperative agreements celebrated between the
Autonomous Communities as to provide common
services. This is mentioned in the section 145. 2 of
Spanish Constitution. There, Spanish Constitution
distinguishes between agreements to provide own
servic s and cooperation agreements. The second
are atypical and lend a wider margin of freedom to
Autonomous Communities (Pérez Moreno y otros,
1981). In any case, this constitutional precept can
b  understood as valid for the celebration of agree-
ments of cooperation and collaboration among
whatever Administration.
In this sense, the section 6 of the Act 30/1992, of
the Legal Regime of the Public Administrations and
the Common Administrative Process, defines the
legal regime of the collaboration interadministrative
agre ments, inside which we can include, of course,
the interadministrative VEAs, which are not the
prototypical ones in the field of Environmental
protection.
The section 149. 1. 18ª of Spanish Constitution also
grants the State the exclusive competence on "the
bases of the legal regime of the Public Administra-
tions... and the Common Administrative Processes,
giving as well to Autonomous Communities the
allowance to develop its own specialities on the
subject matter. Because of this it was passed in
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1992 the mentioned Act 30/1992, 26th November,
recently modified by the Act 4/1999, 13th January.
The 5th heading of the section 3 of that Act has
regulated two new general principles affecting the
regime of the agreements signed by Administra-
tions. Such principles have to be followed by the
Administrations when interacting with the citizens
and companies. Those are the principles of trans-
parency and of the participation of the citizens in
the public affairs. Through the voluntary Agree-
ments we can confide in the opening of new ways
of positivation of the influence of citizens in the
administrative affairs: it is important the "what", but
it is more interesting in a legal context the "how"
taking into account the participation (Pérez Moreno,
1981). And given that there is no longer a more
direct relation with the citizenship than that derived
from the contractual activity of the Administration,
these principles must be applied to VEAs.
These two principles are, as we have advanced,
those of transparency and participation. The princi-
ple of participation (section 9. 2 of Spanish Consti-
tution) has a clearer and direct relation to VEAs, as
it is in the philosophy of participation with the pr-
vate where we must insert them. So much it is this
way that the 5th Communitary Action Programme
announces the principle of shared responsibility,
one of the major contributions to the Environmental
policy, emphasising the importance of the integra-
tion of the large amount of possible social agents in
the prosecution of environmental aims, considering
as "interested agents" not only the Public Admini-
stration but also associations of consumers, em-
ployers, ecologist organisations, housewives, trade
unions, and so on... The Recommendation 96/73/CE
of the European Commission, 9th December 1996,
related to the Agreements on Environment through
which the Communitary Directives are imple-
mented (DOCE L nº. 333, de 21st-1 - 996), devel-
ops this concept.
This principle comes from, moreover, the possibil-
ity that the private have to finish a concrete admin-
istrative process by agreements, which is a chance
given by the Act 30/1992. As a matter of that, al-
ready gained by the `participative philosophy´ many
important sectors of the Administrative activities, in
Spain, such as the elaboration of regulations (as
stated in Act 6/1997, 14th April), the economic
educative health and urban coordination... it only
lacked giving way to citizens to achieve the most
sacred place of the classic administrative powers:
the Administrative Law. That is the intention of the
section 88 of the Act 30/1992, which has estab-
lished a basic regime for all the agreements, pacts
and accords that the Administrations sign with the
private, regulating the borders and their minimal
content. This basic regulation is safeguarded by the
section 149. 1. 18ª of Spanish Constitution, above
quoted (Sánchez Sáez, 1998).
The national regulation on environment has also a
basic character, without the prejudice of the
Autonomous Communities being able to set addi-
tional protective environmental rules (section 149.
1. 18ª of Spanish Constitution). The same prescrip-
tion must be done about the national rule on moun-
tains, wood profits and cattle paths. In this frame-
work, for instance, a recent environmental regula-
tion has been passed allowing the celebration of
VEAs with the purpose of environmental protec-
tion, as we will see later on. A typical example is
the Act 10/1998, 21st April, about Waste.
In other sectorial cases, it is possible to find consti-
tutional support for the Environmental Agreements
in the national basic legislation as far as the General
Planning of the Economic Activity is concerned
(section 149. 1. 13th of Spanish Constitution), wide
setting in which historically the planning rules of
reorganisation and modernisation of industrial ac-
tivities are included, as for example. In these, CAs
between the Public Administrations and definite
industrial sectors delayed were foreseen in Spain.
3.2 Constitutional borders to the signing of VEAs
in Spain
As the conventional environmental activity of the
Public Administrations is considered in Spain as a
specific administrative activity, the first limits that
must be fulfilled on the Public part when subscrib-
ing a VEA, are the general edges to which this has
to be submitted. That is to say, this must respect the
principle of legality (Carretero Pérez, 1970), the
principles collected in the section 103. 1 of Spanish
Constitution and the basic principles of the legal
Regime of the Public Administration of the Act
30/1992 (section 3, plus the novelties introduced by
Act 4/1999, 13th January: principles of b na fide,
legitimate trust, efficiency, service to the citizens,
transparency and participation) which are eroding
the ancient jurisdictions of the Administrations.
The principle of administrative legality is closely
related to the main commitment of Public Admini-
strations, which is no other than objectively serving
to the common good. We must think over, before
anything else, about the impact that the environ-
mental administration by means of agreements has
provoked in the bases of the "classic Environmental
Law". This has been motivated, among other rea-
sons, by a very reasonable reluctance of the Tribu-
nals to accept that the search for the collective in-
terests and the respect to the legality characteristic
of the previous environmental policy be compatible
with an individual profit for a concrete firm. This
prejudices were most than justified in some of the
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fields of the administrative contractualism in Spain,
such as the urban pacts.
Notwithstanding, a fact remains unquestionable: the
evolution of the legislative technique is leading us
to soothe the consequences of the principle of le-
gality. Nowadays we see how Acts give a wide
range of instruments for the search of the public
interest, overcoming the legislative rêverie of the
XIXth century. Today, it is usual that a norm be
applied not only through the regulations but also
through agreements or economic and financial
tools, sanctions... But it is also usual that the Act
does not descend to a degree of concretion that
disable the chance of negotiation by the Admini-
stration (Delgado Piqueras, 1995). This evidence
lends validity to no legally qualified VEAs which
could be included in the margin of contractualism
left by the Act.
The defence of common good by the Administra-
tion (section 103 of Spanish Constitution) is other
of those general limits imposed to the contractual
capability of Public powers. So, in VEAs, the Ad-
ministration can negotiate, but in a way that dis-
ables Public authority to come to an agreement on
environmental goals awarding the firms and not the
general interests of the citizens. That leads to the
question of the quality of the legal relations needed
in Environmental Agreements: behavioural codes or
gentlemen accords are not so dangerous to public
needs as legally binding contracts. It is about an old
polemic of Administrative Law, that comes from
the late years of XIXth century in France (and af-
terwards in Spain, Italy, Germany and other Eur-
pean countries) about the real possibility given to
Public Administration to agree like a private ind-
vidual. The idea of collaboration was thought to be
perfectly compatible with the general position of
superiority of Administration (Carbonnier, 1988)
because the collaboration way of act does not in-
volve the parity of both sides of an agreement
(Martín-Retortillo Baquer, 1959).
This argument is still more worthy in the CAs,
where the Public authorities and the private find
each other at the same level. However, that was the
true reason used by the French Conseil d´État to
deny VEAs as a legal instrument, in the famous
arrêt "Friends of the Earth"(Prieur, 1995).
The section 106 of Spanish Constitution builds
other general border to the administrative activity:
this has to be a legal and accurate activity in rela-
tion to the scope of Administration, which involves
the submission to the Judges and Tribunals. The
contracts must be under that legal demand, not only
the administrative but the private Law contracts,
and also VEAs. The problem with attaching the
administrative activity to aim its scope is the ambi-
guity of those objectives, which are not often well
defined. This handicap is still stressed in VEAs,
whose concrete purposes sometimes appear not to
exist, making difficult to take legal actions on "de-
viation of powers".
Mor  specific borders to contractual capability are
set in the above mentioned section 4 Act 13/1995,
which prevents Administration from agreeing
"wh n the conditions of the accord were opposed to
public interests, to legal regulations and to good
man gement principles". These two first limits are
general. The good management principles demand
economic efficiency, which, taken to the environ-
me tal protection, requires competition and com-
p titiveness when selecting companies for the VEA.
Huergo Lora has highlighted some material limits to
the subscription of agreements in Spain. Firstly,
agreements binding regulation power of Admini-
stration were hardly accepted. Given that it is by
means of regulations how the general interests are
ordered, it seems to be inappropriate linking a
regulation, bound to attend the general concerns, to
the satisfaction of a few individual interests. Al-
though this type of drawback does not specially
affect VEAs concerning Waste (due to the fact that
these are mainly addressed to implement the rules)
we could affirm this possibility when, as the author
says, the degree of concretion of the regulation be
maximum, in other words, when we face regula-
tions that, because of the fact they are addressed to
a very precise group of citizens, condition, as less as
possible, the general interests (Huergo Lora, 1998).
They are also of complicate compliance the admin-
istrative acts of judgement or opinion encharged to
a specific body of the Administration, due to its
high impartiality and technical capability to dictate
them. This is the case, for example, of the adminis-
trative sanctions.
4 VEAs Concerning Waste in Spain
As it is already known, VEAs are a ar  avis in
Spanish environmental policy. Notwithstanding,
little by little such a figure is being appreciated,
encouraged by the Communitary directives and by
the increasing interest that the doctrine is showing
(n wadays more a technical than a legal one). As a
result of this understanding atmosphere, we find a
very new regulation c rpus, that, according to us,
will bring about a true revolution regarding the use
of VEAs in Spain, above all on the waste manag-
ment framework. There are two recent Acts which
have taken into account the voluntary agreements
for the production, treatment and recycling of waste
in Spain: the Act 11/1997, 24th April, on Packaging
and Packaging Waste and the Act 10/1998, 21st
April, of Waste. After them, some of the Autono-
mous Communities, such as Catalonia, Basque
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Country and Murcia have largely used these instru-
ments.
4.1 VEAs in the field of Packaging and Packaging
Waste in Spain
Before coming deeply into the regulation of Vol-
untary Agreements placed in the Act of Packaging,
it could be useful to inform about a previous project
of VEA which failed due to many reasons. Like the
French and German voluntary waste plans of the
first 90s, Spain wanted to have a similar voluntary
waste management system. So, the President of the
Environment Spanish Employers Organisations
Commission proposed it to Spanish Water and
Environment State Secretary, based on a great Vol-
untary Agreement celebrated between Ministries,
Autonomous Communities and Local authorities
and the involved Spanish organisations. The works
were actually very advanced when the UE Directive
94/62/CE was passed, which caused the early death
of this VEA. Nevertheless, the developed studies
were used to build up the structures of the Waste
Management Voluntary Systems, recently approved
after the Act of Packaging (Poveda Gómez, 1997).
The packaging waste represents a huge part of the
whole amount of waste in Spain. To get this target,
the 5th Communitary Action Programme on Envi-
ronment and Sustainable Development approved the
mentioned Directive, and afterwards, Spanish Par-
liament passed the Act 11/1997, which was inserted
in the framework of basic national legislation on
Planning of general economic activity (art. 149. 1.
13ª of Spanish Constitution) and on Environment
(art. 149. 1. 23ª of Spanish Constitution).
Spanish Packaging Act tries to achieve different
aims: stimulating prevention and reusing packaging
and establishing the foreseen objectives of recycling
and management. In addition to the obligation,
imposed to manufacturers, of using packaging
waste materials, the Chapter IV of the Act orders
two different processes for packaging waste treat-
ment: the first one, which is also the general system,
consists of the participation of all agents involved in
the business chain (industrials, importers, wholesale
and retail dealers) who must collect from their cli-
ents, up to the final consumer, an amount of money
for each unit of bottled product sold, refunding to
all of them the same amount when the clients bring
the bottles or cans back as well. The second system,
the one we are interested in, free the business agents
from that obligation, when taking part in an Inte-
grated Packaging and Packaging Waste Manag-
ment System (SIG), known as well like "green
point system". This also guarantees periodical col-
lecting and recycling of bottles and the achievement
of the purposes of reusing. The authorisation of
these systems, implemented through voluntary
agreements signed between the agents, concerns to
Autonomous Communities.
In comparison with other European countries,
Spanish Law is especially linked to European Law
objectives, given that it demands from Spanish
society the reduction of 10% of the whole packag-
ing waste volume in 30th June 2001, which does not
occur in any other European country.
4.2 The Legal Nature of Packaging and Packag-
ing Waste Agreements in Spain
In this norm there is a general principle supporting
the agreements for the management and treatment
of the used bottles and the management of the pack-
aging waste. This is in accordance with the 3rd Ad-
ditional Disposition of the Act, encouraging the use
of the agreements between the Public competent
Administrations and the economic agents with the
intention of preventing and reducing the impact on
the environment caused by the packaging waste
throughout the lifetime of the bottles. But apart
from this declaration of intentions, the Act foretells
the use of specific voluntary Environmental
Agreements. Thus, the Act proposes the appearance
of the so-called SIG, as an alternative to the obliga-
ions that the rules fix for the producers and mer-
chants of bottled products. For this reason, rather
than a complete option to the norm itself, these
systems are born like a alternative within the norm
(and so legitimate) which exempt them from the
general waste management regime (this based on
the obligation of reusing the bottles returned back
by the users in exchange for the payment of a qua-
tity of money per unit) (Rehbinder, 1997). The Act
establishes this way two systems, moving itself
towards the agreed solution, as this is more efficient
and environmental protective.
The SIGs included in Spanish Act inspire in those
Fre ch plans regulated by the French Decree 92-
377, 1st April, but differs from them in the fact that
wh reas in Spanish ones the collect is carried out by
the local Entities, that join the system by means of
Voluntary Agreements, in the French ones this is
rder d directly by the Act. This requirement of
wilfulness was demanded from the beginning by the
representatives of the local Entities (Madrid, Bar-
celona and others, for instance), something that,
however, did not pleased the Employers Organisa-
tions very much. Unlike, in Catalonia, thanks to the
Act 6/1993, on Waste, the Local corporations ex-
ceeding 5.000 inhabitants have to introduce selec-
tive waste services, which are perfectly compatible
with the existence of voluntary agreements in the
nati nal regulations, as the Autonomous Communi-
ties has the competence to develop and implement
those rules.
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But, which is the legal nature of these systems?
According to us, there are two different systems:
those completely subscribed between the private
and those others in which a local Entity or a
Autonomous Community plays a role. On the one
hand, the first systems (section 7) are structured as
private contracts between the bottle companies or
trade dealers of bottled items and other management
firms of packaging in charge of evaluating, recy-
cling and reusing them (Moffet and Bregha, 1999).
The fact is that these systems are devoted to execute
a certain type of public functions -the waste treat-
ment- and it is for that reason that the Act demands
some administrative control of the SIG. In this case,
a legal authorisation is required, conceded by the
Autonomous Communities.
On the other hand, the other genre of agreements
(section 9) are actually typical voluntary agreements,
due to the participation of a Public Administration in
them (Local Authorities, generally, or Autonomous
Communities, subsidiary). Here, a great margin of
freedom is given to the sides of the accord. They can,
for example, concrete complementary financial
mechanisms, the way of transferring the property of
packaging waste from Township to the management
company, temporal dates of collaboration, and so on...
This freedom inserts this type of VEAs in one of the
seven classifications established by Börkey and
Glachant. In particular, they are contractual negoti-
ated collective engagements, similar to the Dutch
covenants but with a content more public than private
granted by the administrative protection of the regu-
lations, as it is the rule in the countries with a heritage
from French Administrative Law (Börkey and
Glachant, 1997).
This second type of agreements are said to be CAs for
encouraging private activities regarding general inter-
ests. As a matter of fact, they are public contracts,
submitted to Administrative Law. It is not the same
thing to stimulate private activities regarding the
common interest than the private execution of public
powers. Apart from the difference of the formal in-
struments used in each one (contracts and administra-
tive authorisations, respectively), the origin of the
activity also varies from one to another systems: the
public powers encouraging the private activity to
reuse and recycle the packaging waste (in the first
ones) and the private firms agree to do the same (in
the second) (Carrillo Donaire, 1999).
And, what is more, these agreements in which Ad-
ministrations participates are binding agreements,
given that the relations born from them are legally
regulated: the private firms have to pay a certain
amount of money to the Administrations in exchange
for their collaboration in the transport of the packag-
ing waste to the management entity. If not, the Ad-
ministrations can collect that quantity, from the pri-
vate side of the agreement, through a surety or deposit
that they are demanded (section 10. 3). Any contrac-
tual breach of the voluntary agreement entitles the
Administration to put a light sanction to the manage-
me t firm (section 19). However, nothing is said
about contractual non-completions by the Admini-
strati n itself. Consequently, we have to make use of
th se solutions foreseen by the Contract Legislation
(Act 13/1995, already mentioned) in the field of CAs.
These are voluntary agreements, and the wilfulness
is almost pure and does not find menaced by the
enforcing administrative power of passing more
harmful regulations in case of non- completion of
the agreement by the firms, which supposes some-
times a distorting measure (ELNI and CAMERON
MAY editors, 1999).
Oth r basic requirements must appear in SIG to be
passed  as it is usual in the sphere of voluntary agree-
ments: concretion of objectives, clearing the setting of
financial mechanisms, instruments to check the target
compliance, public information of the agreement, and
so on. As it is also usual in CAs, these packaging and
pa kaging waste agreements are temporally limited (5
years). Despite the fact that the section 8 describes the
cont t of the agreement application form, the
authorisations are not transmissible to third parties.
The cause of this is the discretionary nature of the
authorisation, given in view of the involved firms (in
tuitu personae) which is an characteristic of CAs as
well.
Finally, the Act establishes in the section 18 a general
clause encouraging the agreements, where the use of
economic instruments by the Administrations is
foretold with the "green" purposes already mentioned.
4.3 Voluntary SIG already celebrated in Spain
Thanks, among other causes, to the profit stemming
from the Voluntary agreement project on Waste,
which was left just before the approval of the Act
11/1997, three great SIGs were immediately born in
S ain: ECOEMBES, ECOACERO and
ECOVIDRIO. However, on the 11th June 1997, the
second entity came to an agreement with the first
ne, which meant the integration of ECOACERO in
ECOEMBES. See further details in Appendix.
Lately, one more SIG has been celebrated in Spain:
SIGRE, referring to pharmaceutical products man-
gement.
4.4 Voluntary Agreements concerning Waste in
Spain: its legal nature
Last year, Spanish Parliament passed the Act
10/1998, 21st April, on Waste, which is the natural
complement to Act 11/1997, already quoted. That
Act transposed, with two years of delay, the Euro-
pean Directive 91/156/CEE. The Act includes all
the types of waste produced in Spanish State, except
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for the emissions to the atmosphere, the effluents on
water and the radioactive waste. This Act is located
in the tittle of the basic national legislation on Envi-
ronment (section 149. 1. 18 Spanish Constitution).
It is a novelty introduced by this Act the incentive
of collaboration between the Administration and the
firms responsible for introducing products in the
market involving the generation of waste, through
an accurate legal framework that could be imple-
mented by means of voluntary and collaboration
Environmental Agreements. The regulation dis-
posed by this norm is essentially similar to that
established in Act 11/1997.
The sections 8 and 28 address to the use of Envi-
ronmental Agreements. In the section 8 the Legis-
lator suggests the subscription of VEAs to the firms
dealing with the products that turn into waste in the
future, with the following purposes, stated in the
section 7: using of "green" products and packaging;
taking part in an Integrated Waste Management
System (SIG); accepting a deposit refund and return
System; informing of these processes to Autono-
mous Communities Administrations... The same
rule was already regulated three years before by the
Act 1/1995, 8th March, on Protection of the Envi-
ronment, of Autonomous Community of Murcia
(We must remember than in Spain, this kind of
Administrations have legislative powers).
The section 28 regards to a new use of voluntary
agreements: the Autonomous Communities will
encourage the owners of lands polluted by the waste
from themselves or from somebody else to agree
voluntarily with Administrations or private indi-
viduals for the cleaning and recuperation of soils.
This is a prototypical case-study of the environ-
mental use of contracts based on the real estate
property, which involves a plus of obligations for
the owners, forced to take care of their land as to
protect the right to a healthy environment, a so-
called "social function" of the property (Carbonnier,
1988).
In both cases, the agreements would be celebrated,
like in the Act of Packaging, exclusively between
the private or between the private and the Public
Administration. The Act calls the first ones "volun-
tary agreements", and the second ones "CAs." The
reason is absolutely logical: it has been translated
from the English expression "voluntary agreement"
literally, because this refers to a new tool, unknown
until now in the environmental Spanish policy.
When one of the sides is an Administration, the
expression is "CA", a well known figure in Spanish
Administrative Law from the former rules on Ad-
ministrative Contracts. The first ones, authorised by
the Autonomous Communities, are private con-
tracts. The second ones are public contracts, sub-
mitted to the Act 13/1995, regarding the Contracts
of he Administrations. As we can see, the same
s heme mentioned in the Act of Packaging is set-
tled.
The Act concretes the payment of economic sup-
ports by the Public authorities, fixed through the
voluntary or CAs when cleaning the polluted soils.
Particularly, the National Spanish Plan of Recover-
ing Polluted Soils conferes 122. 000 million pesetas
for the period from 1995 to 2005, paid half and half
between the State and the Autonomous Communi-
ties (Poveda Gómez, 1998). The specific amount of
the help could be negotiated in the CAs, but it will
be unilaterally regulated in the case of voluntary
agreements, after the application form submitted by
the people in charge of the cleaning. As a compen-
sation for these helps, apart from the ecological
benefit obtained from this cleaning (which is to the
advantage of the collective ownership) the Act
demands that the whole capital gains coming from
public helps be shared with the Administration: the
quantity of this benefits will be also specified in the
CA or the concrete rule which regulates the conces-
ion of the allowance. This comes from the social
func ion of the private property again.
There is a difference, however, between the volu-
tary agreements regulated in both Acts. The most
important one is the establishment, in the Act
10/1998 of sanctions to the private which do not
fulfil the obligations derived from the agreement. If
we remember, in the Act on Packaging, it was only
the bottle and the bottled products dealers the ones
obliged to subscribe any kind of guarantee from
which the Administration could collect in case of
any contractual breach, also imposing light sanc-
t ons on the management company of the integrated
sy em as the responsible for the non-completion of
whatever obligation coming from the same. In the
Act on Waste, the sanctions are imposed in perso-
n m, that is on the true protagonist (section 34. 2)
who is involved in a voluntary or CA, so much of
the section 8 as of the section 28 of the Act. These
are serious and very serious sanctions. With this
sanctionary regime we clearly see the binding of the
legal obligations coming from the agreements. The
fines will be from 5.000.001 pesetas to 200.000.000
pesetas and disqualification of the sanctioned per-
son to keep on working, from one up to ten years in
the case of the very serious ones. For the serious
ones, the responsible person will be fined with an
amount from 100.001 up to 5.000.000 pesetas and
disqualification up to a year. As we have mentioned
regarding the constitutional limits of contractual
capability of the Administrations, the power of
sanction is an extra commercium thing, excluded
from a possible voluntary or collaboration agree-
ment, due to the fact that this power is an absolute
administrative authority.
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The Act 3/1998, 27th February, on Environmental
Protection, of the Autonomous Community of
Basque Country, has the virtue of advancing the
National Act on Waste in a month, foreseeing the
use of Voluntary Agreements not only for the
cleaning of polluted lands (section 83) but, in gen-
eral, for sharing the responsibility for the manage-
ment of those activities risky for the environment
(generation of packaging or packaging waste, as an
example). The Basque Act calls them "concerts",
expression already appeared in the 60s, in the first
Spanish economic Acts on Planning, inspired in
those French ones. This Basque norm also sanctions
the person who does not clean or restore to their
original state the spoiled lands (art. 109, k).
Recently, in a "curious" temporal coincidence with
this Basque Act, it has been passed the Act 3/1998
27th February, on Integral Intervention of the Envi-
ronmental Administration, of the Autonomous
Community of Catalonia. In this Act it is given the
first definition of general VEA in the history of
Spanish environmental regulation. They are told to
be "the agreements subscribed between the envi-
ronmental competent Administration and one firm
or the representatives of a certain industrial sec-
tor, by means of which both sides bind each other
in a voluntary way for the achievement of quanti-
fied objectives of environmental quality."
In this concept we can appreciate the success of the
spirit of accord, which is enough for such a general
and brief definition like this. Many things remain
clear and expressive about their legal nature:
(1) They are only voluntary agreements the ones
celebrated between a public and a private side,
consequently submitted to public regulations)
excluding the accords signed exclusively be-
tween the public or between the private.
(2) These are always binding agreements. They
have contractual nature, with the consequences
attached to it: judicial review and sanctions.
(3) They must have a specific purpose. Taking this
into account, the Catalonian Act does not con-
sider the conduct codes or the gentlemen
agreements as VEAs.
(4) The targets must be previously fixed by regu-
lations (as usual) or by administrative Law (for
instance, in the administrative processes of
authorisation or in the conventional ending of
the process).
The section 8 (4th paragraph) of the Catalonian Act
allows the adoption of whatever technical measures
to prevent the environment from impacts derived of
human risky activities. One of these agreements can
deal with waste treatment, for example, one in
which can be pacted the use of the best available
technologies (BAT), the quantifying of the waste
volume permitted, and so on... The VEAs estab-
lished by the Catalonian Act are CAs as well, but
with the special feature of being a true alternative to
regulation, to which they can affect or even over-
come. They cannot, evidently, be against the legi-
lation, which is a general principle of Spanish Law
(principle of legality).
5 Liability and Participation Rights in Pack-
aging and Waste VEAs in Spain
We have already anticipated some characteristics of
VEAs when talking about their constitutional limits.
Within the legal sphere of the Environment, there
are some other regulations on VEAs, which ap-
peared before the Acts of Packaging and Waste. For
instance, the regulations about the Natural Park of
Cabañeros (1995).
We have said that VEAs belong to a major genre of
pacts, the so-called CAs, subscribed by the Public
Administrations and the private people (firms, in
general). The Environmental Agreements are a
concrete type of collaboration agreements, those
articulated through administrative measures of
encouragement or help. In these, the Administration
gives an economic quantity or a financial, technical
or l gal advantage to companies taking part in the
environmental sector. These firms engage to act in a
more environmental efficient way. For example, a
technical VEA was signed in July 1999 between the
Council of Environment of the Autonomous Com-
unity of Andalucía and Acerinox (a private firm
devoted to the obtaining of steel from metallic
waste). In this agreement, the Administration agrees
to lend technical support to the company regarding
its water effluents and mud filtering.
Other VEA, is implemented by the Order 23rd De-
cember 1994, passed by the Ministry of Industry
and Energy, on Approval of the Second Stage of the
Environmental Technology and Industry Plan
(PITMA II). This is a VEA in which the State con-
fers a legal advantage, due to the fact that the appli-
cation forms for the allowances regulated, submit-
ted by firms taking part in a VEA in the Order, are
given priority (section 9. 2, b).
Collaboration agreements are regulated in section 3.
1, letters c) and d) of the Act 13/1995, 18th May, on
Contracts of Public Administrations. In letter c) the
Act establishes the legal rules about interadminis-
trative CAs, developed on section 6 Act 30/1992,
above quoted. In letter d) the Act orders the legal
regime of CAs signed between the private people
and the Public Administrations. Here, the Act says
that it will be submitted to the Administrative Law
those CAs having the object of a contract of public
Works, public services, public supply, public con-
su tancy, public specific tasks, or whatever other
purpose devoted to directly satisfy a certain general
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interest. Given that the protection of the Environ-
ment is established as a public power (section 45
Spanish Constitution), we have to conclude that
Spanish VEAs are CAs of section 3. 1. d) and that
their basic legal regime is the one of the adminis-
trative contracts regulated in Act 13/1995. That fact
involves the application to them of the general prin-
ciples of administrative contractualism: publicity,
transparency, competitiveness, binding relations
between the parties, liability, judicial review by
Administrative Tribunals, and so on... Like proto-
typical administrative contracts, the Administration
holds powers throughout their lifetime (Cabugheira,
1999).
Briefly, about the liability of VEAs, we have only
to go to section 4 Act 13/1995, above explained,
where all type of pacts, accords and agreements are
allowed to the Administrations if they are neither in
contradiction to the public interests, to the legal
regulations nor to the principles of good manage-
ment. Thus, in a VEA, in the event of contractual
breach (section 29 Act 29/1998, 13th July, on Ad-
ministrative Jurisdiction Tribunals) or wrong im-
plementation (sections 25 and 30 Act 29/1998) on
the part of the Administration, the firms could take
legal measures and appeal against them. On the
contrary, if the contractual non-completion was
caused by the firms taking part in the agreement,
they could be also prosecuted by Administrations.
The sectorial regulations on each type of VEA
could not be opposed to this essential principles of
basic legislation (ex section 149. 1. 18 Spanish
Constitution). But, what is more, in case there was
no concrete regulations for a VEA, this one would
have to respect the same principles, in accordance
with the orders given by section 4 Act 13/1995,
given that the pursuit of public interests is an ad-
ministrative duty which can never be given up.
Regarding the legitimation to apply to the courts by
third parties, we have to take into consideration the
rule of section 19 Act 29/1998, aforementioned,
which confers that right to people and legal socie-
ties holding an accurate right or interest, to corpo-
rations, associations, trade unions and groups af-
fected or legally entitled to defend the rights or
legitimate collective interests, and to any citizen
when legally foreseen (popular prosecution a-
tions). In the environmental field, this "popular
actions" are not regulated (due to the slight protec-
tion of this right in Spanish Constitution) but, for
instance, do are in the sphere of town planning. A
few authors complain about this lack (Jordano
Fraga, 1995).
If the administrative non-completion provoked
measurable damages in a third person, this third will
be able to ask for extracontractual responsibility to
the Administration. The section 139 Act 30/1992,
awards this right to all those that suffer some harm
in their properties and/or rights, provided that this
damage be a consequence of the usual or unusual
functioning of the Public Services. Given that the
publi  and objective character of the administrative
responsibility in Spain (without being necessary any
blame or negligence). We do not see any handicap
to use this other alternative, which can make up for
the absence of a "popular action" on Environment.
The difficult thing, of course, will be to prove in
court the existence of an effective and economically
valu ble damage because of the administrative
action, above all when that damage does not affect
third parties‘ goods. Let´s imagine that the Town-
hall collaborating in the Waste Integrated System
carelessly transports the waste to the management
floor. The citizens, the private owners of goods,
directly affected by the waste could react. It would
be still more difficult for those people who declare a
hypothetic harm to their right to a healthy environ-
ment (section 45 of Spanish Constitution).
Regarding the management agreements on Waste
and Packaging signed exclusively between the pri-
vate, we must conclude, contrario sensu, that they
are contracts submitted to the private Law, framed
inside the freedom to agree recognised to citizens
and safeguarded by Spanish Civil Code dating from
1888 (section 1255), with the boundaries of the
moral, of the public order and the Law. Anyway,
the legal relationships built up between the compa-
nies signing agreements of integrated management
on waste or packaging, are not indifferent to the
administration, which will have to give the authori-
sations or receive communications and reports from
the private. This way, these activities are included
within the policy of Administration, also known as
ordering activity of the private behaviours (San-
tamaría Pastor, 1988).
The judicial review of these agreements, differs in
respect to the pacts celebrated with the Administra-
tions, as it will now depends on the type of the
agreement carried out between the private and the
regulations applied to these, to appeal or not to the
Tribunals. As the SIG counts with an administrative
control (the authorisation), it is logical to think that
we are before true civil contracts (lex inter partes),
therefore, creators of authentic legal obligations for
the other parts, which can be taken to administrative
courts. The right to appeal does not exclusively be-
long to the signing parts of the agreement, but also (in
the field of extracontractual civil responsibility) to
those people who were damaged by the contractual
breach. One of the differences between the adminis-
trative and the civil extracontractual responsibility
rests on the fact that, in the second type of responsi-
bility, the third person has to prove the existence of
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blame or negligence on the part of who broke the
agreement (section 1902 and following of the Civil
Code). Specially, almost the whole doctrine special-
ised on Spanish Civil Law, see in the section 1908. 2
of the Civil Code the base that allows the claim for
responsibility because of environmental harms. In that
section, in fact, it is mentioned the concept of "exces-
sive smokes", a generic expression in which nowa-
days we can include the emissions, noises, vibrations,
emanations, and so on... derived from the waste
(Díaz-Regañón, 1998).
6 Conclusion
The VEAs in Spain have remained as an underused
tool because of different reasons. Among them, we
have quoted the legal doubts that this instrument
brought about. We have tried to clear their legiti-
macy, granting them a nature of public or private
contracts, depending on the fact that the aims they
attempt to reach be directly or indirectly of public
interest, respectively.
In addition to this, the recent Spanish regulation on
Waste and Packaging largely inspires in the consen-
sus between the producers of waste and the Public
Administrations (local and regional above all). This
new legislation, stemming from the three last years,
can mean a support in the introduction of the figure
of VEAs in Spanish environmental policy, as it has
already done. Pérez Moreno (1998) has highlighted
the consensus and participation culture as a great
new deal in the next future of environmental law.
As an example of this, in this paper we have d-
scribed three Voluntary Integrated Systems (SIG)
signed on packaging management.
The legal relations existing between the members of
these agreements are specially regulated in Spanish
case, not only because this agreements are inserted
in the positive rules -appearing as a development or
implementation of the same and not as an alterna-
tive to it-, but also because the use of agreements in
Spain happen to be particularly fortunate due to the
already existence in Spanish Law of a conventional
institution in which VEAs can be placed: the col-
laboration agreements (CAs) between the Admini-
strations and the firms to encourage the private
activities affecting positively the common good. To
be exact, VEAs on waste belong to the type of
"product agreements", classification established by
Suurland (Suurland, 1994).
As it has been said in the study about the effective-
ness of VEAs, these can be more useful as a com-
plement of other environmental instruments (regu-
lations or financial tools) to which they could help
in an efficient way, particularly in the sense of im-
proving the environmental sensibility of consumers,
of creating consensus and of constituting a sphere
of s ared information among the different sectors
(EEA, 1998).
7 Appendix
Details about the three Packaging SIG subscribed
in Spain
As we have advanced above, three were the SIG
which appeared at the beginning in Spain: they are
systems managed by the associations ECOVIDRIO,
ECOACERO and ECOEMBES. These triad has
also been said to have been reduced to a duet
months later, thanks to the integration of
ECOACERO into ECOEMBES. Also SIGRE has
join the voluntary approach, concerning the man-
agement of the pharmaceutical products. The func-
tion of ECOACERO in ECOEMBES is developed
through the Technical Commission of tinplate,
formed by 18 members, of which ECOACERO will
name 9. The Ecological Association for the recy-
cling of tinplate (ECOACERO) was set up the 30th
November 1996. Among its purposes, we can find
the following: 1) solutions to environmental prob-
lems generated by light metallic bottles, like tin-
plate and tin; 2) the Constitution of an integrated
system under the protection of the European Direc-
tive 94/62/CE and of the rules of Spanish Acts, that
develop it; 3) Exploitation, recovering, investiga-
tion, formation, spreading of techniques, and sub-
scription of voluntary agreements with all kind
of private and public entities for the achievement
of the previous aims. While ECOEMBES tries to
cover all the types of bottled materials, except for
the glass, ECOVIDRIO makes the same with the
glass, but only through the recycling as this is a
material which is worthless from the energy per-
s ective.
ECOEMBES
Th  partners who joined the Voluntary management
Sys em of ECOEMBES were several:
(1) GRUPO DE ENVASADORES which includes
the following companies and associations:
FEDERACIÓN DE INDUSTRIAS DE
ALIMENTACIÓN Y BEBIDAS (FIAB),
ASOCIACIÓN NACIONAL DE
FABRICANTES BEBIDAS REFRESCANTES
(ANFABPA), ASOCIACIÓN NACIONAL DE
EMPRESAS DE AGUAS DE BEBIDAS
ENVASADAS(ANEABE), ASOCIACIÓN
NACIONAL DE FABRICANTES DE





GENERAL DE FABRICANTES DE
AZUCAR DE ESPAÑA (AGFA),
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ASOCIACIÓN DE FABRICANTES DE
DETERGENTES TENSOACTIVOS Y
PRODUCTOS AFINES (ADTA),
CODORNIU, CAMP, LECHE PASCUAL,
PROCTER & GAMBLE, NESTLE, NUTREX-
PA, UNILEVER, CAMPOFRIO, COLGATE-
PALMOLIVE, GALLINA BLANCA, DANO-
NE, HENKEL, FREIXENET JHONSON’S
WAX, CLESA, GILLETTE, BIMBO, KRAFT,
JACOBS SUCHARD, L’OREAL, GENERAL
BISCUITS, PESCANOVA, AUSONIA,
ARBOFA, PROMARCA Y COCA-COLA.
(2) GRUPO DE COMERCIO Y DISTRIBUCIÓN,
which includes the following companies and
associations:
IFA, EUROMADI, MERCADONA, EL
CORTE INGLÉS, PRYCA, ALCAMPO, DIA,
CONTINENTE, MARK & SPENCER. Y
EROSKI.
(3) GRUPO MATERIAS PRIMAS
(MATERIALES DE ENVASADO): which in-
cludes the following companies and associa-
tions:
RECIPAP (Paper), ANEP (plastic PET),
TETIRA LAVAL HISPANIA (Tetra-brik),
CICLOPLAST (Plastics, except for PET),
ARPAL (Aluminium), FEDEMCO (Wood),
ECOACERO (tinplate and steel).
(4) GRUPO RECICLADORES Y OTROS, which
includes the following companies and associa-
tions:
ECOLENO S.L., CESPA S.A., CESPA G.R.,
ASOCIACION NACIONAL DE RECICLA-
DORES DE PLASTICO (ANARPLA),
(ASOCIACIÓN CATALANA DE PYMEs DE
LA RECUPERACIO DE PAPEL Y CARIO
(ACARE), RECIPAP S.L. (paper recyclers) y
PAPELES GAYA.
ECOVIDRIO
In the beginning, ECOVIDRIO was founded by 13
associations which included about 3.000 thousand
companies of the sector, manufacturing more than
one billion pesetas (what have already developed a
Program on Recycling and Collecting valid in about
3.500 Townships all over Spain. Among them, we
find the following:
Agrupación Nacional de Reciclado de Vidrio
(A.N.A.R.E.VI), Asociación Nacional de Empresas
de Fabricación Automática de Envases de Vidrio
(ANFEVI), Asociación Española de Fabricantes de
Sidra, Asociación Española de Mostos, BSN Vidrio
España, Cerveceros de Espa6a, Confederación
Española de Vino, Federación Española de Vino,
Federación Española ce Fabricantes ce Bebidas
Espirituosas, Vicasa, Vídrala, Vidriera Leonesa,
Vidriera Rovira.
Ecovidrio includes in its Statutes the amounts that
the bottlers will provide per each bottled product
that they put in the market by means of such sys-
tem: 20 cents of peseta per each bottle up to 1/2 litre
and 40 cents per each bottle of 1/2 litre or more
capacity. On its part, Ecoembes defines the cost of
the green point for the empty bottles according to 5
or 6 categories of volume, and, in the case of flat
bottles, it will be according to the weight (Poveda
Gómez, 1997).
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Glachant, Martina Chidiak, François Lévêque and the
other charming people of the staff at CERNA (Paris) for
making possible this paper. They allowed me to stay there
to finish my research and gave me all their support.
The author is the only responsible for all the mistakes
contained in this paper, in case there was any.
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1 Introduction: Objects of the Research Proj-
ect and Selection of the Cases
In Germany environmental agreements are increas-
ingly used as an instrument in environmental pol-
icy. Until 1997 more than 90 of such agreements
were concluded for the most different environ-
mental objects. In the meantime there may exist
more than 100 environmental agreements which are
more or less successful in achieving their purposes.
It must be pointed out that the following research
results on environmental agreements only concern
the specific kind of agreements concluded in Ger-
man environmental policy. In Germany these ar-
rangements are unilateral, legally not binding decla-
rations by industrial associations or companies to
take up certain environmental measures. In this
context a central question to be answered by this
research project was: Which preconditions must
exist for the success of such specific, legally not
binding agreements? To answer this question a case
study was carried out comparing two cases of
agreements in the field of waste management which
differed in their outcome. By comparing two
agreements, which aimed to fulfill the same objects
                                                          
* Research assistant at the Centre for Economic and Environmental
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(increase of the recycling of residue materials, im-
plementation of a circulation based economy) and
regulated the same policy (waste management)
more detailed statements about the preconditions
for a successful implementation of that instrument
w re expected.
In the research project the agreement of the German
Battery Industry and the Association of the German
Retail Business for the taking back and the disposal
of batteries (1988) was compared with the agree-
ment of the Paper Trade and the Publishers´ Asso-
ciation for the taking back and the recycling of
scrap paper (1994). While the battery agreement
was successful to only some extent the paper
agreement is a clear case of success in achieving its
objects in waste management policy.
The empirical research of the policy processes in
both cases and the analysis of the specific eco-
nomic, political and legal conditions generated
important information about the preconditions for a
successful implementation of environmental agre-
ments. The following paper will deal with the most
important of them.
2 The Representation of the two Cases refer-
ring to their Success in Implementation
The most important purposes of the battery agree-
ment were firstly the reduction of noxious sub-
stances (esp. of mercury, lead and cadmium) in
Chances and Limits of Environmental Agreements in Waste Management
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specific types of batteries and secondly the reduc-
tion of toxic waste in the normal household refuse
caused by the inadequate disposal of hazardous
batteries (containing heavy metal substances as
mercury, lead or cadmium) in the normal household
refuse. In order to achieve the second object a spe-
cific collection and disposal system should be es-
tablished aiming to reduce the amount of toxic
batteries in this kind of refuse.
While the agreement was relatively successful in
reducing toxic substances in single battery types it
did not succeed in reducing the emissions of toxic
substances into the environment through the estab-
lishment of an efficient collection and disposal
system for noxious batteries. Even after the imple-
mentation of the agreement a considerable amount
of toxic batteries was still disposed within the nor-
mal household refuse. The newly established col-
lection and restoration system was not as successful
as expected. Altogether the battery agreement was
only a partial success.
As in the battery agreement, the main object of the
paper agreement was to reduce the amount of waste
by increasing the collection and recycling of scrap
paper. Therefore quantitative objects considering
the recycling rates were clearly formulated in the
agreement. During the last years these quantitative
objects were outnumbered by far.
Table: Comparison of the Recovery Rates of Scrap Paper with the Objects Proposed in the Agreement







53% 55% 58% 60%
Period of Time 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999/2000
Achieved Recovery
Rate
54.6% 64.0% 72.3% 81.1% 80.8% ? ?
Source: Arbeitsgemeinschaft Graphische Papiere (Date: 07/04/1999)
It is interesting that in the battery agreement no
quantitative recycling objects were defined. There
was only a general formulation that the recycling of
harmful labeled batteries containing toxic sub-
stances as mercury, lead and cadmium should be
increased. The amount of harmful batteries in the
normal household refuse should be decreased by
implementing this agreement. But the agreement
failed in attaining this object. It was not able to
justify its expectations in this regard.
What are the reasons for the different success of the
two agreements? On the one hand the main reason
are specific differences in the regulation of the
collection of both products. On the other hand there
are reasons based on different political, economic
and legal circumstances under which the agree-
ments were implemented.
3 The Most Important Research Results:
Different Features of the Success Factors in
the Compared Cases
In the following the most important results of the
research will be explained. In this context the prob-
lems with competition law (as it became evident in
the battery case)  will be especially considered.
Factors for Success
As crucial factors for success of environmental
agreements in waste management the following
were found:
1. Credible potential of the state to impose sanc-
tions on business and its associations which
stimulate them to conclude substantial agree-
ments;
2. Accordance with the legal order, especially
competition law;
3. Amount of expenditures the participating actors
have to invest to implement the agreement;
4. Feasible management of the involved partners:
requirements concerning the number of partici-
pants;
5. Positive influence of the market (sup-
ply/demand) on the realisation of the targets;
6. Existence of adequate control and information
mechanisms.
3.1 Credible potential of the state to impose
sanctions on business and its associations
which stimulate them to conclude substantial
agreements
The comparative analysis affirmed that only credi-
ble threat by the state to impose sanctions leads to
ecologically substantial concessions of the indus-
trial branches in the agreement. It can be proved
that this potential is crucial for the success of envi-
ronmental agreements. In this context the possibility
of the state to impose legal sanctions (e.g. to issue a
decree) is a very important precondition for the
successful implementation of agreements. With this
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potential the state is able to mobilize the establis-
ment of efficient negotiation systems in which dif-
ferent business associations are organized to de-
velop and implement their own measurements in
order to improve the environmental conditions.
In the analyzed cases the establishment of a nego-
tiation system for implementing the agreement took
place in different ways. In the unsuccessful case the
establishment of such an negotiation system failed
while in the successful case an efficient working
group for organizing and implementing the meas-
urements was founded. This fact is a consequence
of the different way the state pressurized the
branches to implement measurements in waste
management. In the case of the paper agreement a
particular working group was established due to the
actual governmental pressure to issue a decree re-
garding the recycling of scrap paper. In the draft for
this decree, which was submitted to the different
organizations and associations of the papers‘ and
publishers industry, clear quantitative recovery rates
were formulated aiming to increase the recycling
rates of scrap paper. Therefore the working group´s
aim was to prevent this decree by formulating and
implementing an environmental agreement which
was supposed to achieve the same environmental
objects as proposed in the decree.
The interviews proved that the industry had clear
economic incentives to conclude an agreement.
Otherwise the German government would have
issued an ordinance regulating the disposal and
improvement of recycling scrap paper. The ordi-
nance would have obliged the industry to establish a
collecting system and to increase the recycling
rates. The paper industry conducted calculations to
determine the costs which would arise for them if
they had to establish a collection system as intended
by the ordinance. These calculations forced that
industry branch to prevent this decree by conclud-
ing own measurements. This led to negotiations
between the paper industry, the printing industry,
the publishers branch and the German government.
For these negotiations the industry formed an own
negotiation system which was institutionalised as
‚Arbeitsgemeinschaft Graphische Papiere‘. It was
responsible for the realization and implementation
of the agreement. It is most important to emphasize
that all influential business associations within the
product cycle of paper were and still are organized
in this working group. The members of this group
include producers and importers of paper, the
printer industry, the paper wholesale and the pub-
lishers. The group negotiated the contents of the
environmental agreement with the responsible min-
istries (esp. the Ministry of Environment and the
Ministry of Economic Affairs). Therefore the policy
network between the governmental actors and the
indu trial branches was integrated to a high degree.
Due to the fact that all important actors dealing with
the agreement were included in the formulation and
implementation process from its beginning all par-
ticipants were able to claim their interests and aims
according to a practicable solution.
The comparison with the policy process of the bat-
tery agreement elucidates some important diffe-
ences responsible for the less success of this agree-
me t. In this context it is important to point out that
th  political background of this agreement differs
from the one in the paper case. Because of an EU-
irective released in 1991 during the negotiations
for the battery agreement it was evident that the
German government was obliged to issue a decree
to regulate the disposal of harmful batteries. For the
participating industry branches it became already
distinct in the late 80s that a decree was to be ex-
p cted. As a consequence the government was not
able to put credible pressure on the relevant indus-
try associations to formulate and implement a sub-
stantial agreement. In this perspective the battery
agreement is a special case: it is a self-commitment
anticipating a national decree.
In sum, in the battery case the governmental pres-
sure on the industry was much more moderate than
in the paper case. For example there was no pres-
sur  imposed on the industry by presenting the draft
of a decree with clearly formulated quantitative
recycling objects. As a consequence to the rather
moderate proceeding of the government no compa-
rable working group as in the paper case was estab-
lished. The battery case can be characterized by the
fact that no such working group representing all
relevant actors of the product cycle (i.e. from the
producers to the retail trade as responsible actor for
the collection of batteries) was founded. The nego-
tiations in this case were not performed between the
relevant ministries on the one side and a integrated
working group representing all relevant business
as ociations of the product cycle on the other side
eith r. Also the negotiations were less joint and are
characterized by changing participants. In sum the
negotiation process was much less integrated in the
battery case than in the paper case. The conse-
quence is a much less substantial agreement in its
collection and restoration objects compared to the
paper case. For the implementation of the battery
greement a working group was also founded – its
name was ‚Arbeitsgemeinschaft Batterien‘. But
characteristically enough it was only established
after the adoption of the agreement. It included only
the battery industry and not the retail business as
most important actor for the collection of batteries.
It will become clear in the following that the miss-
ing of the retail business in this group - as decisive
actor for achieving objects at collection – indicates
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that the retail business was not able to manage the
function to collect the harmful batteries.
3.2 Accordance with the legal order, especially
competition law
The collection of waste products is much more
problematic in the case of batteries than in the case
of paper. In Germany a collection system for scrap
paper exists for many years. The municipalities as
statutory companies are responsible for its financial
and organizational performance. With the adoption
of the environmental agreement nothing changed
the legal responsibility of the municipalities con-
cerning the collection of scrap paper.
Instead the collection of batteries is much more
complicated. Because a specific part of batteries
consists of harmful substances they belong to the
category of extraordinary refuse which can not be
disposed with the normal household refuse. As a
consequence this kind of waste is not collected by
statutory companies in Germany. It must be col-
lected by the battery industry (as actor interested in
recycling) and the enterprises of the retail business
(which put the batteries into circulation).
Since the producers and the retail are responsible
for the collection and recovery of batteries in Ge-
many problems concerning the responsibilities for
the collecting of them could arose. Together with
missing accordance to competition law this agree-
ment finally became a case of failure. In the fol-
lowing this fact will be explained more in detail.
One problem was that a collection system for bat-
teries first had to be planned and established. In this
system the enterprises of the retail business had the
crucial function to control and ensure the correct
collection of harmful batteries. Since they did not
fulfill this function in a sufficient way the imple-
mentation of a efficient collection system failed.
With regard to this it is important to know that the
battery agreement of 1988 only concerned the col-
lection and recycling of harmful batteries which are
particularly labeled. The market of batteries consists
only to a small part of such harmful batteries. The
share of harmful batteries in a narrow definition –
batteries which contain mercury, lead and cadmium
– was about 10% in 1996. That means that the bat-
tery agreement did not concern the major part of
harmless, unlabeled batteries (the other 90%). An
efficient collection of batteries by the established
collection system failed since the consumers did not
distinguish between harmful labeled and harmless
not labeled batteries in a sufficient way. Harmless
batteries should be disposed with the normal house-
hold refuse while the harmful labeled ones were
meant to be disposed in the specific collection
boxes placed in each single retail enterprise. Al-
though expensive customer information campaigns
about the correct collection of the batteries were
carried out, they did not succeed to improve the
consumers´ behaviour to distinguish between the
different kinds of batteries. Furthermore many con-
sum rs casted away both types in the collection
boxes or – much worse – threw them into the nor-
mal household refuse. The retail enterprises did not
sort out the harmless batteries in the full collection
boxes but sent them all together to the battery in-
dustry. As a consequence serious conflicts broke
out between the battery industry and the retail trade
ab ut the responsibility for sorting the batteries and
about the reasons for which the collection system
had failed. In the end this conflict led to the failure
of this agreement concerning its collection and
recycling objectives. As a consequence the German
government aimed to issue a decree in order to
regulate the disposal of all batteries – harmful and
harmless types – because the separate collection of
batteries did not seem to be practicable. To prevent
such a decree – which should regulate the disposal
of all batteries while the EU-directive required only
a national decree concerning harmful batteries – the
battery industry wanted to conclude a further envi-
ronmental agreement concerning the collection and
recovery of all batteries. Beside the difficulties with
the implementing of the first agreement, problems
relating to the competition law led to the conse-
quence that this one was never adopted. In the fol-
lowing the problems concerning the competition
law will be explained more in detail.
Referring to this second agreement it is of great
importance to know that an obligation to take back
batteries would only be economically useful for the
industry and the retail trade if it was organized in a
joint system of all producers and importers of ba-
teries in Germany. A point in favor for this argu-
mentation is, that the battery market in Germany
contains more than 120 batteries which differ in
size and type. Further important problems are the
high scale of import which is more than 70% and
the high number of more than 100.000 most differ-
ent outlets bringing the batteries into circulation.
The experiences with the first agreement made
evident that neither the consumer nor the retail
enterprises were able to perform a proper pregrad-
ing. For that reasons the battery industry argued that
batteries could only be efficiently collected in a
joint collection system managed by mostly all pro-
ucers and importers of batteries. This solution of a
pool collection system was presented in the draft for
the econd agreement concerning the disposal of all
batteries. But it was not accepted by the German
Offic  for the Control and Supervision of Cartels
because the foundation of such a collection system
would represent the establishment of a contract
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restraining competition concerning the disposal of
batteries. Such a pool sollution would not have been
compatible with competition law. It would restrict
price competition between the producers of batte-
ies and also impede innovational competition nec-
essary for the establishment of efficient utilization
procedures. Only the members of the pool would
appear as demanders. Therefore innovative enter-
prises not belonging to the pool would have an
inferior stimulus to enter into the market. It was
also argued that the development of alternative
solutions would be impeded. The German Office
for the Control and Supervision of Cartels also
predicted a considerably restricted price competi-
tion if costs for disposal would be standardized by
the branches.
In this context it is of special interest that the ‚Ar-
beitsgemeinschaft Batterien‘, which was founded in
1988 to implement the agreement also represents a
joint system of battery producers and importers. As
a pool system it was responsible for the collection,
disposal and recovery of used batteries. But this
responsibility only referred to labeled harmful bat-
teries. When the draft of the second agreement was
controlled with respect to compliance with the
competition law the activity of the Arbeitsgemein-
schaft was also controlled in this regard. The result
was a toleration of the activities of the Arbeitsge-
meinschaft by granting a exceptional permission.
The argumentation for this permission was that the
volume of turnover administered by this Arbeits-
gemeinschaft was too small in comparison with the
volume of the battery market. As already pointed
out the activity of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft only
concerned labeled harmful batteries which, in 1996,
formed a total market share of only about 10%.
Because of this small share the prevention of com-
petition was not expected. The exceptional permis-
sion was only granted under the condition that the
‚Arbeitsgemeinschaft Batterien’ would not expand
its volume of turnover. Otherwise its activity would
become incompatible with the competition law and
in consequence illegal.
As a consequence of this legal examination the
‚Arbeitsgemeinschaft Batterien‘ was only allowed
to collect labelled batteries. Therefore it refused to
accept the collection boxes which contained both
types of batteries. For that reason the ‚Arbeitsge-
meinschaft‘ sent the  collection boxes back to the
retail enterprises arguing that it was not allowed to
take other than labeled batteries. As an empirical
consequence the conflict between the retail trade
and the battery industry escalated. The battery in-
dustry blamed the retail trade to take not enough
care for an adequate distinction between labeled and
unlabeled batteries. On the other side the retail trade
reproached the battery industry to label their bat-
teries in an unrecognizable manner which in their
yes was supposed to be the reason for the insuffi-
cient separation by the consumers. None of the
actors wanted to be responsible for the bad collec-
tion result. Neither the battery industry nor the retail
tr de agreed to pay the additional costs that sud-
denly arose for grading the batteries according to
their types.
This kind of conflict was not expected and because
of missing institutions in which such a conflict
could have been balanced the final failure of the
agreement was inevitable. We will see that in the
successful case of the paper agreement such an
institution of conflict management was established
from the beginning of its implementation process.
The existence of such an institution was a crucial
point for the success of the paper agreement.
3.3 Amount of expenditures the participating
actors habe to invest to implement the agree-
ment
The battery agreement was less successful than the
paper agreement because the costs were much
higher in the first case. In contrast to the collection
of scrap paper a collection and recycling system for
spent batteries first had to be established with all
existing organizational and financial problems.
Compared with that the collection of scrap paper
could be organized within the existing collection
system. The municipalities were responsible for the
financial and organizational aspects of this collec-
tion system for a long time. No conflicts concerning
responsibilities of the disposal of scrap paper could
occur.
3.4 Feasible management of the involved part-
ners: requirements concerning the number of
participants
The success of the battery agreement was hindered
by the difficulties relating to a correct collection of
the batteries by the retail enterprises. Within this
context I want to quote an employee of the German
Ministry for Environment who told me that envi-
ronmental agreements would only be adequate
instruments if the number of affected persons or
enterprises is relatively small. In the battery case an
immeasurable number of most different retail ou-
lets (more than 100.000) was responsible for the
collection of the batteries. This immeasurable num-
ber prevented a successful implementation of the
agreement. This argument can be explained with the
theory of transaction costs. With an increasing
number of enterprises responsible for the successful
implementation of an agreement the transaction
costs for its successful implementation will increase
simultaneously. Transaction costs are costs for
negotiating and controlling the implementation of
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the agreement. The control over all participants is
necessary to ensure their support in attaining the
objects of the agreement. The more enterprises are
involved in the implementation of the agreement the
larger is the risk that some enterprises will not fol-
low the rules to achieve the objects. By evading the
rules of the game these enterprises save costs which
arise in order to achieve the objects. The larger the
numbers of participants the most likely it is that
their opportunistic behavior will not be discovered
and punished. In other words, a small number of
participants will ease the free-rider-problem. The
possibility of endangering the successful imple-
mentation of an agreement by opportunistic behav-
ior will decrease with a smaller number of partici-
pants.
Because of the immeasurable number of outlets
responsible for a correct collection of batteries the
Association of the Retail Trade (which was respon-
sible for achieving the objects on the retailers´ side)
was not able to inform and control each single busi-
ness about the correct collection of batteries in a
sufficient way. Moreover the structure of the retail
is much more differentiated (from the wholesale
store to the corner shop) and concerns different
market segments (from the service station to the
electrical dealers). The structure of the retail trade is
very heterogeneous. These characteristics made an
efficient collection of batteries difficult.
In contrary to this the collection of scrap paper is
organized by institutions which are statutory com-
panies. Semi-public or public authorities are r-
sponsible for the collection of scrap paper. There-
fore the organization of collecting scrap paper is
less complicated.
3.5 Positive influence of the market (sup-
ply/demand) on the realization of the targets
Another important factor for the success of the
paper agreement and its recycling objects is the fact
that a positive demand for scrap paper as valuable
raw material has decisively promoted the achieve-
ment of the restoration objects. The forces of the
market carried the objects of the agreement com-
pletely and were responsible for their achievement.
The influence of the demand for scrap paper as raw
material on the successful implementation of the
agreement can be illustrated by the development of
the quota concerning the use of scrap paper within
paper production. This quota could be increased
continuously since the mid 80s. In 1986 it was
45.9%, in 1990 48.6%, in 1992 52.1%, in 1994
56.4%, in 1996 60.4%. At the same time the overall
consumption of paper stagnated on an almost con-
stant high level (between 6.9 million and 7.6 mil-
lion tons each year between 1992 and 1997). These
numbers illustrate the increasing demand for scrap
paper in the mentioned period. The increasing im-
portance of scrap paper as raw material in paper
production can be illustrated by another fact: b-
tween 1994 and 1996 three paper plants in Germany
went into production. They produce printing paper
for newspapers which consists of scrap paper by
100%. Their total output in one year is 750.000
tons. Furthermore the German paper industry in-
vested five billion of DM until the year 2000 to be
able to produce more products out of scrap paper.
These numbers prove that an increasing demand for
scrap paper products supported the achievement of
the recovery rates defined in the paper agreement.
In the battery case a market for restoring the sub-
stances of batteries is just emerging. The reason for
that is that efficient procedures concerning the
grading and restoring of such substances in batteries
have just been developed. Their development is still
in progress. The main problem is to increase eco-
nomic efficiency of such procedures to make resto-
ration profitable. But contrary to the paper case the
restoration objects of batteries were not carried by
th  forces of demand. It must be pointed out that the
situation may change in future because of possible
t ch ical innovation in restoring batteries.
3.6 Existence of adequate control and informa-
tion mechanisms
Another very important factor for the success of
environmental agreements identified is an adequate
management during its implementation. In this
context the comparative case study illustrated that
the existence of an institution accompanying the
implementation of the agreement is indispensable.
In the case of the paper agreement such an institu-
tion was established with its adoption in 1994. It
was designated ‚Altpapierrat‘. This institution was
founded with the aim to control and accompany the
measurements performed for attaining the formu-
lated objects. It monitors the achievement of the
objectives but most importantly functions to be a
stage for conflict management if difficulties should
arise concerning the realization of measurements.
The members of the ‚Altpapierrat‘ are representa-
tives of:
1. the federal business association of the publishers
(Bundesverband der Deutschen Zeitschriften-
verleger (BDZV), Bundesverband Deutscher
Anzeigenblätter (BVDA), Verband Deutscher
Zeitschriftenverleger (VDZ)), the business asso-
ciation of the German producers of paper (Ver-
band Deutscher Papierfabriken (VDP)), the fed-
era  business association of the paper wholesale
(Bundesverband Papiergroßhandel), the business
associations of the printing industry, the dis-
patch dealers, the booktrade and the press trade.
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2. the German Ministry for Environment, the Fed-
eral Office for Environment (Umweltbun-
desamt), the German Ministry for Economic Af-
fairs, the project group ‚waste’ of the German
Bundesländer (Länderarbeitsgemeinschaft Ab-
fall) and three most important German Associ-
tions of the Municipalities.
The meetings of the ‚Altpapierrat‘ take place once a
year in order to inform the representatives of the
government about the success of the formulated
objects defined for each single year. But in the
interviews during the project it could be proved that
it also assembles if conflicts and problems con-
cerning the implementation of measurements should
arise suddenly between the responsible actors.
Therefore the interviews proved that the ‚Altpapier-
rat’ is of great importance for conflict management.
In this context this institution also benefits confi-
dence between the involved partners concerning the
implementation of the agreement. The ‚Altpapier-
rat‘ also is an important institution for the exchange
of information and scientific knowledge concerning
solutions for environmental protection, which pro-
motes innovation in the waste management of scrap
paper. For that reason it must be assessed as a factor
on its own relevant for the success of this agree-
ment. Such an institution had never been esta-
lished before in the case of the battery agreement
which may be a further reason why this case was
less successful.
4 Conclusion
At the beginning the potential of the state to impose
credible sanctions on the business associations and
the enterprises concerned was identified as an in-
dispensable factor for the success of environmental
agreements. In the case of the paper agreement the
pressure exerted on the relevant industries was
strong so they were motivated to develop a sub-
stantial agreement. In the battery case the govern-
mental pressure imposed during the negotiation
process was rather moderate. This agreement was
characterized as a specific case: it is an agreement
anticipating national regulation. Therefore the con-
tent of this agreement was less substantial. The
careless definition of objects and responsibilities
caused conflicts which arose later during the im-
plementation of the agreement and led to its finally
failure concerning the collection and recycling
targets.
Furthermore the different regulation of the collec-
tion is most important for the different success in
both cases. In the paper case the municipalities were
still responsible for efficient collection – in organ-
izational and financial matters. An efficient collec-
tion system had already been established and func-
tioned well. The paper industry did not have to
carry additional costs concerning the establishment
of a new collection system. In the battery case the
establishment of this system brought many conflicts
with it because of the specific problems concerning
the correct collection of batteries. These conflicts
also arose because of unexpected additional expen-
ditures along with a correct collection of the batter-
ies. Since a correct collection failed this system
came also into conflict with the competition law.
Finally this conflict led to a quarrel between the
battery industry and the retail trade about responsi-
bilities for the collection which ended in the failure
of the agreement.
Als  an adequate monitoring and managing of the
battery agreement was not possible because of the
high number of outlets responsible for attaining the
collection targets. This could not become a problem
in the paper case because the municipalities as
statutory companies remained responsible for the
coll ction of scrap paper.
Another factor for the success of the paper agree-
ment – perhaps the most important one - was the
positive demand for scrap paper as raw material in
paper production which made the collection and
restoring profitable. The forces of demand for scrap
paper were supporting the attainment of the recov-
ery rates formulated in the agreement. Such a de-
mand is still developing in the case of batteries.
Because it did not exist the last decade an increase
of the recycling rates concerning the different sub-
stances of batteries was more difficult. One reason
for that was that adequate efficient technical proce-
dures were still missing. But they were developed in
the last years so the situation might change.
Finally the establishment of a specific institution
responsible for monitoring and managing the im-
plementation of the paper agreement was identified
as an important factor for success. In the paper case
the ‚Altpapierrat‘ is taking up significant functions
concerning conflict management and the exchange
of scientific knowledge. An comparable institution
was not established in the battery case which is the
reason why this agreement was less successful.
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Abstract
The increasing use of environmental voluntary
agreements in place of legislative instruments rep-
resents asignificant challenge for administrative
lawyers in modern constitutional states. While cur-
rent discussions concerning environmental volun-
tary agreements are predominantly concerned with
their effectiveness, the aim of this paper is to ex-
amine universal aspects of tensions between “the
rule of law” and the use of environmental voluntary
agreements.
Although administrative law traditions vary be-
tween countries, given the term “the rule of law”
refers to the principle that those exercising public
power should be subject to legal controls, that prin-
ciple is the cardinal element in any modern consti-
tutional state. The public powers of government are
limited by law, and under the influence of the
democratic principle, legislation passed by Parlia-
ment has constituted the most significant legal co-
straints of the government’s area of influence.1 On
the other hand, in contrast to conventional environ-
mental regulation, the use of voluntary agreements
is usually not incorporated into a statutory frame-
work. Thus there is a concern that the use of volun-
tary agreements lies largely outside the scope of
administrative legal mechanisms which control the
use of public power. This may result in further
retreat from the ideal of “the rule of law.”
Bearing in mind the universality of the idea of “th
rule of law,” it may be presumed that this concern
holds true to some extent in any modern constitu-
tional states irrespective of the differences between
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administrative law traditions (particularly differ-
ences between common law countries and civil law
countries). In order to investigate the validity of this
proposition, this paper examines the subject in the
context of two different jurisdictions, namely Eng-
lish administrative law (a common law system) and
Japanese administrative law (a civil law system),
and analyses how far administrative law, as op-
posed to private law, governs the use of environ-
mental voluntary agreements, and how much legal
protection under administrative law can be offered
for private parties to a voluntary agreement, third
parties and the public interest.
This paper demonstrates that the use of voluntary
agreements in place of legislative instruments could
be a further retreat from the ideal of “the rule of
law” in both England and Japan, and concludes that
this concern is relevant to other jurisdictions as
well.
1 Environmental Voluntary Agreements and
Their Functional Equivalence to Conventional
Regulation
In this paper the term “voluntary agreements” refers
to formal or informal agreements between govern-
ment (or one of its agencies) and industry (or its
representatives)2 which are devised to achieve a
specific public policy goal. The most formal type of
voluntary agreements, such as those in the Nether-
lands,3 take the form of contracts between a public
authority and industry. The most informal type of
voluntary agreements take the form of self-
commitments or declarations of intent made by
industry, which are publicly recognised by a public
authority, examples of which can be found in Ger-
many.4
                                                          
2 This paper does not deal with voluntary agreements between industry and
NGOs.
3 See NETH. MINISTRY OF HOUSING, SPATIAL PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT,
SILENT REVOLUTION (1998).
4 See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW NETWORK INTERNATIONAL, ENVIRONMENTAL
AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE AND EFFECT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES 44 – 49 (1998); EUROPEAN COMMISSION, STUDY
VEA AND THE RULE OF LAW – COMPARISION BETWEEN ENGLAND AND JAPAN
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Due to widespread trends to deregulation and the
complexity of sustainability issues, there has been
an increasing interest in the use of environmental
voluntary agreements as substitutes for legislative
instruments (e.g. conventional environmental regu-
lation). There are many studies and survey,5 which
show that recent trends towards the increasing use
of voluntary agreements in environmental policy
are not confined to particular countries or regions.
Indeed, their use has emerged as one of the key
policy instruments in environmental policy in
Europe, Japan and the United States, irrespective of
the different political and social contexts, legal
cultures, and environmental concerns, which exist
in those regions. More significantly, these studies
and surveys indicate that voluntary agreements are
normally used as substitutes for conventional regu-
lation to deal with issues which, under the tradi-
tional environmental policy paradigm, would have
probably been addressed by conventional regula-
tion.
There are a rich variety of voluntary agreements,
and they can be categorised according to their
statutory status and their functional equivalence to
conventional regulation. Firstly, voluntary agree-
ments vary according to the degree of their func-
tional equivalence to conventional regulation in
terms of their regulatory formality and/or de facto
coercion. With regard to the regulatory formality,
some voluntary agreements only stipulate environ-
mental targets to be achieved by industry, such as a
20% reduction of CO2 emissions, and often lack a
mechanism to ensure compliance with the agree-
ments. On the other hand, some voluntary agree-
ments establish a high degree of regulation with
codes of practice and formal (but non-statutory)
regulatory mechanisms.6 7 In order to enhance the
                                                               
ON VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BETWEEN INDUSTRY AND PUBLIC
AUTHORITIES IN THE FIELD OF THE ENVIRONMENT, Annex 5, at 12 – 31(1997).
5 E.g., P. BÖRKEY & F. LÉVÊQUE, OECD, VOLUNTARY APPROACHES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (1998); VOLUNTARY
APPROACHES IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (C. Carraro and F. Lévêque eds.,
1999); EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 4; ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
NETWORK INTERNATIONAL, supra note 4, at 21 – 183; CO-OPERATIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE - PUBLIC-PRIVATE AGREEMENTS AS A POLICY
STRATEGY (P. Glasbergen ed., 1998); H. IMURA, OECD, THE USE OF
VOLUNTARY APPROACHES IN JAPAN: AN INITIAL SURVEY (1999); J. MAZUREK,
OECD, THE USE OF VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES: AN
INITIAL SURVEY (1998).
6 R. Baggott, By Voluntary Agreement: the Politics of Instrument Selection,
64 PUB. ADMIN. 51, 52 (1986).
7 E.g., the Pesticide Safety Precautions Scheme (PSPS). PSPS was in
operation from 1957 to 1986 in the UK, and was based on a voluntary
agreement between government departments and the relevant trade as-
sociations representing pesticide manufactures, importers, and formula-
tors. The scheme required that those who manufacture, distribute or im-
port new pesticides are required to submit test data relevant to the safety
of the pesticide to independent, expert scrutiny, and to ensure that the
pesticides were given clearance before entering the market place. PSPS
was replaced by a statutory framework, namely the Part III of the Food
and Environment Protection Act 1985 and the Control of Pesticide Regu-
effectiveness of environmental voluntary agree-
ments, there has recently been a tendency in the
development of voluntary agreements towards a
higher degree of regulatory formality. Indeed, rec-
ommendations by the European Commission con-
cerning the use of voluntary agreements clearly aim
at a higher degree of regulatory formality.8 In ddi-
ti n, there are often some elements of de facto coer-
cion backed by the dominant powers and resources
of government. Government could threaten other
measures, including the introduction of new legis-
lation, or make the award of relevant subsidies, tax
reductions, statutory permits/licences, or other re-
wards for private parties dependent on the conclu-
sion of/compliance with a voluntary agreement.9 10
Thus, even if a voluntary agreement lacks a high
degree of regulatory formality, voluntary agree-
ments can be used as substitutes for conventional
regulation to achieve a regulatory goal.
Secondly, voluntary agreements can be classified
into statutory voluntary agreements and non-
statutory voluntary agreements. The term “non-
statutory voluntary agreements” r fer to those that
do not have a statutory basis. “Statutory voluntary
agreements” are used here to mean voluntary
agreements with statutory authorisation. Statutory
volu tary agreements vary depending on how far a
relevant statute and secondary legislation imposes
substantive and procedural constraints on their use.
For example, legislation may stipulate that substan-
tive requirements should be included in a voluntary
agreement, and that  certain set of procedures must
be followed when concluding a voluntary agree-
m nt.11 On the other hand, a statute may only state
that a public authority may conclude a voluntary
agreement in order to deal with a particular policy
issue, thus giving a freehand to a public authority
regarding the use of voluntary agreements.
Out of the rich diversity of voluntary agreements,
the main concern of this paper is with the use of
                                                               
lations 1986. For more information on PSPS, see, D. Gilbert, Pesticide
Safety Policy and Control Arrangements in Britain (1987) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of London) (on file with the Imperial College
Central Library).
8 See Commission Recommendation of 9 December 1996 concerning
Environmental Agreements Implementing Community Directives
(96/733/EC), 1996 O.J. (L 333) 59, paras. 2.2, 2.3. It states, for example,
that agreements should establish dissuasive sanctions such as fines,
penalties or the withdrawal of a permit, in case of non-compliance.
9 See Baggott, supra note 6, at 54.
10 For example, the European Commission states that an “effective tool in
ensuring compliance [with an environmental voluntary agreement] could,
for instance, consist in making individual permits subject to compliance
with the agreement.” See Communication from the Commission to the
Council and the European Parliament on Environmental Agreements.
COM(96) 561 final, point 36.
11 E.g., voluntary agreements under the Consolidated Environmental
Protection Act, Act No. 625 of July 15, 1997. (Den.)
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non-statutory voluntary agreements which are fun-
tionally equivalent to conventional regulation in
spite of their lack of statutory basis. It is this type of
voluntary agreement that is often used in many
developed countries.12 The key question is whether
the development of this type of voluntary agree-
ments runs contrary to the development of adminis-
trative legal mechanisms towards the ideal of “th
rule of law.”
2 Where has “the Rule of Law” Gone?
“The rule of law” is a widely-used term which has
meant many things to many people in many coun-
tries. In this paper, the term taken to refer to the
public law principle that those exercising public
power should be subject to legal controls. Given
that the term “the rule of law” refers to that princi-
ple, “the rule of law” is the universal principle of
modern constitutional states.13 The principle may
have different names in different jurisdictions (e.g.
the rule of law in England, le principe de légalité in
France, Prinzip der gesetzmäßigen Verwaltung in
Germany, Horitsu ni yoru Gyosei no Genri [the
Principle of Government by Legislation] in Japan),
but all are united by a common belief that public
power should be subject to legal controls.14 With its
allegiance to the idea of “the rule of law,” adminis-
trative law in modern constitutional states has made
a great stride in developing legal mechanisms to
keep powers of government within their legal
bounds so as to protect the citizen against their
abuse. The public power of government is limited
by law, and under the influence of the democratic
principle, parliamentary legislation has become the
most significant legal constraint on the use of public
power.15 From the viewpoint of “the rule of law,” a
legislative instrument is not only an instrument for
the implementation of policies but also constitutes
one of undamental constraints o  the use of public
power.16
                                                          
12 See BÖRKEY & LÉVÊQUE, supra note 5; IMURA, supra note 5; MAZUREK,
supra note 5; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 4.
13 For discussion of the universality of the idea of “the rule of law” and the
meaning of “the rule of law” in various modern constitutional states, see
SCHWARZE, supra note 1; GENDAI GYOSEIHO TAIKEI I [MODERN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SYSTEMS I] 121–276 (I. Ogawa et al. eds., 1984); N.
NEVILLE BROWN & J. BELL, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 214–16 (1993); M.
P. SINGH, GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN COMMON LAW PERSPECTIVE 5–6
(1985); WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 24–
28 (7th ed. 1994).
14 For example, the Article 6 of the Treaty of European Union states that “the
rule of law” is a principle which is common to the member states of the
EU.
15 SCHWARZE, supra note 1, at 231.
16 A similar distinction of two theoretical perspectives concerning legislative
instruments are made in C. HARLOW, EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE 3–4 (1998) and M. KOBAYAKAWA, GYOSEI HO JO
[ADMINISTRATIVE LAW I] 16–17 (1999).
One of the fundamental conviction of the idea of
“the rule of law” is a rejection of the instrumental-
ist’s perspective which regards legislative instru-
ments, such as conventional regulatory law, asno
more than one of tools available to achieve a public
policy goal.17 Nonetheless, one of hidden themes
run ing through current arguments for voluntary
agreements in Europe, Japan, and the United States
is that of anti-legalism which are mainly based on
the instrumentalist’s perspective, and voluntary
agreements are normally used as substitutes for
legislative instruments (e.g. conventional regula-
tion).
Bearing in mind the fact that in many cases volun-
tary agreements are non-statutory and hatthere is a
tendency in many developed countries to develop
voluntary agreements which are highly regulatory
in nature in order to enhance their effectiveness, the
increasing use of voluntary agreements could repre-
sent a significant challenge for administrative law-
yers in any modern constitutional state. The k y
question here is whether existing administrative
legal mechanisms can provide effective legal con-
trols on the use of voluntary agreements, with due
consideration for their potential as functional
equivalence to c nventional regulation. If environ-
mental voluntary agreements are functionally
equivalent to conventional regulation, there should
be little difference b tween voluntary agreements
and conventional regulation in terms of the legal
controls of their use. Otherwise, government can
escape from the legal constraints affecting the exer-
cise of statutory powers of conventional regulation,
by using voluntary agreements functionally
equivalent to conventional regulation.18
This concern is shared by some institutions and
academics. In particular, the concerns expressed by
the European Parliament are worth noting here. The
European Parliament states that “when EAs [envi-
ronmental voluntary agreements] are used, the same
level of legal protection for those directly concerned
and third parties as is offered when legislation is
implemented must be guaranteed, and it calls on the
Commission to investigate the most appropriate
ways of offering this legal protection.”19 It also
points out that “where EAs are concerned, legal
                                                          
17 Cf., M. Hunt, Constitutionalism and the Contractualisation of Government
in the United Kingdom, in THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 21, 22
(M. Taggard ed., 1997) (supporting this point in the context of constitu-
tionalism).
18 Cf., T. Daintith, The Techniques of Government, in THE CHANGING
CONSTITUTION 209, 236 (J. Jowell & D. Oliver eds., 3rd ed., 1994) (pointing
out the same concerns with regard to non-statutory policy instruments as
alternatives to legal regulation).
19 Resolution on the Commission Communication to the Council and the
European Parliament on Environmental Agreements, EUR. PARL. DOC.
(A4-0224/97) para. 8 (1997).
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protection under administrative law disappears both
for the parties to EAs (industrial operators) and for
third parties affected thereby (e.g. local resi-
dents)….”20
On the other hand, the most striking feature of cur-
rent discussions concerning environmental volun-
tary agreements is the lack of analysis from the
perspective of “the rule of law.” Current discussions
are primarily centred on the effectiveness of volun-
tary agreements.21 Although some of the literature
examines values r levant to “the rule of law,” such
as the accountability, transparency, and credibility
of voluntary agreements, they are considered pri-
marily as preconditions for the effective use of
voluntary agreements and thus are not considered
from the viewpoint of “the rule of law” per se. For
example, the European Commission states, “[i]n
order to be effective, t is essential…to ensure their
[voluntary agreements’] transparency and reliabil-
ity” (emphasis added).22 In short, current discus-
sions concerning voluntary agreements emphasise
the instrumentalists’ perspective rather than the idea
of “the rule of law.” Although there is some litera-
ture which is concerned with both “the rule of law”
and environmental voluntary agreements, most of
the literature, including that of the European Par-
liament, merely express these concerns andhas
not yet examined in detail, in the context of a par-
ticular jurisdiction, tensions between “th  rule of
law” and the use of voluntary agreements. This
paper therefore provides a basis for such an analyti-
cal perspective.
3 Analytical Perspectives
3.1 Public Law Mechanisms and Environmental
Voluntary Agreements
The use of voluntary agreements instead of conven-
tional regulation may result in enabling gover-
ments to escape from the legal constraints which are
imposed by administrative legal mechanisms to
control the use of public power. Although there are
                                                          
20 Id. para. 9.
21 For example, in 1996 the European Commission expressed three main
concerns about the use of environmental voluntary agreements, and all of
them are concerned with their effectiveness. Firstly the use of voluntary
agreements usually subject the targets and content of voluntary agree-
ments to negotiation between government and industry rather than legis-
lative rule-making processes, and thus it may only result in little more than
“business as usual” targets and measures. Secondly, there is the possibil-
ity of non-compliance because of the lack of statutory enforcement
mechanisms and sanctions. Thirdly, voluntary agreements only bind those
who have committed themselves, thus there is always the possibility of the
free-riders. See, Communication from the Commission to the Council and
the European Parliament on Environmental Agreements. COM(96) 561
final, points 10 to 12.
22 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament on Environmental Agreements. COM(96) 561 final, point
47.
vari us administrative legal mechanisms, the three
legal mechanisms outlined below are particularly
important.
· Substantive Statutory Controls: This term
refers to those controls where legislation stipu-
lates substantive constraints on the exercise of
public power. These constraints include: the
environmental goals to be attained; the regula-
tory standards to be applied; the conditions u-
der which a public authority may exercise its
public power; the kinds of administrative ac-
tions that a public authority may take; and the
nature of private ctivities which may be regu-
lated by a public authority. In this way, discre-
tion of public authorities is confined within le-
gal bounds. In modern constitutional states, this
control mechanism is substantiated by the re-
quirement of a statute, which demands that a
public authority should have specific statutory
authorisation, under the democratic principle,
for undertaking certain categories of adminis-
trative actions, such as those unilaterally in-
fringing or modifying legal rights of private
parties.
· Procedural Statutory Controls: This term
refers to those controls through statutory pro-
cedures which public authorities must comply
with in their exercise of public power. The pro-
cedures include: a fair hearing; giving reasons
for certain decisions; information disclosure;
public participation; and consultation with the
other stakeholders concerned. E vironmental
impact assessment legislation is a typical ex-
ample of this kind of procedural control on the
use of public power in environmental policy.
Administrative procedural laws such as those
that operate in the United States, Germany, and
Japan, constitute other examples of the proce-
dural control of public power. As the signifi-
cance of the discretionary power of government
has increased in modern administrative states,
procedural statutory controls have become key
mechanisms for the control of public power.
· Judicial Controls: While the two public law
mechanisms above are ex ante legal control
mechanisms, the judicial controls of public
power are ex post legal controls on the use of
public power, where ordinary courts (e.g. in
England) or administrative courts (e.g. in
France and Germany) review the legality of
administrative actions in terms of their sub-
stance and procedures.
The history of administrative law has been a history
of the development of these administrative legal
mechanisms towards the ideal of “the rule of law,”
and legislative instruments have formed the basis of
these control mechanisms. On the other hand, the
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use of public power by environmental voluntary
agreements may run contrary to this development of
administrative legal mechanisms. Firstly, most
environmental voluntary agreements in Europe,
Japan and the United States are not under substan-
tive statutory control.23 Secondly, as a result of the
lack of statutory status, there may be few statutory
procedural rules applicable to the use of voluntary
agreements. Although there are cases where de-
tailed non-statutory procedures are applied to the
use of voluntary agreements,24 they are mere ad-
ministrative practices, non-compliance with which
is not necessarily illegal.25 Thirdly, because of the
lack of substantive and procedural statutory controls
on the use of environmental voluntary agreements,
the courts may find it difficult to find legal grounds
for subjecting the use of voluntary agreements to
legal controls under administrative law.
3.2 Legal Protection of Parties to a Voluntary
Agreement, Third Parties, and the Public In-
terest
Even if the use of voluntary agreements lies largely
outside the scope of existing administrative legal
mechanisms for the control of public power, why
should administrative lawyers be concerned? Bear-
ing in mind that the use of voluntary agreements has
its basis on “consensus” among parties, and that
compliance with them is “voluntary” in theory, it
could be argued that their use is essentially different
from the use of public power with legal compulsion.
However, bearing in mind that voluntary agree-
ments can be functionally equivalent to conven-
tional regulation, if administrative legal mecha-
nisms to control public power are not available for
the control of the use of an environmental voluntary
agreement, this could result in a reduction in the
legal protection of parties to a voluntary agreement,
third parties, and the public interest compared to the
use of conventional regulation.
First of all, there is no guarantee that private parties
to a voluntary agreement are offered sufficient legal
protection against the use of voluntary agreements.
An environmental voluntary agreement has, in some
instances, a high degree of regulatory formality, and
there is a risk that regulatory power based on a
voluntary agreement may be abused by public
authorities or by private self-regulatory associa-
tions. Furthermore, voluntary agreements are not
                                                          
23 See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 4; BÖRKEY & LÉVÊQUE,
supra note 5; IMURA, supra note 5; MAZUREK, supra note 5.
24 E.g. A guideline for environmental voluntary agreements in the Nether-
lands (Vaststelling Aanwijzingen voor convenanten, 18 december
1995/Nr. 95M009543).
25 It may, however, result in a complaint of maladministration to the appro-
priate Ombudsman or an equivalent body.
necessarily “voluntary” and there is a risk that pri-
vate parties are coerced by a public authority to
undertake “voluntary” measures. Finally, the use of
voluntary agreements may result in inequality
among parties because terms and conditions of a
voluntary agreement can vary depending on the
bargaining power of parties concerned.26 In spite of
these concerns, there may be no suitable adminis-
trative legal mechanisms available to provide legal
protection of the parties to a voluntary agreement.
On the subject of the protection of third parties and
the public interest, it should be noted that environ-
mental issues are not private matters to be decided
only among parties to a voluntary agreement. A
public authority does not necessarily represent the
public interest, and there is a risk that the use of
voluntary agreements results in the abuse of public
power in favour of private parties to a voluntary
agreement at the expense of third parties and the
public interest. Firstly, there is a risk that third par-
ties are excluded from the arrangement of a volun-
tary agreement,27 which would run contrary to one
of recent developments in environmental regulation,
namely the development of public participation
schemes in administrative decision making proc-
esses. Secondly, the use of voluntary agreements
rai es the risk of privatisation of public policy, since
it is often the case that the substance of a voluntary
agreements is not the outcome of an open public
debate but rather that of negotiations and bargaining
behind closed doors. Thus, it is less likely than in
the case of conventional regulation that a wide
range of social and political interests is well-
integrated into a public policy in question.28 While
conventional regulation has its basis in a statute
whose authority is derived from Parliament, the use
of voluntary agreements often lacks such demo-
cratic legitimacy, as most of them bypass Parlia-
men .29 In short, “[t]he crucial question is whether
the right of third parties and the public interest can
be well-served by a voluntary agreement between
government and industry.”30
                                                          
26 F. Ost, A Game without Rules? The Ecological Self-Organization of Firms,
in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ECOLOGICAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE CONCEPT
AND PRACTICE OF ECOLOGICAL SELF-ORGANIZATION 337, 348 (G. Teubner et
al. eds., 1994).
27 See, e.g., J. W. Biekart, Environmental Covenants Between Government
and Industry: A Dutch NGO's Experience, 4 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L
ENVTL. L. (RECIEL) 141, at 148 (1995).
28 See Martin Enevoldsen, Democracy and Environmental Agreements, in
CO-OPERATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE - PUBLIC-PRIVATE
AGREEMENTS AS A POLICY STRATEGY 201(Pieter Glasbergen ed., 1998).
29 See, e.g., Resolution on the Commission Communication to the Council
and the European Parliament on Environmental Agreements, EUR. PARL.
DOC. (A4-0224/97) para. 13 (1997); Ost, supra note 26, at 349.
30 Biekart, supra note 27, at 141.
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3.3  Universal Implications for “the Rule of Law”
Administrative law traditions vary significantly
among countries, and it remains to be carefully
examined in the context of administrative law in
each jurisdiction whether the concerns above (i.e.
(a) concerns about the availability of administrative
legal mechanisms; and (b) concerns about legal
protection of parties to a voluntary agreement, third
parties and the public interest) are valid or not.
However, it may be assumed that these concerns
hold true to some extent in any modern constitu-
tional states irrespective of differences of adminis-
trative law traditions (particularly in spite of differ-
ences between common law traditions and civil law
traditions). In order to investigate this issue further,
this paper will examine the subject in thecontext of
English31 administrative law (a common law sys-
tem) and Japanese administrative law (a civil law
system). Both jurisdictions have long traditions of
voluntary approaches/self-regulation, and there
have been extensive discussions concerning th
tensions between “the rule of law” and non-
statutory public power in both jurisdictions.
4 Non-Statutory Public Power and “the Rule
of Law”: Current Discussions in England and
Japan
In the UK and Japan public authorities have often
pursued their regulatory goals by way of non-
statutory power such as the use of contractual tech-
niques or other “consensual” or “voluntary” ap-
proaches, relying on various means of coercion or
rewards backed by their dominant powers and re-
sources against private p rties.32 33 In this context,
in both jurisdictions the use of non-statutory powers
that are functionally equivalent to statutory public
power (e.g. regulatory statutory power) is a matter
of concern from the perspective of “the rule of law”
because it could provide government with a way to
escape from the province of “the rule of law.”
                                                          
31 Administrative law in England and other regions in the UK such as
Scotland vary slightly. The following examination of the UK is conducted in
the context of English administrative law.
32 With regard to the UK, see, e.g., Baggott, see supra note 6; R. Baggott,
Regulatory Reform in Britain: the Changing Face of Self-Regulation, 67
PUB. ADMIN. 435 (1989); B. V. Harris, The “Third Source” of Authority for
Government Action, 109 L.Q. REV. 626 (1992); Daintith, supra note 18.
33 With regard to Japan, see, e.g., J. O. HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER:
LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX (1991); M. Dean, Administrative Guid-
ance in Japanese Law: A Threat to the Rule of Law, 1991 J. BUS. L. 398;
F. K. Upham, Privatized Regulation: Japanese Regulatory Style in Com-
parative and International Perspective, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 396 (1996);
M. K. Young, Judicial Review of Administrative Guidance: Governmentally
Encouraged Consensual Dispute Resolution in Japan, 84 COLUM. L.
REV.923 (1984).
4.1  “The Rule of Common Law” and “the Rule by
Legislation”
In both England and Japan, the primary meaning of
“the rule of law” is that those exercising public
power should be subject to legal controls. However,
there are differences between the ideas of “th  rule
of law” in England and Japan in terms of their em-
phasis. In England it is the rule of “common law as
modified by Parliamentary statute”34 rather than the
rul  by legislation. Thus it might be argued that the
common law paradigm in English administrative
law makes it easier than in civil law countries to
subject the use of non-statutory power to legal con-
trols, i.e. controls by common law, in spite of the
lack of relevant statutory c nstraints on its use. On
the other hand, Japanese administrative law is
firmly founded on a civil law tradition with an em-
phasis on the rule of “legislation.” The fundamental
administrative law principle in Japan is called
“Horitsu ni yoru Gyosei no Genri” [the principle of
government by legislation], whose essence is the
control of public power through legislation. Thus
the lack of statutory constraints imposed on the use
of public power poses a significant difficulty for
Japanese administrative law in subjecting gover-
ment to legal controls under “the ule of law.”
The difference of emphasis of the idea of “the rule
f law” between England and Japan results in a
difference in their approach to the question of how
to subject the use of non-statutory power to legal
controls. While in England the emphasis is on
broadening the scope of judicial review (i.e. control
through common law), in Japan it is on broadening
substantial and procedural statutory controls (i.e.
c ntrols through legislation).
4.2  Discussions in the Context of English Ad-
ministrative Law: Broadening the Scope of Ju-
dicial Review
English administrative law is “overwhelmingly
concerned with the control of public power by judi-
cial review”35, and a large proportion of all applica-
tions for judicial review is concerned with the exer-
cise of the statutory powers and discretion conferred
upon public authorities by specific Parliamentary
legislation.36 Thus the difficulty for English admin-
istrative law in dealing with the use of non-statutory
power for public purposes li  in the lack of statu-
                                                          
34 Schwarze, supra note 1, at 140.
35 A. Page, Toolboxes and Blueprints: Controlling the Control of the Execu-
tive and the New Administrative Law, in CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF
EXECUTIVE SELF-REGULATION 39, 39 (Terence Daintith, Institute of Ad-
vanced Legal Studies, ed., 1997).
36 HARRY WOOLF ET AL. DE SMITH, WOOLF & JOWELL’S PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 3-015 (1999).
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tory constraints on their use that could in turn pro-
vide significant grounds for judicial review of ad-
ministrative actions. In this context, English ad-
ministrative law has been driven beyond the tra i-
tional scope of judicial review (i.e. judicial review
of statutory power) to include two kinds of non-
statutory power.37 One is where bodies which are
unquestionably governmental do things for which
no statutory authorisation is necessary.38 The other
is where judicial review is extended to the use of
non-statutory power by private bodies which per-
form public functions but fall outside the sphere of
government altogether.39 It is important to note that
the use of environmental voluntary agreements
often involves these two different contexts. One is
the use of non-statutory power by a public authority
for a public purpose. The other is the use of non-
statutory power by a private self-regulatory asso-
ciation so as to secure compliance with the agree-
ment.
A key case pertaining to the use of non-statutory
power by public authorities in England is that of
Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the
Civil Service40 [hereinafter the GCHQ case], which
held that a government action was not immune from
judicial review merely because it was carried out in
pursuance of a power derived from common law
rather than a statutory source, and that it was the
subject-matter that counted, not the source of
power. Thus, English administrative law does not
necessarily presuppose the existence of relevant
legislation in order to subject a particular adminis-
trative action to judicial review. If there is any pub-
lic element in the use of non-statutory power, it may
be subject to judicial review as a public law issue.
However, the courts have difficulty in subjecting
the contractual power to judicial review, and it
“appears that the courts are not certain as to when
and how judicial review should be available in
respect of the government’s decisions to contract
and the exercise of the powers which government
may derive from contract.”41
Secondly, regarding the use of non-statutory power
by a private self-regulatory body which performs
public functions, theCourt of Appeal decision in R
v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Data-
fin plc42 is worth noting here. It held that, bearing in
mind that the Panel on Take-overs and Mergers did
have government backing and was exercising its
                                                          
37 Wade & Forsyth, supra note 13, at 660.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 [1985] AC 374.
41 Harris, supra note 32, at 645 – 46.
42 [1987] QB 815.
duties in the public interest, its decision should be
subject to the control of public law (i.e. judicial
review) even though the Panel is a private body
without a statutory basis. However it should be
noted that recent cases43 have added one significant
qualification with regard to the applicability of
judicial review to decisions by a private self-
regulatory association. These cases held that a mere
contractual relationship is not subject to judicial
review, conceptualising a mere contractual relation-
ship as a private rather than public law issue. Thus,
while English courts feel the necessity to subject the
use of non-statutory public powerby a private body
to judicial review, they have hesitated about cover-
ing contractual re ationship.
In both cases which use non-statutory powers for
public purposes, the lack of statutory basis of the
use of public power in question affects the courts’
use of grounds for judicial review.44 These grounds
for judicial review include an improper purpose, the
failu e to take into account relevant considerations,
nd the taking into account of irrelevant considera-
tions.45 The procedures which are required in order
to satisfy procedural propriety, or the principles of
fairness are more difficult to ascertain because of
the absence of statutory constraints.46 More impor-
tantly, the tendency evident in R v Disciplinary
Committee of the Jockey Club, ex parte Aga Khan47
to assert that a decision-maker deriving power from
a contract cannot be subject o judicial review, has
given rise to concern about the ability of English
administrative law to respond to the use of volun-
tary agreements. If thegovernment chooses to im-
ple ent its public policies through a voluntary
agreement, the courts may treat such governmental
activities as being beyond the reach of judicial re-
view, and thus let the matter be regulated by the
private law of contract only.48 Indeed, Lord Diplock
states in the GCHQ case that a decision will not be
susceptible to judicial review if the decision-
maker’s authority is merely derived from an agree-
ment between the parties.49
                                                         
43 See, R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex parte Aga Khan
[1993] 1 WLR 909; R v Insurance Ombudsman Bureau, ex parete Aegon
Life [1994] COD 426
44 See, Harris, supra note 32, at 647.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 [1993] 1 WLR 909
48 Hunt expresses the same concerns with regard to the contracting out of
public services to private bodies. See, Hunt, supra note 17, at 35.
49 This equation of contract with private law is the focus of criticisms by
many academics. See, e.g., S. Fredman & G. S. Morris, The Costs of
Exclusivity: Public and Private Re-examined, 1994 PUB. L. 69; M. Freed-
land, Government by Contract and Public Law, 1994 PUB. L. 86; S. Ar-
rowsmith, Judicial Review and the Contractual Powers of Public Authori-
ties, 106 L.Q. REV. 277 (1990).
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Lastly, it is important to note that all these devel-
opments above constitute the expansion of the
scope of judicial review, and it is interesting that
there have been few discussions concerning how to
subject the use of non-statutory public power with-
out legal coercion to substantive and procedural
statutory controls.
4.3  Discussions in the Context of Japanese Ad-
ministrative Law: Broadening the Scope of
Substantive and Procedural Statutory Controls
As in the UK, the use of non-statutory public power
has been traditionally prevalent in the Japanese
administrative style.50 Two typical examples of the
use of this administrative style are gyosei shido
[administrative guidance] and Kogai Boshi Kyotei
[LPCA: local pollution control agreements].
Gyosei shido is one of key concepts for under-
standing the Japanese administrative style. Gov-
ernment departments in Japan often choose not to
adopt regulatory approaches to accomplish their
policy goals but instead to rely on gyosei shido.
Gyosei Tetsuduki Ho [the Administrative Procedure
Law]51 defines “gyosei shido” as an administrative
action by a public authority, excluding the use of
statutory power with legal compulsion, to ask a
private body or an individual person to undertake a
particular action or inaction to achieve a govern-
ment policy goal.52 Gyosei shido has its basis in
negotiation and consensus between a public author-
ity and a private party,53 and thus the use of gyosei
shido can be understood, in some cases, as similar
to practices of informal voluntary agreements oper-
ating in Germany.54
Though translated into English as “administrative
guidance,” the Japanese term “gyosei shido” con-
notes certain authoritative characteristics of its own
which the translation does not fully express.55 “Al-
though compliance with administrative guidance
[gyosei shido] is technically voluntary, Japanese
administrators rely on informal pressure and other
means of enforcement to persuade regulated parties
to comply.”56 Japanese academic commentators are
concerned about whether it is acceptable, from the
                                                          
50 See, e.g., HALEY, supra note 33; Dean, supra note 33; Upham, supra note
33; Young, supra note 33.
51 Law No. 88 of 1993.
52 Art. 2, no. 6.
53 See, e.g.,MUNEYUKI SHINDO, GYOSEI SHIDO [ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE] 77
– 129 (1992).
54 For information on the use of informal voluntary agreements in Germany,
see generally ENVIRONMENTAL LAW NETWORK INTERNATIONAL, supra note 4,
at 44 – 49; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 4, annex 5, at 12 – 31.
55 W. Pape, Gyosei Shido and the Antimonopoly Law, 15 L. JAPAN 12, 13
(1982).
56 Young, supra note 33, at 982.
perspective of “the rule of law,” to let public
authorities exercise non-statutory public power in
the form of gyosei shido which is functionally
equivalent to statutory regulation. In this context,
many Japanese academics now state tha th  use of
gyosei shido that is functionally equivalent to
statutory regulation must have a statutory basis and
thus must be under substantive statutory control.
However, this position is not upheld by the courts.
The courts hold that the use of gyosei shido does
not necessarily require statutory authorisation, but
rather that the use of gy sei shido must be on a
voluntary basis and that there should not be any
elements of de facto coercion in persuading private
parties to undertake voluntary measures in line with
a government policy.57 This position is now codi-
fied in Gyosei Tetsuduki Ho [the Administrative
Procedure Law].58 59 Thus, the Law delegalises the
use of gyosei shido with de facto coercion, while
permitting the use of gyosei shido on a purely vol-
untary basis.
In addition, the Administrative Procedure Law
stipulates procedural rules concerning the use of
gyosei shido, in order to enhance transparency,
accountability, and equality. The procedural rules
include issuing an document, upon request, which
clarifies the purposes of, contents of, and the name
of the official who is responsible for the gyosei
shido in question.60
LPCAs are environmental voluntary agreements
between a local authority and industry, and have
been widely used in Japanese environmental policy
inc  the 1960s,61 normally as substitutes for con-
                                                          
57 See, e.g. 39(5) Minshu 989 (Sup. Ct., 16 July 1985).
58 Law No. 88 of 1993.
59 Gyosei Tetsuduki Ho [the Administrative Procedure Law] states as follows
(translated by the author):
A public authority shall give due consideration to the principle that the use
of gyosei shido must be based on voluntary co-operation on the part of
private parties. (art. 32, para. 1.)
A public authority must not treat disadvantageously those who do not
comply with gyosei shido because of their incompliance. (art. 32, para. 2.)
A public authority must not use its relevant statutory powers such as those
to give or revoke permits, licences, or authorisation of certain private ac-
tivities in order to compel private parties to comply with gyosei shido. (art.
34.)
60 Gyosei Tetsuduki Ho [the Administrative Procedure Law] states as follows
(translated by the author):
In issuing administrative guidance, a public authority shall make clear its
purposes, contents, and the name of an official who is responsible for the
administrative guidance. (art. 35, para. 1.)
When requested by those whom a public authority gives administrative
guidance to, the public authority shall, in principle, issue a document de-
tailing its purposes, contents, and the name of the staff who is responsible
for the administrative guidance. (art. 35, para. 2.)
When a public authority issues administrative guidance to more than two
private parties to achieve the same administrative goals, the public
authority shall establish common guidelines with regard to the contents of
the administrative guidance and shall publish them. (art. 36)
61 There are more than 30,000 voluntary agreements used by local authori-
ties. See Japan. Environment Agency, Chihokokyodantai no Kankyo
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ventional regulation. It is important to note that the
use of gyosei shido is closely related to the use of
LPCAs, because it is normally by way of gyosei
shido that a local authority urges industry to enter
into LPCAs. In addition, it is not only the use of
enforcement powers (e.g. monitoring, inspections,
and sanctions) authorised by a voluntary agreement
but also gyosei shido that a local authority uses to
enforce a LPCA. Thus, it could be argued that
LPCAs are contractual arrangements based on gyo-
sei shido, and therefore all the discussions and
statutory constraints explained above in relation to
gyosei shido are directly relevant.
While there are many concerns expressed over the
use of gyosei shido particularly with regard to its
functional equivalence to statutory regulation, on y
a few concerns are expressed about the use of
LPCAs. Many academics state that LPCAs are
based on consensus among parties, and thus that
their use isdifferent from the use of statutory power
which are coercive in its nature. Th s, if LPCAs are
purely voluntary, they argue, there are no tensions
between the use of LPCAs and “the rule of law.”
However, in strict legal terms gyosei shido is also
based on “consensus” among parties and “volun-
tary” co-operation on the part of private parties, and
there is not much difference between the use of
gyosei shido and LPCAs in terms of their nature as
non-statutory public powers which are functionally
equivalent to statutory regulation. Based on this
recognition, some academics express there concerns
over the use of LPCAs. For example, Abe states
that the use of voluntary agreements as substitutes
for statutory regulation essentially constitutes an
evasion from the province of “the rule of law” be-
cause there are no legal protection provided for the
parties to a LPCA and third parties.62 Harada argues
that there should be some mechanisms to enhance
accountability of LPCAs, such as information dis-
closure, the right to a fair hearing, and public par-
ticipation.63 Similarly, Kitamura is concerned about
the unlimited use of LPCAs as substitute for
statutory regulation, because it may result in the
shift away from the ideal of “the rule of law” in the
sense that there are few statutory constraints im-
posed on their use in spite of their functional
equivalence to conventional regulation.64
                                                               
Hozen Tisaku Chousa [Environmental Policies in Local Authorities] 60
(1999) (unpublished, on file with the Environment Agency of Japan).
62 Y. Abe, Kogai Boshi Kyotei to Jumin no Kyusaihoho [Local Pollution
Control Agreements and Legal Protection of Local Residents], 988 HANREI
JIHO [CASE L.J.] 17 (1981).
63 N. HARADA, KANKYO HO [ENVIRONMENTAL LAW], 177 (1994).
64 Y. KITAMURA, JICHITAI KANKYO GYOSEI HO [ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW IN LOCAL AUTHORITIES] 48 – 50 (1997).
While there are extensive discussions from the
perspective of broadening the scope of substantive
and procedural statutory controls on non-statutory
public powers, there has been little discussion of
br adening the scope of judicial review. Indeed, the
sc pe of judicial review in Japan is much more
limit d, and Gyosei Jiken Sosho Ho [the Adminis-
trative Case Procedure Law]65 limits the scope of
judicial review to cover only the use of “statutory
public power” which unilaterally affects the legal
rights and duties of private parties.66 Although the
use of gyosei shido which does not comply with
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Law is
illegal, there is no administrative law remedy avail-
able to directly challenge the gyosei shido, because
gyosei shido does not, in strict legal terms, consti-
tute the use of “statutory public power” as defined
in the Administrative Case Procedure Law. For the
same reason, the use of LPCAs is not subject to
judicial review in the context of Japanese adminis-
trative law.
5 Administrative Legal Mechanisms and En-
vironmental Voluntary Agreements
The use of environmental voluntary agreements in
Japan is more prevalent than in the Netherlands and
Germany, which are two leading countries in the
development of the use of environmental voluntary
agreements in Europe. In Japan, there are more than
30,000 voluntary agreements by local authorities
(i.e. LPCAs: Local Pollution Control Agree-
ments),67 and more than 160 voluntary agreements
are currently used by government departments.68 It
should be noted that voluntary agreements by gov-
ernment departments in Japan take the form of
“voluntary action plans” launched by industry, and
that government departments and academics in
Japan does not see any equivalence between the
“voluntary action plans” in Japan and environ-
mental agreements in Europe. However, th se vol-
untary action plans i  Japan are actually arranged
by means of gyosei shido [administrative guidance]
and they are publicly recognised by the government
departments. Thus these action plans can be la-
                                                          
65 Law No.139 of 1962.
66 Art. 3. para 1. See also, the Supreme Court’s decision on 29 October
1964 (18 (8) Minshu 1809 (Sup. Ct., 29 Oct. 1964)).
67 JAPAN. ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, CHIHOKOKYODANTAI NO KANKYO HOZEN
TAISAKU CHOUSA: HEISEI 10 NENDO CHOSA [ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES IN
LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1999] 60 (1999) (unpublished,
on file with the Environment Agency of Japan).
68 These voluntary action plans falls into 4 categories: (a) voluntary action
plans on the reduction of hazardous air pollutant emissions (73 action
plans); (b) voluntary action plans on the recovery, reuse and destruction of
CFCs (7 action plans); (c) voluntary action plans on climate change (ap-
proximately 60 action plans); and (d) voluntary action plans on HFCs (25
action plans).
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belled as environmental voluntary agreements in the
European terminology.
On the other hand, the number of voluntary agree-
ments used in the UK is still small69 compared to
the three countries above mentioned. It should be
noted, however, that the figure for the UK is as
large as any other EU member states except for the
Netherlands and Germany, d that it is likely that
the figure in the UK will increase steadily, given the
current British government’s strong preference for
voluntary approaches in environmental policy.70
This section reveals thatin both jurisdictions the
use of voluntary agreements is largely outside the
scope of administrative legal mechanisms to control
the use of public powers in spite of the differences
in administrative law traditions and the iffering
approaches of each jurisdiction n subjecting the use
of non-statutory public power to legal controls.
5.1  Substantive Statutory Controls and Environ-
mental Voluntary Agreements
English administrative law allows that a public
authority can do anything which ordinary citizens
can lawfully do,71 while a public authority can not
take an action u ilaterally infringing or modifying
legal rights of the citizens without statutory authori-
sation to do so.72 It is therefore acceptable under
English administrative law that a public authority
implements one of its policies by way of a volun-
tary agreement.73 Indeed, the use of non-statutory
voluntary agreements has a long tradition in Eng-
land and is not confined to environmental issues.
One such example is the voluntary agreement con-
cerning the prohibition of tobacco advertising made
between the Minister of Health and the tobacco
industry.74 There are also statutory voluntary
agreements in the field of the wildlife protection
and planning control.75
In the context of English administrative law the lack
of statutory status makes a significant difference in
                                                          
69 The author has identified 18 non-statutory voluntary agreements in use in
the UK as of the end of 1999.
70 Since the Labour Party came to office in 1997, the UK government have
been enthusiastic advocates of the wider use of voluntary agreements in
environmental policy. Indeed, in various consultation papers published
under the current Labour administration, the UK government has explicitly
supported the wider use of voluntary agreements in environmental policy
and has invited various industry sectors to express their interest in enter-
ing into voluntary agreements with government on various issues of envi-
ronmental policy.
71 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 32.
72 See, e.g., Daintith, supra note 18, at 215.
73 See, e.g., Freedland, supra note 49, at 87.
74 For information on the use of voluntary agreements in other policy issues,
see C. TURPIN, BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION, 353–55
(1995).
75 See, e.g., Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, s. 39; Town and Country
Planning Act, 1990, s. 106.
terms of legal controls on the substance of volun-
tary agreements. With regard to statutory voluntary
agreements, relevant legislation normally imposes
more or less legal constraints on the contents of the
agreements, and whether a public authority has
acted within its statutory constraints in using a
statutory voluntary agreement is subject to judicial
review.76 On the other hand, the contents of non-
statutory voluntary agreements ar  up to negotia-
tions between public authorities and industry with-
out any legal constraints by relevant legislation, and
their use lies outside the scope of substantive statu-
tory controls under administrative law.
Japanese administrative law also holds that a public
authority can do anything which an ordinary citizen
can lawfully do,77 while the government needs
specific statutory authorisation to do anything that
unilaterally affects legal rights and duties of the
citizens. It is therefore also acceptable under Japa-
nese administrative law that the government im-
plements one of its policies by way of a voluntary
agreement. Although a few statutory environmental
voluntary agreements are used by a small number of
local authorities,78 their use as well as the use of
non-statutory voluntary agreements are ot subject
to judicial review because j dicial review is appli-
cable to only the use of “statutory public power”
which unilaterally change the legal rights and duties
of private parties, 79 and the use of voluntary agree-
ments is not deemed to constitute the use of “stat-
tory public power.”
In both jurisdictions thenon-statutory status of most
voluntary agreements gives wider discretion to
public authorities when determining the contents of
voluntary agreements. On the other hand, the statu-
tory status of certain voluntary agreements provides
certain substantive constraints on the use of volun-
tary agreements in both jurisdictions. However, the
statutory status of voluntary agreements has differ-
ent legal implications in England and Japan. While
in England a statutory status could provide legal
grounds for judicial review to check whether a
public authority has acted within the statutory con-
straints, in Japan a judicial review is not available to
challenge directly the use of voluntary agreements,
in spite of their statutory status. In addition, it is
worth noting that a statutory status does not neces-
sarily result in substantive controls on the contents
of voluntary agreements. Neither English nor Japa-
                                                          
76 See WOOLF ET AL., supra note 36, 3-019, 5-036.
77 See, e.g., K. Morita, Gyosei Keiyaku/Kyotei Hoshiki no Mondai Ten
[Problems of Governmental Contracts and Agreements], in GYOSEIHO NO
SOTEN [ISSUES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] 84, 84 (Y. Narita ed., 2d ed. 1990).
78 See, Kitamura, supra note 64, at 48 – 49.
79 See, supra note 66.
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nese legislation pertained to the use of voluntary
agreements in environmental policy stipulates de-
tailed requirements concerning contents of volun-
tary agreements.
5.2 Procedural Statutory Controls and Environ-
mental Voluntary Agreements
In both England and Japan, administrative law has
developed procedural legal controls on the use of
public power. Administrative law today is not only
concerned with the substance of what a public
authority does, but also with the procedures by
which a public authority exercises its power. Proce-
dure is not a matter of secondary importance. As
governmental powers continue to grow signifi-
cantly, it is only by procedural controls that the
abuse of public power can effectively be pre-
vented.80 The question is whether existing adminis-
trative legal mechanisms concerning procedural
legal controls on public power cover the use of
voluntary agreements.
In England, there are two different types of proce-
dural control mechanisms concerning the use of
public power. One involves procedural rules stipu-
lated in statutes or secondary legislation i.e. statu-
tory procedural rules. The other comprises common
law procedural rules, namely the rules of natural
justice, which are a set of uncodified common law
rules offering procedural safeguards to ensure that
decision-makers act according to basic standards of
fairness. There is no comprehensive administrative
procedure legislation, such as those in Germany,
Japan, and the United States, which comprehen-
sively covers administrative actions, and there are
no statutory procedural rules applicable to the use
of non-statutory voluntary agreements.
Although there are some statutory voluntary agree-
ments in England,81 the statutory status of a volun-
tary agreement does not necessary mean that there
are sufficient procedural statutory controls on the
use of the agreement. Indeed, there are only a few
statutory procedural requirements stipulated con-
cerning the use of statutory voluntary agreements in
England.82 Nonetheless, the lack of statutory proce-
dural rules concerning the use of voluntary agree-
ments does not necessarily mean that there are no
procedural rules applicable to their use, since Eng-
lish administrative law has the rules of natural jus-
tice as common law rules which are widely applica-
ble to administrative or executive decisions affect-
ing legal rights.83 These rules are the right to a fair
                                                          
80 See Wade, supra note 13, at 463.
81 See supra note 75.
82 See supra note 75.
83 See Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40 (HL).
hearing (audi alterem partem) and the rule against
bias (nemo judex in causa sua). However, the rules
of natural justice annot be applied if the use of
environmental agreements is not subject to judicial
review, since the rules of natural justice is applica-
ble only through judicial review,84 and it is not clear
whether the use of environmental voluntary agree-
ment  are subject to judicial review under English
administrative law (see 4.2 above).
In Japan, there are two different types of procedural
control mechanisms for controlling the use of public
power. One involves procedural rules stipulated in a
specific statute or secondary legislation, i.e. specific
statutory procedural rules. The other mechanism is
that of general procedural rules, which are codified
in the Administrative Procedural Law. Although
there are some statutory voluntary agreements by
local authorities in Japan, the statutory status of
voluntary agreements does not necessarily provide
procedural legal controls on the use of voluntary
agreements. Indeed, there are only a few examples
where substantial procedural requirements are
stipulated in such cases.85 On the other hand, the
Administrative Procedural Law stipulates generally
applicable rules concerning the use of public power,
such as the duty to give reasons for administrative
sanctions and the right to a fair hearing.86 However,
these rules are only applicable to the use of statu-
tory public powers and do not apply to the exercis-
ing of non-statutory public powers. Instead, the Law
sets out other procedural rules concerning the use of
“gyosei shido” or “administrative guidance,” and
thus there are some statutory constraints imposed on
the use of voluntary agreements since the use of
gyosei shido is closely related to the use of volun-
tary agreements with regard to their arrangements
and enforcement (see 4.3 above).
5.3 Judicial Controls and Environmental Volun-
tary Agreements
The substantive and procedural statutory controls
explained above can be toothless if there are no
judicial controls to secure compliance with these
substantive and procedural legal controls.
In the context of English administrative law the use
of no -statutory voluntary agreements may be sub-
ject to judicial review if there is a public law ele-
ment to their use. In the GCHQ case the court held
that a government action was not immune from
                                                          
84 However, it is often said that the inclusion of the concept of natural justice
is an implied term in the contract under private law, and thus it may be
argued that the rules of natural justice are applicable to voluntary agree-
ments as an implied term in a voluntary agreement.
85 See, Kitamura, supra note 64, at 48 – 49.
86 Arts. 5 to 31.
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judicial review merely because its power was d -
rived from common law rather than a statutory
source, and that it was the subject-matter i.e. th
existence of public law elements that counted, not
the source of power. However, two qualifications
must be made to that statement. The courts have
difficulty in subjecting the contractual power to
judicial review, and it is not clear when and how
contractual powers can be subject to udicial re-
view.87 Furthermore, even if the use of voluntary
agreements is subject to judicial review, the courts
may find it difficult to find legal grounds (e.g. an
improper purpose, the failure to take into account
relevant considerations and procedural impropriety)
to subject the use of non-statutory voluntary agree-
ments to legal controls because of the lack of sub-
stantive and procedural statutory rules for the use of
voluntary agreements.88 On the other hand, the use
of statutory voluntary agreements is subject to judi-
cial review in terms of its compliance with statutory
requirements.89
In the context of Japanese administrative law the
use of non-statutory voluntary agreements as well
as statutory voluntary agreements is no  subject to
judicial review. The Administrative Case Procedure
Law limits the scope of judicial review to the use of
statutory public powers which unilaterally change
the legal rights and duties of private parties, 90 and
thus the use of voluntary agreements, irrespective of
their statutory status, can not be directly challenged
through judicial review.91 The restrictive approach
adopted by the Administrative Case Procedure Law
defining which administrative actions are subject to
judicial review ensures that neither the recipients
nor third parties adversely affected by a voluntary
agreement have access to the courts92 except in
particular circumstances through damage actions
under Kokka Baisho Ho [the State Liability
Law]93.94
                                                          
87 Harris, supra note 32, at 645 – 46.
88 Cf. Id. at 646 – 47 (supporting this proposition with regard to the use of
non-statutory public power).
89 See Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur, supra note 36.
90 See supra note 66.
91 With respect to judicial review and gyosei shido, see, e.g., Young, supra
note 33.
92 For example, there was a case where an electrical power company and a
local authority had concluded a environmental voluntary agreement where
the company must obtain a consent of the local authority before it modifies
or enlarges its thermal power plant facilities. The local residents chal-
lenged a decision by the local authority to give its consent under the
agreement with respect to extension of the facilities of the plant. The Na-
goya District court held that the consent is based on a contract and does
not constitute the exercise of public power, and therefore held that the
decision by the local authority was not subject to judicial review. See 893
Hanrei Jiho [Case L.J.] 25 (Nagoya District Ct., 18 January 1978).
93 Law No. 125 of 1947.
94 Cf. Haley, supra note 33, at 161 (presenting the same observation with
regard to gyosei shido and judicial review).
6 The Implications of the Insufficient Admin-
istrative legal mechanisms
6.1 Legal Protections of Private Parties to an
Environmental Voluntary Agreement
There are two dimensions t  the protection of pri-
vate parties to a voluntary agreement. The first is
the relationship between a public authority and
private parties. A public authority might put pres-
sure on or even coerce private parties, by taking
advantage of its dominant powers and esources, to
undertake “voluntary” measures in line with a gov-
ernment policy. In addition, public authorities might
use their enforcement powers (such as monitoring,
inspections, and sanctions) whose authority is de-
rived not from a statute but from the voluntary
agreement in question to achieve their r gulatory
goals. The second dimension is the relationship
between a private self-regulatory association (e.g. a
trade association) and its members. In order to se-
cure compliance with a voluntary agreement, a self-
regulatory association often plays the role of a non-
statutory regulatory agency to enforce the agree-
ment, and there is a risk that the self-regulatory
association exercises its non-statutory regulatory
power arbitrarily.
English Case
With regard to the first dimension i.e. the relation-
ship between a public authority and a private party,
it is unlikely that sufficient legal protection is pro-
vided under administrative law for private parties to
a voluntary agreement. Although it is no  clear
when and how contractual powers can be subject to
judicial review, the English courts appear to have
difficulty in subjecting the contractual power to
judicial review95 unless there are any statutory
frameworks for the use of voluntary agreement.
Furthermore, even if the use of environmental vol-
untary agreements is subject to judicial review, the
courts may find it difficult to find legal grounds t
subject their use to legal controls when there are no
substantive and procedural statutory rules for the
use of voluntary agreement.96 O  the other hand, if
a public authority uses irrelevant statutory powers
to force private parties to enter into/comply with a
voluntary agreement, or if a public authority im-
poses de facto penalties or sanctions on private
parties to a voluntary agreement, the English courts
would have no hesitation in invalidating such at-
tempts by the public authority when the private
parities had done no legal wrong or when the deci-
                                                          
95 Harris, supra note 32, at 645 – 46.
96 Cf. Id. at 646 – 47 (supporting this proposition with regard to the use of
non-statutory public power).
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sion by the public authority were based on irrele-
vant considerations.97
Concerning the second dimension i.e. the relation-
ship between a self-regulatory authority and its
members, if there is any contractual relationship
between a self-regulatory association and its mem-
bers, it is unlikely that decisions by the association,
such as revocation of the membership, can be sub-
ject to judicial review, and thus there is no legal
protection under administrative law for private
parties to the voluntary agreement in question.98
However, if there is no contractual relationship
between them, there is some room for the courts to
intervene through judicial review.
Japanese Case
With regard to the first dimension i.e. the relation-
ship between a public authority and a private party,
under the article 32 of the Administrative Procedure
Law99 it would be illegal to coerce private parties to
enter into/comply with voluntary agreements by
means of irrelevant statutory powers or d  facto
sanctions. Thus the withdrawal of irrelevant per-
mits/licences or other forms of sanctions to secure
compliance with voluntary agreements would be
illegal. However, the restrictive approach adopted
by the law defining administrative actions subject to
judicial review ensures that private parties ad-
versely affected by a voluntary agreement are not
entitled to challenge directly the use of voluntary
agreements100 except in particular cases through
damage actions under the State Liability Law. On
the other hand, if a public authority uses irr levant
statutory powers to force private parties to enter
into/comply with a voluntary agreement, the Japa-
nese courts would have no hesitation in invalidating
such use ofstatutory powers by the public authority
when the decision by the public authority were
based on irrelevant considerations or beyond the
limits of the powers conferred on it by irrelevant
legislation.101
The relationship between a self-regulatory authority
(e.g. a trade association) and its members is totally
outside the administrative legal mechanisms.
Firstly, the provisions of the Administrative Proce-
dure Law are applied to only administrative actions
by government departments and agencies. Sec-
ondly, because of the limited scope of judicial re-
view in Japan, judicial review covers only the use
                                                          
97 Cf., WOOLF ET AL., supra note 36, ¶ 5-035 (supporting this observation in
the broad context of the use of non-statutory public power).
98 The issue is likely to be treated as a private law issue.
99 See, supra note 59.
100 See, supra note 92.
101 Cf., T. FUJITA, GYOSEI HO I [ADMINISTRATIVE LAW I], at 316–20 (1995)
(explaining this point with regard to gyosei shido).
of statutory public powers which unilaterally
change legal rights and duties of private parties.
6.2 Legal Protections of Third Parties and the
Public Interest
In both England and Japan, existing administrative
legal mechanisms have not yet provided sufficient
legal protection for the rights of third parties and the
public interest. While the rights of private parties to
a voluntary agreement can be secured so long as the
agreement in question is truly voluntary in nature,
the rights of third parties and the public interest are
not necessarily protected even if an agreement is
truly voluntary in nature. B aring in mind recent
developments in environmental law concerning
procedural rights for third parties, public participa-
tion and information disclosure and so on, the use
of voluntary agreements outside of administrative
l gal mechanisms may have significant implications
for he protection of the rights of third parties and
the public interest.
In England, the lack of a statutory framework for
the use of voluntary agreements has posed a signifi-
cant challenge for administrative lawyers. Firstly, it
should be noted that British environmental regula-
tory law has come to include various provisions
concerning information disclosure and public par-
ticipation. In contrast, however, the use of environ-
mental voluntary agreements does not involve such
statutory provisions for procedural rights for the
protection of third parties. Secondly, athird party is
not entitled to challenge a voluntary agreement
through judicial review unless the voluntary agree-
ment has a statutory basis.102 Although the English
courts have come to broaden the scope of locus
standi to include third parties,103 these cases are the
ones where there are relevant legislation which can
be a ground for the courts to subject administrative
actions in question to judicial rev ew. Thirdly, non-
statutory voluntary agreements bypass the Parlia-
ment and there is a concern about the lack of demo-
cratic legitimacy. It should be noted here that legis-
lative processs serve to integrate wider interests
into public policies, and in the case of non-statutory
v luntary agreements this integration process is
normally much weaker than in the case of legisla-
tion.
Japanese administrative law is similar to that of
English administrative law in that, while the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Law provides some statutory
constraints on the use of voluntary agreements,104
                                                          
102 See, Hunt, supra note 17, at 35-38.
103 See e.g., R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
ex parte World Development Movement Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 386.
104 See supra notes 59, 60.
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the Law is primarily concerned with the protection
of those who are directly affected by a govern-
ment’s action. Furthermore, there are no statutory
provisions for procedural rights for the protection of
third parties. Moreover a third party is not entitled
to challenge a voluntary agreement through judicial
review. Although the Japanese courts have come to
widely admit locus standi to third parties con-
cerned, these cases are the ones where relevant
legislation exist as a legal ground for judicial re-
view.105 Finally, the restrictive approach adopted by
the law defining administrative actions subject to
judicial review ensures that third parties adversely
affected by a voluntary agreement do not have ac-
cess to the courts. And since non-statutory volun-
tary agreements bypass Parliament, there is a con-
cern that i is less likely that wider public interests
are integrated into voluntary agreements.
7 Create a Bridge Between “the Rule of Law”
and Environmental Voluntary Agreements
This brief survey of tensions between the use of
environmental voluntary agreements and “the rule
of law” in England and Japan suggests that the use
of voluntary agreements could be a thr at to the
idea of “the rule of law” for tw  reasons. Firstly, he
use of voluntary agreements lies largely outside the
scope of existing administrative legal mechanisms
in both jurisdictions. Secondly, the insufficient
administrative legal mechanisms result in less legal
protection, under administrative law, of parties to a
voluntary agreement, third parties and the public
interest than conventional regulation does. The lack
of a statutory basis for the use of voluntary agree-
ments constitute a significant barriers for adminis-
trative legal mechanisms to extend their controls on
the use of voluntary agreements, irrespective of the
difference between English administrative law (a
common law system) and Japanese administrative
law (a civil law system). The author is well aware
that there have recently been various efforts to en-
sure the protection of various interests by means of
administrative guidelines rather than legislative
instruments. However, there is no guarantee that
these administrative arrangements are always com-
plied with by public authorities. At least as far as in
the context of English and Japanese administrative
law is concerned, administrative guidelines cannot
                                                          
105 The article 9 of Gyosei Jiken Sosho Ho [the Administrative Case Proce-
dural Law], Law No. 139 of 1962, states that only those with sufficient
statutory interests are entitled to challenge a decision by the public
authorities concerned. Although the Japanese courts have come to
broaden the meaning of “sufficient statutory interests” to include third
parties, there is a minimum requirement that there should be relevant
legislation as a basis for determining sufficient statutory interests. See, for
example, 43 (2) Mishu 56 (Sup. Ct., 17 February 1989); 46 (6) Minshu 571
(Sup. Ct., 22 September 1992).
be seen as ufficient alternatives to legislative ar-
rangements, because of the lack of sufficient ad-
ministrative legal mechanisms to secure compliance
with them.
It is important to note, however, that excessive
legalism might undermine the very advantages of
the use of voluntary agreements, such as informality
and flexibility, which supposedly encourage a pro-
active approach from industry. Experiences in
Denmark, where most voluntary agreements are
concluded as non-statutory agreements rather than
statutory agreements under the framework the
Danish Environmental Protection Act,106 107 high-
light this risk very clearly.
On the other hand, the Danish experiences do not
necessarily diminish the necessity of some form of
administrative legal mechanisms on the use of vol-
untary agreements. “I  is a mistake to suppose that a
developed system of administrative law is neces-
sarily antagonistic to efficient government. Inten-
sive government will be more tolerable to the citi-
zen, and the government’s path will be smoother,
where the law can enforce high standards of legal-
ity, reasonableness and fairness.”108 The challenge
that administrative lawyers ar  now facing is to find
a proper balance between (a) legal controls on the
use of public power by voluntary agreements a d
(b) the flexible and effective use of voluntary
agreements, and to develop administrative legal
mechanisms to achieve this goal.
One thing is certain irrespective of th  differences
in administraive law traditions between modern
constitutional states. The more functionally
equivalent environmental voluntary agreements
have become to conventional regulation, the more
necessary it would be from the perspective of “the
rule of law” to provide the same level of ga con-
trol mechanisms for the use of environmental vol-
untary agreements as hose for conventional regula-
tion. Although the power of governments i  modern
administrative states has ignificantly increased and
we have retreated far from the ideal of “the rule of
law,”109 the increasing use of voluntary agreements
as substitutes for legislative instruments can re ult
in another substantial retreat from the ideal of “the
rule of law.”
                                                          
106 Consolidated Environmental Protection Act, Act No. 625 of July 15, 1997.
107 See, e.g. Enevoldsen, supra note 28, at 218–19, 222–23.
108 Wade & Forsyth, supra note 13, at 22.
109 Id., at 27.
Environmental Law Network International elni 1/2000
71
1 Introduction
More and more industrial organizations are will-
ingly committing to meet heightened environmental
standards through private environmental certifica-
tion programs. Such programs generally claim to
harness the incentives of the market to promote the
public interest.1 The programs typically define the
environmental standards that firms must meet and
establish organizational mechanisms for achieving
and “certifying” compliance. Well known examples
include the chemical industry’s “Responsible Care”
program,2 the International Organization for Stan-
dardization’s ISO 14000 environmental manage-
ment program,3 and the Forest Stewardship Coun-
cil’s well-managed forests program.4
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1 E.g., Errol Meidinger, Look Who’s Making the Rules: the Roles of the FSC
and ISO in International Environmental Policy. 4 HUM. ECOL. REV. 52
(1997).
2 The American Responsible Care Program is described at
http://www.cmahq.com. The Canadian program (the first in the world) is at
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ca00797e.html. For a general overview see,
Neil Gunningham, Environment, Self-Regulation, and the Chemical In-
dustry: Assessing Responsible Care, 17 L. & POL. 57-109 (1995)
3 See ISO Website: http://www.iso.ch/9000e/isoanden.htm. For a general
overview, see e.g., Steven Bass, Introducing Forest Certification, Report
of the International Institute for Environment and Development (1997)
http://www.efi.fi/publications/Discussion_Papers/01.pdf or Errol Meidinger,
‘Private’ Environmental Regulation, Human Rights, and Community, 6
BUFF. ENV. L. J. 132 (1999) (hereafter Meidinger, Private Environmental
Regulation) http://www.ublaw.buffalo.edu/fas/meidinger/hrec.pdf
4 See FSC Website: http://www.fscoax.org/principal.htm. For general
overviews, see again Bass or Meidinger, supra note 3. There are numer-
ous other private environmental certification programs. Many of the older
ones concentrate on food labeling, particularly in Europe. Many of the
newer ones focus on particular sectors of environmental management,
such as forestry, fishing, chemical production, and so on.
With their standard setting, adjudication, and im-
plementation mechanisms, certification programs
bear an interesting resemblance to government
regulatory programs. Yet, because of their appar-
ently autonomous and voluntary nature, these “uni-
lateral commitment” programs5 are often conceptu-
alized as separate and distinct from legal systems. It
appears, however, that certification systems are
deeply intertwined with law. Not only do they use
legal mechanisms to organize themselves and con-
trol their members, they also cite the possibility of
intensified legal regulation to attract members.
Perhaps more importantly, they can have a signifi-
cant influence on governmental policies, and on the
content and implementation of legal rules. Given
the common focus of certification and legal systems
on policy-making and control, it seems obvious that
they will intersect and interact in various ways.
The goal of this paper is to describe the main ways
in which environmental certification systems are
likely to interact with the U.S. legal system. Al-
though certification systems depend on legal sys-
tems to organize themselves, and may also increase
the institutionalization of law in private organiza-
tions in important ways, this paper focuses primar-
ily on how legal systems use, are influenced by, and
respond to certification systems.6 Its working hy-
pothesis is that environmental certification systems
will have a substantial influence on the substance
and operation of the U.S. legal system over time. Its
primary goal is to describe the avenues through
                                                          
5 This categorization reflects the work of the Concerted Action on Voluntary
Approaches (CAVA) project, an EU-supported effort to develop a research
network and a body of research on the use of “voluntary approaches” to
improved environmental management. 
http://www.ensmp.fr/Fr/CERNA/CERNA/Progeuropeens/CAVA/index.html
See, Steven Baeke, Marc DeClercq, and Erik Matthijs, The Nature of
Voluntary Approaches: Empirical Evidence and Patterns: Literature Sur-
vey, CAVA Working Paper no 99/08/3, August 1999; Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, VOLUNTARY APPROACHES
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: AN ASSESSMENT (1999). Certifica-
tion systems are a special kind of unilateral commitment program, since
they do not claim to be “one shot” efforts, but rather set up frameworks for
long-term policy development and implementation.
6 The use of law by certification organizations is the topic of a planned
subsequent paper.
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which certification systems are likely to shape the
legal system. Because of the potentially high degree
of legal influence by certification, legal systems are
also likely to try to constrain or shape certification
systems. So the paper also describes the primary
means through which this may happen.
It is too early in the development of private envi-
ronmental certification systems to offer either an
assessment of their overall societal importance or a
strong theory explaining their emergence and ex-
pansion.7 Their normative implications must also be
left to other papers.8 Before reviewing the ways in
which certification systems can be incorporated into
law, however, it is helpful to give some definition to
the key terms: “legal system” and “certification
system.”
a  Legal Systems
Of course, the definitions of “law” and “legal sys-
tem” have been much disputed over the years, and
will not be resolved here. For present purposes it is
sufficient to note that there is widespread accep-
tance that legal systems have the following fea-
tures:9
(1) Legislative bodies, often representing defined
interests, make rules governing actors within
their jurisdiction.
(2) Adjudicative bodies determine the applicability
of rules in particular cases. In doing so they of-
ten give further definition to rules.
(3) Enforcement bodies
(a) gather information on compliance with
rules, and
(b) use sanctions (punishments and rewards), to
promote compliance.
(4) The legal bodies operate under rules, ordinar-
ily governing both their composition and pro-
cedures. The latter often include public partici-
pation requirements.
(5) Actions taken by legal bodies are not fully de-
termined by rules. They also involve the exer-
cise of judgment and discretion.10
                                                          
7 For a preliminary effort, see Meidinger, supra note 3.
8 See id.
9 See, e.g., Joseph Raz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF LEGAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1980).
Although I am using western legal terms here, such as legislation and
adjudication, these terms need not be used by legal systems. The key
idea is that they have ways of formulating rules, determining their applica-
bility, applying sanctions, and so on.
10 The amount of discretion, however, may often look larger when viewed
from the perspective of rules than when viewed within a social context
including cultural assumptions, shared operating procedures, and the like.
E.g., Errol Meidinger, Regulatory Culture: A Theoretical Outline. 9 L. &
POL., 355-386 (1987); Edward L. Rubin, Discretion and Its Discontents
1997, 72 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1299 (1997).
(6)Sovereign states provide the primary authority
and implementation mechanisms.
The last criterion is asserted by many,11 but not all12
legal theorists. It has long faced problems regarding
how democratic a state must be for its rules to
qualify as law. More recently, the growth of a
global order transcending individual states yet en-
acting rules that operate like laws has created prob-
lems for this conception.13 These issues receive
further attention in the conclusion of this paper.
b) Certification Systems
Although there is no uniform definition of a certifi-
cation system, and existing programs that are classi-
fied as certification systems vary greatly, most
definitions include the following elements:
(1) Standard setting bodies operating with defined
membership and decision processes. These can
be either industry groups, as in the Responsible
Care Program, or broader sets of stakeholders,
as in the Forest Stewardship Council.14
(2) Standards for certification,
(a) These tend to follow either or both of two
general approaches:
(i) Substantive performance standards (the
FSC approach);15
(ii) Environmental management system
standards (the ISO approach)16, stressing
1. enterprise-based policy making;
2. detailed organizational arrangements
for planning, information gathering,
monitoring, compliance assessment,
and plan revision; and
3. continuous improvement in either
a. the management system, or
b. environmental performance.17
                                                          
E.g., Hans Kelsen, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE
(1945). Kelsen, like most western legal theorists of the late 19th and 20th
centuries, argued that law must involve a threat of punishment by the
state.
12 E.g., Friedrich Charles von Savigny, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE
FOR LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE (Arno Press 1975) (Abra-
ham Hayward trans., London 1831). Savigny argued that law "is first de-
veloped by custom...next by jurisprudence -- everywhere, therefore, by
internal silently-operating powers, not by the arbitrary will of a law-giver."
Id at 30. He was arguing against the creation of a national law for Ger-
many, and in favor of preserving local variation.
13 E.g., Guenther Teubner, Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay of Legal
and Social Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. LAW. 149 (1997).
14 The scope of certification programs varies. They can be global, regional,
national, or even sub-national, though subnational and national programs
are likely to be viable only in the narrowest markets.
15 See Appendix A for the primary FSC management principles, and exam-
ples of criteria applying them.
16 See Appendix B for the primary ISO environmental management system
standard.
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(b) Certification can attach to an enterprise, a
product, or both.
(3) Organizational mechanisms for certifying com-
pliance of individual firms with applicable stan-
dards, which generally:
(a) rely heavily on professional expertise,
(b) focus on information production and man-
agement,
(c) struggle over the relative independence of
the certification body from the firm.18
(4) Provisions for public participation19
(5) Mechanisms for sanctioning non-compliance,
usually:
(a) withdrawal of certification, and/or
(b) expulsion from an industry group.20
Thus, many environmental certification systems
have most of the basic organizational elements of
legal systems. The Forest Stewardship Council
(FSC), for example, has a constitutional structure
establishing an international “general assembly”
representing economic, environmental, and social
interests in equal proportions, and giving northern
(developed) and southern (developing) societies
equal voting power within each interest.21 It also
provides for national and regional legislative bodies
to define place-based forest management standards
and criteria, which become applicable upon ap-
proval by the General Assembly. The central and
regional legislative bodies have promulgated a large
number of rules governing forest management, its
evaluation, and certification, which closely resem-
ble what legal scholars ordinarily call legislation.22
                                                               
17 Whether improvements in the system are acceptable, or whether im-
provements in outcome measures should be required is a major source of
in the debate about certification systems. See e.g., Naomi Roht-Arriaza,
Private Voluntary Standard-Setting, the International Organization for
Standardization, and International Environmental Lawmaking, in Günther
Handl, 6 YEARRBOOK OF INTL ENVTL LAW 107 (1995); Joel Ticknor,
ISO 14,000: Will it Deter Cleaner Production, 8 NEW SOLUTIONS 285,
286 (1998); Pierre Hauselmann, ISO Inside Out: ISO and Environmental
Management, WWF International Discussion Paper (1997).
18 Many voluntary codes and certification programs started with self-
certification by the firm, then moved to trade association certification, and
now seem to be moving to third party certification. There is a growing
understanding in the field that unless programs are monitored by credible
third parties (sometimes environmental NGOs, sometimes organizations
vetted by them), they are unlikely to be seen as credible.
19 Public participation provisions vary considerably among programs, and
often seem designed to limit rather than expand the public role in standard
setting and certification. See Meidinger, Private Environmental Regulation,
supra note3.
20 There is no systematic information on how often certification systems
actually employ sanctions. My impression from communicating with
knowledgeable sources is that sanctions have rarely been imposed to
date.
21 For a thorough description of the FSC structure, see Meidinger, Private
Environmental Regulation, supra note 3.
22 For examples, see Appendix A. Note that much but not all of the legisla-
tion is applicable to forestry management. Much of it also defines how the
Much like a government agency, the FSC also has
standards and procedures for accrediting the certifi-
ers who determine whether forest management units
meet FSC management standards. The certifiers act
as both adjudicators and enforcers of standards.
First they are charged with determining whether
applicants for certification meet the various eco-
logical, operational, economic, and social criteria.
Second, they are charged with monitoring firms that
receive certification and can revoke certificates if
forest management falls below set standards. As in
many regulatory regimes, considerable responsibil-
ity for collecting information and reporting on com-
pliance falls to regulated firms.
FSC certifiers exercise a great deal of discretion and
judgment in determining whether individual forest
management operations meet the standards for
certification. This is due to both the inherent com-
plexity of forest management and the multiple envi-
ronmental, social, and economic goals of the certifi-
cation regime. Although substantive and organiza-
tional details vary, other environmental certification
systems, including those of the International Or-
ganization for Standardization and the Chemical
Manufacturers Association, established primarily by
industry,23 show similar organizational patterns.24
The institutional characteristic typical of a legal
system that the FSC and most other private envi-
ronmental certification systems lack is a command
from a sovereign directing all management organi-
zations in a given category to achieve certification
standards, and subjecting them to sovereign-
imposed penalties for failure to do so. As indicated
above, certification systems are generally charac-
terized as “voluntary.” Firms subscribe to them
because they determine that it is in their interest to
do so. Yet it is increasingly common to describe
environmental certification as a “de facto require-
                                                               
various bodies in the FSC system are to operate, as would be the case
with traditional legislation. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administra-
tive State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369 (1989).
23 I do not use the term “self regulation” here, for two reasons. The most
obvious is that some systems, such as those of the Forest Stewardship
Council and the Marine Stewardship Council, have been established pri-
marily by environmental NGOs, and not by industry. Secondly, the term
“self” can obscure the organizational dynamics of regulation, since there
are complex and distinct interests within many industry based regulatory
programs. Nonetheless, the work of scholars who have studied self-
regulation is fundamental to this research. E.g., Ian Ayres and John
Braithwaite, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); Peter N. Grabosky, Green Markets:
Environmental Regulation by the Private Sector, 16 L. & POL. 419-48
(1994).
24 See generally Meidinger, Private Environmental Regulation, supra note 3;
Gunningham supra note 2. The primary institutional differences at this
time have to do with how broad partcipation is in the standard setting
process and the degree of independence and professionalism necessary
to make verification of compliance credible.
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ment” for doing business in many jurisdictions.25
When interviewed, corporate officials often state
that they feel they have “no real choice” but to
become environmentally certified. The reasons they
give vary, and include such factors as avoiding
intensified government regulation, maintaining or
expanding market share, averting negative public-
ity, improving community and/or employee rela-
tions, improving organizational efficiency, meeting
demands of up-stream sellers or down-stream buy-
ers,26 obtaining higher prices, avoiding legal liabil-
ity, increasing shareholder confidence, and so on.
Although many of these reasons do not flow di-
rectly from state regulation, they do suggest a con-
text in which industrial enterprises view environ-
mental certification as a mandatory condition of
operating in modern society.
Thus, the gap between coercive state regulation and
“voluntary” private certification is not as wide as
one might expect. Moreover, many of the reasons
given to explain the growth of certification have at
different times in history been grounds for ex-
panded government regulation. It is not surprising,
therefore, that complex relationships might emerge
between certification and legal systems.
The next two sections catalog some of the legal
channels through which those relationships can
operate. Section 2 lists legal mechanisms that seem
largely receptive to certification systems, while
Section 3 lists ones that seem resistant. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that most of the legal mecha-
nisms described below could in principle be used
either to promote or to undermine certification
programs. State environmental regulatory agencies,
for example, could prohibit certification of firms or
otherwise punish certified firms. The primary rea-
son that they do not appear likely to do so is that
certification programs claim to build upon state
regulatory programs. Participating firms claim to be
going “beyond compliance,” and it would be very
difficult for agencies to rationalize prohibiting firms
from doing so, or punishing them for it. Nonethe-
less, it is possible to interpret rules as “ceilings” and
not just as “floors,” and regulatory folklore has it
that officials and industry groups sometimes punish
firms informally for going above ceilings.
                                                          
25 E.g., Virginia Haufler, “Private Sector International Regimes, 4 POLIBUS 2
(1998); Roht-Arriaza, supra note 17 at 119; Ticknor, supra note 17 at 286.
26 Ford Motor Company, for example, recently announced that it will require
all of its suppliers to have at least one manufacturing site ISO 14001 cer-
tiified by the of 2001. General Motors Corporation is requiring to meet the
ISO 14001 standard, but not necessarily to be registered, by the end of
2002. Amy Zuckerman, Ford, GM set ISO 14000 Requirements, NEW
STEEL, Mar. 1, 2000 at 58.
2 Legal Incorporation of Certification Sys-
tems
Private environmental certification systems can be
incorporated in formal legal systems in many possi-
ble ways. The list that follows is preliminary, and is
intended to characterize the problem with sufficient
precision to allow further inquiry. As will be dis-
cussed in Section 4, the list is largely limited to
“legal” mechanisms as they are conceived in tradi-
tional legal scholarship. Other important micro and
macro dimensions of incorporation should also be
considered.
a) Legal requirement of certification
The most obvious means of incorporating certifica-
tion into a legal system would be for an authorita-
tive legal body to require that firms operating
within its jurisdiction be certified. That legal body
could be either a legislature, or an administrative
agency with a broad mandate to achieve environ-
mental improvement. There is much to commend
this strategy, since it can mandate global, state-of-
the-art standards, place much of the administrative
burden on non-state bureaucracies funded by the
enterprises involved, and garner some of the politi-
cal legitimacy of environmental NGOs for the state
regulatory system. Its downsides include a reduc-
tion in state control over regulatory policy (although
the state retains the option of imposing and admin-
istering its own standards) and potentially higher
costs of operation for enterprises than if state agen-
cies bore the costs of administration.27 To date there
are only a few examples of states requiring envi-
ronmental certification: the Brazilian state of Acre
recently made FSC certification a requirement of
practicing forestry in the state28 and Zimbabwe has
incorporated ISO 14001 into its regulatory system.29
Yet it seems likely that their numbers will grow as
the c rtification systems mature and become better
known.
Ad inistrative agencies also have the capacity to
require certification. They would most likely use
                                                          
27 Of course there are contending normative arguments regarding who
should bear administrative costs. One position is that the public should
bear them, since the certification program promotes the public interest in
an improved environment. The other is that the enterprise should bear
them, ordinarily through increased costs to its consumers, since it creates
the situation requiring the regulatory program. This is the so-called “pol-
luter pays” principle. The position one takes on these questions depends
on the entitlement structure from which one begins the analysis.
28 Personal communications, Professor Dr. Michel Becker, Institute for
Forest Policy, University of Freiburg and Dr. Dietrich Burger, Deutsche
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Organization for
Technical Cooperation), Frankfurt.
29 Paulette L. Stenzel, Can the ISO 14000 Series Environmental Standards
Provide a Viable Alternative to Government Regulation? 37 AM. BUS. L.J.
237, 276 (2000). Whether these examples are evidence that developing
countries are especially likely to adopt private environmental certification
requirements in their regulatory systems can only be known over time.
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rules, in conjunction with contracts, as mechanisms
for doing so. A rule, for example, could simply
require firms operating in the jurisdiction to be
certified by a specific program, or by one of several
eligible programs. Contracts could then be used by
the agency to achieve a degree of control over the
certification programs without going through more
cumbersome rulemaking or adjudication proce-
dures. While these methods are being used in some
other areas of privatization, such as prisons and
healthcare,30 their extension to environmental
regulation would probably be a new development. It
should be noted, however, that the U.S. environ-
mental laws already give a large role to private
enforcers through “citizen suit” provisions, which
allow interested parties to bring enforcement a-
tions for violations of federal or state pollution
control standards.31
In the U.S. legal system a law requiring private
certification would probably face legal challenges
based on the “non-delegation doctrine,” which is
generally held to prohibit the delegation of law
making powers to private actors.32 There is a simple
solution, however, which is for the legislature to
review the standards involved and to enact them as
its own if it so chooses. It may even suffice for the
legislature to reserve the power to review the pri-
vate rules and to provide for judicial review of them
under general administrative law.33 In the case of
administrative agencies, which have convened a
number of negotiated rulemaking (“reg-neg”) com-
mittees of stakeholders to negotiate draft rules in
recent years, it is sufficient that the agency convene
a “balanced” committee, review the rule developed
by the committee, and subject it to normal agency
decisional procedures.34
                                                          
30 See generally, Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 543 (2000); Laurent Hourcle and Frederick J. Lees, Appli-
cability of ISO 14000 Standards to Government Contracts, 27 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10071 (1997).
31 See generally, Barry Boyer and Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory
Enforcement: A Preliminary Analysis of Citizen Suits Under Federal Envi-
ronmental Laws, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 834-965 (1985). Government agen-
cies can exercise control over such actions either by taking over prosecu-
tion of the case or by intervening in the private enforcement action. If the
government does take over prosecution of the case, the private litigant
retains the right to continue participating as an intervenor. Id.
32 The key decision was Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)
which invalidated a New Deal statute allowing bituminous coal producers
to elect boards to set minimum prices for coal in their districts. The court
stressed the possible conflicts of interests of business representatives
regulating others in their industry. For a sophisticated contemporary
analysis, see Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Con-
gressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal
Government, 85 Nw. U.L. REV. 62 (1990)
33 This is what the states often have done when privatizing prison admini-
stration. Ira P. Robbins, The Impact of the Delegation Doctrine on Prison
Privatization, 35 UCLA L. REV. 911 (1988).
34 As authorized by the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 101 P.L. 648;
104 Stat. 4969. The statute requires the agency to exercise somewhat
If state or federal governmental bodies in the U.S.
were to mandate certification, questions regarding
the applicability of anti-trust law and administrative
law would also arise. While they are too involved to
discuss fully here, they could likely be managed.
U.S. anti-trust law has a general exception for anti-
competitive conditions resulting from intentional
state action.35 Thus anti-trust questions could be
handled by clear, legislatively authorized policies
combined with state supervision of the certification
program.36
The administrative law issues would divide among
statutory and constitutional questions. The main
constitutional question would be whether the Due
Process clause applies to certification processes.
The Supreme Court has tended to narrow the defi-
nition of “state action” to which the clause applies
in recent years.37 But it is not entirely clear that the
rulemaking and adjudication involved in standard
setting and certification processes would be exempt.
Thus, it is at least conceivable that certifiers would
have to meet due process standards if certification
were state mandated. That might not be particularly
difficult, however, since Due Process requirements
g nerally are not stringent, and since many nomi-
nally private organizations have already incorpo-
rated comparable procedures.38 In the statutory
real , it seems likely that, on their own terms, stat-
utes such as the federal Administrative Procedure
Act and similar state acts would not be held to ap-
ply to certification processes. Nothing, however,
would preclude legislatures from making them
applicable, and it seems likely that if states chose to
                                                               
more control over the reg-neg process than described in the text, but this
is not a constitutional requirement.
35 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (upholding a California statute fixing
the price of raisins).
36 California Retail Liquor Dealer’s Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U.S. at 97 (1980) (defining the clear statement and state supervision crite-
ria). Absent such active state involvement, however, firms participating in
self-regulatory standard setting do face risks of anti-trust liability. See,
e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492
(1988) (holding the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), a non-
governmental standard setting organization, liable for anti-trust violations,
when steel manufacturers used its processes to prevent approval of plas-
tic conduit as an alternative to steel in the NFPA’s National Electrical
Code, which was subsequently adopted by many governmental bodies).
37 See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 30.; Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization and
the U.S. Administrative Procedures Act: Furthering Democracy and the
Global Public Interest, Bloomington Snyder Lecture, Lauterpacht Center
for International Research, University of Cambridge, February 3, 1999.
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=176691 Copy on file with
author.
38 See generally, Lauren Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational
Governance: The Expansion of Due Process in the American Workplace,
95 AM. J. of SOC. 1401 (1990). There are complex problems in standard
setting organizations, however, some of which do not provide the equiva-
lent of notice and comment rulemaking, or do limit participation those with
direct, material interests. See generally John P. Shoaf, “Business as
Usual or an Instance of Reinvention and Privatization in Environmental
Rulemaking? New Rules and Issues with the Use of Voluntary Consensus
Standards,” May 25, 1999, at 31. Copy on file with author..
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require regulated industries to achieve certification
they could eventually be persuaded to subject certi-
fication systems to administrative law-like proce-
dural requirements.39
b) Official promotion of certification
Rather than “sticks,” governments can use “carrots”
to promote preferred policies. Given their ability to
avert legal and political challenges based on del-
gation of lawmaking powers while still altering
environmental practices, government-provided
incentives could turn out to be the preferred policy
instrument for promoting certification. Several large
U.S. administrative agencies either are considering
or have made ISO 14001 certification one of their
purchasing criteria.40 The EPA has promulgated a
number of policies that explicitly or implicitly pro-
mote certification. Its enforcement policies, for
example, while not directed solely at certification
systems, indicate that environmental certification
will be viewed as a positive factor in reviewing
organizational compliance records.41 EPA’s Office
of Compliance Assurance and Monitoring is inte-
grating environmental management system ele-
ments into its enforcement protocols and settlement
criteria.42 The agency has also used ISO 14001 in
several of its Project XL multimedia permitting
processes.43 EPA has published several documents
and handbooks assisting and promoting develop-
ment of ISO 14000-style management systems for
both industry and for local governments,44 and has
supported research in support of the further de-
ployment of environmental management systems.45
The Federal Sentencing Commission has also pro-
vided that criminal defendants with “environmental
                                                          
39 See Section 3 infra.
40 The Department of Defense and the Department of Energy require ISO
14001 certification for first and second-level suppliers. (Second level sup-
pliers are those who provide supplies to firms which actually supply prod-
ucts to the agencies.) Stenzel, supra note 29 at 270.
41 USEPA, Audit Policy: Incentives for Self-Policing, 60 Federal Register
66706 (December 22, 1995) ("Where violations are found through volun-
tary environmental audits or efforts that reflect a regulated entity's due
diligence, and are promptly disclosed and expeditiously corrected, EPA
will not seek gravity-based (i.e., noneconomic benefit) penalties and will
generally not recommend criminal prosecution against the regulated en-
tity.").
42 USEPA Draft EMS Action Plan for Public Comment, December 20, 1999
http://www.epa.gov/ems/plan99.htm
43 The most recent is with Imation Enterprises Corporation, the world’s
largest manufacturer of magnetic data storage tapes. Id at 15.
44 E.g., EPA Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics, Enviromental Man-
agement Systems. http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/dfe/tools/ems/ems.html ;
EPA Office of Wastewater Management, Environmental Management
Systems: An Implementation Guide for Small and Medium-Sized Organi-
zations, http://www.epa.gov/owmitnet/wm046200.htm
45 E.g., Position Statement on Environmental Management Systems and
ISO 14001 and a Request for Comments on the Nature of the Data To Be
Collected From Environmental Management System/ISO 14001 Pilots, 63
Federal Register 12094-12097 (March 12, 1998) 
http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/EPA-GENERAL/1998/March/Day-
12/g6389.htm
compliance programs,” which many certification
prog ams would probably qualify as, can have their
sentences significantly reduced.46 Even the Over-
seas Private Investment Corporation has published
draft guidance indicating that an ISO 1400 man-
agement system will help project sponsors demon-
st ate environmental monitoring and management
capacity meeting its requirements for support.47
One of the most direct efforts to promote certifica-
tion occurred recently at the state level, when Con-
necticut passed an “Act Concerning Exemplary
Environmental Management Systems.” The Act
provides special benefits to companies that have:
(1) registered ISO 14001 environmental manage-
ment systems, (2) adopted approved principles of
sustainability, and (3) good compliance records.
The benefits include: (1) expedited permit review,
(2) reduced fees, (3) less frequent reporting, (4)
facility wide permits for approved firms, and (5)
public recognition of having attained this achieve-
ment.48 While it is difficult to track developments
like this, other states might well adopt similar leg-
islation. Whether they do or not, it is important to
remember that favorable treatment of certified firms
is only part of the government enforcement package
that will best promote certification. The other part is
effective enforcement of the environmental laws,
which minimizes the relative economic disadvan-
tages of certification for firms.
Government agencies can also promote the expan-
sion of private certification programs by subjecting
themselves to them. A number of state and local
agencies responsible for managing public forests
have had their forests certified. Some have chosen
the more environmentally and socially demanding
FSC program,49 others the somewhat less protective
American Forest and Paper Association program.50
                                                          
46 See Tom Tibor & Ira Feldman, ISO 14000: A GUIDE TO THE NEW
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT STANDARDS 226 (1995); see also
Organization Sentencing Guidelines, 56 Fed. Reg. 22,762, § 8A1.2,
Comment K (U.S. Sentencing Comm. 1991); Draft Corporate Guidelines
for Environmental Violations, §§ 9C1.2, 9D1.1 (U.S. Sentencing Comm.
1993).
47 United States International Development Cooperation Agency (ICDA),
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), Request for Comments
on Draft Environmental Handbook; Notice, 63 FR 9696 (1998).
48 Connecticut State Statutes. 
http://www.cga.state.ct.us/ps99/Act/pa/1999PA-00226-R00HB-06830-
PA.htm. This provision, like much of the other information in this article,
came to my attention through the “voluntary codes” list-serve maintained
by Kernaghan Webb. This is an invaluable source of information, and can
be accessed at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ca00973e.html .
49 Thus far, the agencies responsible for managing state-owned lands in
Pennsylvania, Minnesota, and New York have either achieved FSC certifi-
cation or announced that they intend to do so. Margaret Higgins, New
York forests get green thumbs-up, Environmental News Network, Febru-
ary 5, 2000,                 http://www.enn.com/enn-news-
archive/2000/02/02052000/certification_9680.asp
50 E.g., Itaska and Lake County Minnesota.
http://www.afandpa.org/forestry/sfi/sfi_license.html
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The federal land management agencies appear to
have no near term intention of seeking third party
certification of their lands.51 The EPA, by contrast,
has put a considerable effort into promoting the use
of ISO-style environmental management systems at
all levels of government, including its own opera-
tions and those of other agencies.52
c) Express adoption of the same or substantially
similar standards
As noted above, independent enactment of certifi-
cation standards would be one way of avoiding
delegation doctrine problems. Because the states
and the federal government share authority over
environmental protection, adoption of certification
standards could occur at either level. Moreover, it
could be done either by legislatures, or by adminis-
trative agencies with broad substantive and proce-
dural mandates. At the legislative level, no evidence
of formal adoption of environmental certification
standards has come to light during the preparation
of this paper.53 In the past, moreover, many other
types of privately generated standards have been
adopted by North American legislatures.54 Given
the inherent attractiveness of ready-made standards,
environmental certification system standards seem
likely to become increasingly important in federal
and state legislative processes over time. As that
happens, legislatures will doubtless be tempted to
change private standards to reflect their particular
concerns, as they have done with model legislation
in other areas such as criminal and product liability
law.55 On the other hand, pressure for inter-
jurisdictional consistency in standards is growing,
and privately generated international environmental
standards could prove quite robust.56
                                                          
51 Forest Stewardship Council United States, Federal Lands Policy State-
ment Concerning FSC-Endorsed Certification on U.S. Federal Lands.
http://www.fscus.org/current_issues/federallands.html
52 See generally, USEPA Draft EMS Action Plan for Public Comment,
December 20, 1999 http://www.epa.gov/ems/plan99.htm; USEPA, Code
of Environmental Management Principles for Federal Agencies, 61 Fed-
eral Register 54061-54066 (October 16, 1996).
53 However, Bolivia recently adopted forestry standards virtually identical to
the FSC standards. Personal Communication, Dr. Dietrich Burger, For-
estry Program, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
(German Organization for Technical Cooperation), Eschborn.
54 See generally, Robert W. Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental
Standards in the Development of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting
Safety or Health, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1329-1484 (1978). State and local
legislatures have also adopted uncounted private codes in such areas as
plumbing, construction, accounting practices, and the like. Id.
55 Examples include the Model Penal Code, the Uniform Commercial Code,
Restatements of Torts and Contracts, and the like.
56 The question of how much demand there is for inter-jurisdictional consis-
tency is in fact quite complex. While some industrial interests operating in
multiple legal jurisdictions have powerful interests in uniform standards,
others, either operating in a narrower set of jurisdictions or having more
capacity to vary performance according to locale, have equally strong
interests in differential standards, which they have a comparative advan-
tages in meeting.
At the administrative level, U.S. agencies have a
long history of incorporating privately generated
standards in public regulations. Sometimes the
privat  standards are small elements of rules cov-
ring larger topics, as in a Federal Trade Commis-
sion rule incorporating the American Society for
Testing and Materials’ standard for measuring
gasoline octane in a rule requiring sellers to post
octane ratings on their pumps.57 Other times agency
rules are aimed at essentially the same issues as the
private standards. When the Occupational Safety
and Health Administrative began operations in
1971, for example, it quickly converted a whole raft
of private health and safety standards into regula-
tory requirements.58 Other agencies have done the
same.59 It is clear that EPA has often drawn upon
private standards in setting regulatory requirements,
but there appear to be no published studies provid-
ing a comprehensive overview of how it has done
this. In addition, National Technology Transfer and
Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA) requires that
federal agencies “use technical standards that are
dev loped or adopted by voluntary consensus bod-
ies” and participate in their development where
possible. 60 The exact reach of the statute remains
op n to interpretation, particularly because it does
not define key terms such as “technical standard”
and “voluntary consensus body.”61 Nonetheless, it
s ems likely to exert a steady pull that on agency
practice over time.
It is also important to note that some of the emerg-
ing private environmental standards might be diffi-
cult for agencies to incorporate, because they in-
clude areas beyond the jurisdiction of any single
                                                          
57 See, e.g., National Petroleum Refiners Association v. Federal Trade
Commission, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
58 The OSHA’s review of private standards was not always stellar, and it
sometimes mandated standards that were either poorly developed or
obsolete, such as a rule against ice in drinking water that derived from the
days when all ice was obtained from frozen lakes and rivers. On the other
hand, it also achieved considerable successes by using private standards.
See generally, Hamilton, supra note 54. Though over twenty years old,
this study remains one of the few serious pieces of research ever to have
been done on regulatory incorporation of privately set standards in the
U.S.
59 Id.
60 National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. §
3701 (1996). The statute requires agencies to utilize voluntary standards
unless doing so would be “inconsistent with law or otherwise impractical,”
and to report decisions not to use such standards to the Office of Man-
agement and Budget.
61 For a careful analysis of the statute and its possible effects on environ-
mental regulation by the Environmental Protection Agency, see Shoaf,
supra note 38. It is also important to note that the Office of Management
and Budget has promulgated a revised version of Circular A-119, which
seeks to provide guidance to executive branch agencies on how to im-
plement the Act. OMB Circular A-119, “Federal Participation in the Devel-
opment and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity
Assessment Activities,” 63 Fed. Reg. 8545 (1998). Shoaf’s analysis ex-
plores an number of important ambiguities in the reach of the statute in
terms of what kinds of what kinds of standards and standard setting bod-
ies are promoted by the statute.
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agency. The FSC standards, for example, include
indigenous rights, worker safety, and community
economic concerns, in addition to environmental
protection -- concerns well beyond the jurisdiction
of any single agency. Although some federal and
state administrative agencies have been trying to
achieve cross-agency policy coordination in recent
years, the going has been very difficult.62 This
could conceivably mean either that non-
governmental programs have a significant long-
term structural advantage over governmental ones,
or that their efforts to integrate multiple concerns
are too far ahead of governmental programs to be
attractive to most industries.
Overall, the quality of legislative and administrative
deliberation in adopting private standards has varied
tremendously in different situations. Sometimes the
legal bodies have carefully reviewed, evaluated, and
appropriately amended, private standards, other
times they have not.63 When administrative agen-
cies incorporate standards, they are subject to judi-
cial review and must produce decisional records
sufficient to persuade reviewing courts that their
decisions were rational and based on adequate evi-
dence.64 The NTTAA may make it somewhat easier
for agency rules incorporating private standards to
sustain judicial review, since it expresses a general
preference for such standards, and puts a special
burden on agencies to explain decisions in which
they choose not to use them.
d) Indirect adoption through “environmental” laws
Some of the most important and difficult-to-trace
forms of legal change unfold in informal processes.
These processes include broad discussions in in-
dustrial, professional, and policy circles,65 as well
specific transactions among firms, regulators,66 and
                                                          
62 See, e.g., Errol Meidinger, Organizational and Legal Challenges for
Ecosystem Management. In Kathryn A. Kohm and Jerry F. Franklin, eds.,
CREATING A FORESTRY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: THE SCIENCE
OF ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT, Chapter 23 (1997).
63 Hamilton, supra note 54. It appears to be extremely common for state
legislatures to include private standards in legislation by reference, some-
times providing that changes in the standards will automatically be man-
dated by the legislation. Id.
64 Several Consumer Product Safety Commission rules based on pre-
existent standards, for example, failed the ‘substantial evidence’ test on
judicial review. Id at 1401. Absent statutory directives to the contrary,
agency rules are subject to the nominally less stringent “arbitrary and
capricious” standard under APA Section 706(2)(a), though there is dis-
agreement among scholars about whether there is really any difference
between the two review standards.
65 An example is the growth of the field of “industrial ecology.” See, e.g.,
Robert U. and Leslie W. Ayers, INDUSTRIAL ECOLOGY: TOWARDS
CLOSING THE MATERIAL CYCLE (1996) and Thomas E. Graedel and
Braden R. Allenby, INDUSTRIAL ECOLOGY (1995).
66 See for example the negotiations described by Keith Hawkins,
ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT: REGULATION AND THE
SOCIAL DEFINITION OF POLLUTION (1984).
som times community organizations.67 It eems
q ite likely that the private environmental certifica-
tion programs will affect regulatory programs
through these almost invisible channels, beyond
whatever changes are promulgated as official pol-
icy. S me of tacit changes are likely to occur as
inspectors evaluate practices at industrial facilities
and question whether firms are following best prac-
tices. Others may come into play when permits go
through revision cycles, and regulators or public
inter t groups push for up-to-date standards.
Regulatory officials can also promote private stan-
dards in their choices of which firms to inspect and
monitor. Thus, they might decide to treat certific-
tion as an indicator of strong performance, and to
concentrate their enforcement efforts on other
firms.68 As it became apparent in an industry that
certified firms were likely to suffer fewer or less
intensive inspections, or to find it easier to get nec-
essary regulatory approvals, the standard of practice
in the industry would likely converge with that of
the certification program.
In the Canadian legal system certification standards
may play an additional indirect role in shaping
environmental regulatory standards. Regulated
firms are subject to “strict liability.” To convict, the
government need simply show that a firm violated a
tand rd, and offer no evidence about the overall
quality of its management. The firm can counter
with a “due diligence” defense, which involves
showing that the defendant exercised reasonable
care under the circumstances.69 At least one Ontario
court has treated failure to receive industry certifi-
cation as failure of the due diligence defense.70
Certification standards have also been incorporated
                                                          
67 For a description of community participation see R. Nils Olsen, Jr., The
Concentration of Commercial Hazardous Waste Facilities in the Western
New York Community, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 473 (1991).
68 The appropriateness of preferential treatment for certified firms should not
be presumed, however. At present there appears to be little empirical
evidence that firms in certification programs generally perform better than
uncertified firms. In the American Responsible Care program, in fact, it
appears that participants have reduced their pollution discharges no more
quickly, and possibly more slowly, than non-participants. Andrew King and
Michael Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: the Chemical
Industry’s Responsible Care Program, ACAD. OF MGMT. J. (forthcom-
ing). The authors hypothesize that this may reflect several factors, includ-
ing the possible attractions of participation as a “smoke screen” for poorly
performing firms and the failure of the program to apply significant sanc-
tions to date. They note that the program is considering taking stronger
action against poor performers and the possibility of implementing a third-
party verification program to replace the current self-verification program.
They also indicate that increased external scrutiny, whether by govern-
ment, NGOs, or community members, could stimulate significant im-
provements in the effectiveness of the program.
69 Kernaghan Webb, Voluntary Initiatives and the Law, in R. Gibson, ed.,
VOLUNTARY
INITIATIVES: THE NEW POLITICS OF CORPORATE GREENING, at 32-
50 (1999) at 33.
70 R. v. Domtar, O.J. No. 3415 (Ont.C.J., Gen. Div.) (1993), as cited in
Webb, id.
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into law through remedies. In another Canadian
case involving a violation of air pollution standards
the defendant proposed, and the judge accepted, a
remedy requiring the defendant to achieve ISO
14001 certification. Of course, such certification
was not a requirement of the regulations involved,
but was incorporated through the equitable powers
of the judge to impose an appropriate remedy.71
Finally, it should also be noted that international
environmental law may become an important
source of indirect incorporation of private stan-
dards. Discussions about how to implement the
Kyoto Protocol for the reduction of greenhouse
gasses, for example, include the possibility of using
FSC forest certification to verify the maintenance of
carbon retention “sinks,”72 as well as using ISO
14000 management systems to achieve reductions
in of greenhouse gas emissions.73 What role such
mechanisms will in fact play remains open at pres-
ent, but their proponents are actively promoting
them as important tools for attacking global climate
change.
In all of the above ways, certification programs can
be incorporated implicitly into legal systems with-
out going through formal legislative or rulemaking
processes. They effectively change the definition of
proper behavior and increase the rewards for com-
pliance with certification standards and the penal-
ties for non-compliance. Given the paucity of em-
pirical research in the area, it is unclear how often
they are doing so. Yet it is clear that we need to
carefully survey such indirect processes if we are to
understand the incorporation of private initiatives in
law.
e) Indirect adoption through “non-environmental”
laws
Environmental certification standards can also be
incorporated into legal systems through nominally
non-environmental laws. This section lists some key
areas where this is likely to happen.
i)Tort Law
Tort law sets standards for liability between parties
who have not dealt with potential liability issues by
contractual or other means. It usually applies to
                                                          
71 R. v. Prospec Chemicals Ltd., A.J. No. 174 Alta. Prov. Ct. (Jan. 25, 1996).
As cited in Webb, id. The judge required the defendant to post a bond of
$40,000 subject to forfeiture if the company failed to comply with the certi-
fication order.
72 Forest Stewardship Council, “Background Paper for FSC and Carbon
Certification Workshop,” FSC Website:
 http://www.fscoax.org/html/assembly_general/carbon_bkgd.htm
73 ISO Technical Committee 207 Climate Change Task Force, “Application
of the ISO 140000 Series of Standards to the Issue of Global Climate
Change, Draft Third Interim Report, June 2000 (Document Reference:
ISO TC 207 CCTF N29R3).
“accidents,” often but not always between strangers.
In general, American tort law requires parties who
fail to follow standards of “reasonable care” to
compensate those who are foreseeably injured as a
result. Certification standards can be expected to
infuse several different areas of tort law.
(1) Toxic torts
The most obvious arena for potential incorporation
is that of toxic torts, which involves liability for
damage resulting from exposure to toxic environ-
mental agents. The agents are usually chemicals,
but can be biological organisms as well.74 Certifi-
cation standards are most likely to apply to the
question of what constitutes reasonable care. Both
substantive and management system standards have
the potential for raising requirements. Consider the
example of a firm that releases a toxic agent into a
community and claims non-liability on grounds that
its practices conformed to government regulations75
and industry standards. Plaintiffs could argue that
the firm’s lack of an ISO 14001 management sys-
tem constituted a failure to exercise reasonable care
under the circumstances. Such an argument would
be difficult for a defendant to counter, especially in
light of the fact that a harmful release occurred.
Often the most difficult elements to prove in toxic
tort suits are injury and causation. Environmental
certification systems have the potential to aid plain-
tiffs in these areas too, since they may require firms
to gather and maintain data on a broad array of
environmental effects. These data would probably
be subject to discovery by plaintiffs in a law suit in
many jurisdictions, and could help show chains of
causation and injury. Although some states have
enacted statutes to protect companies from compul-
sory disclosure of information generated in prepar-
ing voluntary environmental audits, such as would
be done for ISO 14001 certification, many states
and the federal government have not enacted such
statutes.76
(2) Negligence
Certification standards might also change liability
standards for run-of-the-mill, non-toxic accidents.
Consider the example of an auto accident triggered
                                                          
74 See e.g., Gene J. Heady, Stuck Inside These Four Walls: Recognition of
Sick Building Syndrome Has Laid the Foundation to Raise Toxic Tort
Litigation to New Heights,” 26 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1041, 1053 (1995).
75 This is sometimes called the “regulatory compliance” defense. On the
whole, American courts have tended not to defer to regulatory standards
in tort cases. They have been criticized for this tendency in recent years,
and doctrine in the area may be undergoing some change. See generally,
Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L. J.
(2000) (forthcoming).
76 Donald A. Carr & William L. Thomas, Devising a Compliance Strategy
Under the ISO 14000 International Environmental Management Stan-
dards, 15 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 85, 191-205 (1997).
elni 1/2000 Environmental Law Network International
80
by road damage resulting from slumping earth
where a firm harvested timber on steep slopes.
Although government regulations might permit it,
and other firms might engage in similar harvesting,
prohibition by a program such as that of the FSC
could be taken as persuasive evidence of failure to
exercise due care.77 Again note that the firm could
be liable whether it was certified or not. Thus law
would operate to extend “voluntary” standards to
non-participants.
(3) Nuisance
General standards for land use in Anglo-American
law are defined through the law of nuisance, which
generally prohibits uses of land which “substan-
tially” and “unreasonably” interfere with the use
and enjoyment of land by others.78 Just what is
unreasonable is hard to define, and depends on
many factors (common practices in the area, prior-
ity in time, costs and benefits of the use, etc.). It is
possible to anticipate, however, that in some i-
stances certification standards, particularly substan-
tive ones, could be called upon to define land uses
as unreasonable. To offer a forestry example again,
stream pollution which results from a clear cut
larger than would be allowed by a certification
system and which substantially affects the water
quality of a downstream owner could potentially be
cited as unreasonable, and enjoined by a court. The
same might be true of air pollution suffered by
downwind residents from a non-certified chemical
plant.
(4) Misrepresentation
American tort law has long provided a cause of
action to anyone physically injured as a result of
reasonable reliance on a fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion made by one who is in the business of selling a
product.79 The common law requirement of physical
harm is likely to limit the number of plaintiffs who
can bring general common law actions involving
certification programs,80 but it is conceivable that
some physical harm might result from misrepre-
                                                          
77 Though the issue is not central to this article, note that the converse is
also possible. Someone injured by a product or enterprise that met a pri-
vately set standard could sue the standard setting organization in tort.
Although American courts tradtionally eschew such suits, some important
ones have been successful. See Shoaf, supra note 38 at 38 for an over-
view. See also Jeffrey Q. Smith, Jeanne P. Bolger and Amy Marasco,
Products Liability Claims Against Voluntary Standards Developers -- An
Update on Recent Developments, American National Standards Institute
Website: http://web.ansi.org/public/library/guides/prod_liability.html.
78 See generally, Prosser and Keeton, LAW OF TORTS (5th Ed, 1984).
79 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY,
Section 42B (1998) (“one engaged in the business of selling or otherwise
distributing products who, in connection with the sale of a product, makes
a fraudulent, negligent, or innocent misrepresentation of a material fact
concerning the product is subject to liability for harm to persons or prop-
erty caused by the misrepresentation.”)
80 Id, Section 21.
sentation of fact such as certification status and give
rise to suits outside of the negligence framework.81
In any case, related statutory provisions regarding
misrepresentation clearly provide actions for eco-
nomic harm. The most important is a broadly
worded provision of the federal “Lanham Act,”
creating general liability for commercial misrepre-
sentation of goods or services to either competitors
or others who are damaged.82 It seems clear that this
provision could be used in suits against firms said to
be misrepresenting their certification status. It is
even possible that it might be used against firms
who claim to be managing their forests sustainably,
but are not certified. Such suits could conceivably
be brought by competitors who are certified, and
who claim that their competitors are falsely imply-
ing that they are as well.83 Suits under this provision
will certainly be worth watching! In addition, the
Federal Trade Commission and various state attor-
neys general have the authority to brings suits
against companies for commercial misrepresenta-
tion, and have often done so.84
ii)Property Law
American property law allows land owners to make
environmental management commitments that will
continue to be binding even if the land comes under
new ownership. One of the most important forms is
the “conservation easement,” through which an
owner, while retaining possession of the land and
the right to use it in many ways, can make specific
commitments to another party regarding how the
land will be used.85 That party, which ordinarily
                                                          
81 There have certainly been suits for misrepresentation of human rights
records. One brought against clothing manufacturers operating in Saipan,
for example, contributed to a fairly far reaching settlement monitored by
an American not-for-profit organization. Monitoring Program: A Plan for
Implementing Settlement on Apparel Production in Saipan
http://www.globalexchange.org/economy/corporations/saipan/monitoring.h
tml
82 Originally passed in 1946, the Lanham Act’s false advertising provision
was amended in 1988 to read as follows: “Any person who, on or in con-
nection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in
commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description
of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which is likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or com-
mercial activities by another person, or in commercial advertising or pro-
motion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic
origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial
activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that
he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.” 15 U.S.C. §1125(a)(1)
(1994).
83 For examples of the many kinds of suits that have been brought by
competitors under the Lanham Act, see Jean Wegman Burns, Confused
Jurisprudence: False Advertising Under the Lanham Act, 29 B.U.L.REV.
807(1999).
84 See Lee Goldman, The World’s Best Article on Competitor Suits for False
Advertising, 45 FLA. L.R. 487, 505-506 (1993).
85 The Uniform Conservation Easement Act defines a conservation ease-
ment as “[a] nonpossessory interest of a holder in real property imposing
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must be a governmental or a not-for-profit organi-
zation, holds the “benefit” of the easement. It has
the power to determine whether the commitments
are being met, and to take action to enforce them if
they are not. Certification appears to be an excellent
way of enforcing the kinds of conservation ease-
ments which allow continued management for for-
estry, but prohibit overcutting, reductions of biodi-
versity, and the like. Using certification as an en-
forcement mechanism would considerably reduce
the burden on benefit holders, and provide a “neu-
tral,” third-party assessment of how well the bur-
dens of the easement are being met. Accordingly, it
seems likely that drafters of conservation easements
will discover the benefits of certification and begin
incorporating them in the agreements.
iii)Tax Law
Tax law could also become an important means of
incorporating certification in the legal system. Con-
servation easements, for example, are often donated
or sold to conservation organizations for very low
prices. If the price received is less than the reduc-
tion in property value resulting from the transfer of
the easement,86 that difference can qualify as a
charitable deduction under federal income tax law87
and may bring additional tax benefits under state
laws. Given the creativity of tax lawyers in arguing
for deductions generally, it seems likely that other
avenues in tax law will be probed in order to im-
prove the financial benefits of certification.
iv)Information Regulation
As the Lanham Act indicates, U.S. law tends to
treat information relatively seriously.88 One very
important statute in the environmental arena is the
“community right to know” law, which requires
users of specified toxic and hazardous chemicals to
file annual reports disclosing names and quantities
of chemicals either stored on site or released into
                                                               
limitations or affirmative obligations the purposes of which include retain-
ing or protecting natural, scenic, or open-space values of real property,
assuring its availability for agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-space
use, protecting natural resources, maintaining or enhancing air or water
quality, or preserving the historical, architectural, archaeological, or cul-
tural aspects of real property.” Unif. Conserv. Easement Act, § 1(1)
(1981). The easement document ordinarily defines in much greater detail
which uses will be allowed and which will not. See, e.g., Janet Kiehl and
Thomas Barrett, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK
(1988). The easement is recorded in the file on the property which is
maintained by the central registry in the local jurisdiction where the prop-
erty is located.
86 Conservation easements are generally expected to reduce the market
value of property because they transfer some of its development potential
away from the property.
87 26 U.S.C. § 170(h) (1994)
88 One possibly important exception is continuing reliance on industry self-
regulation in the area of electronic commerce. This area remains very
dynamic, and it is not clear either whether industry self-regulation will
persist or whether it will have a significant influence on other areas.
the air, land, or water.89 Other laws require addi-
tional reporting of information on water and air
pollution. Information reported under these statutes
is generally available to the public from state and
federal environmental agencies. Although it can be
poorly coordinated and difficult to analyze, the
value and accessibility of this information are likely
to improve steadily as agencies implement modern,
i t rnet-oriented information systems. Moreover, if
certification programs deliver on their promise to
improve information production, management, and
analysis in firms, those improvements may be re-
flected over time in the rules governing public dis-
closure requirements. Finally, public reporting laws
are likely to be important aids to public and private
monitoring of the implementation of environmental
certification programs in firms. By creating external
capacity to compare certified firms to each other
a d to uncertified firms, it may also provide extra
leverage for those pushing firms to become certified
and certification programs to become stringent.90
v)Financial Regulation
U.S. financial regulation may be even more reliant
on information disclosure than environmental
regulation. Because the economic prospects of firms
can be heavily affected by their environmental
performance, financial regulation also has consider-
able potential to reinforce certification standards.
Corporate disclosures are regulated both by detailed
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regu-
lations, and by the general “anti-fraud” provisions
of the securities laws, as well as by state laws. At
present, the formal requirements of SEC rules are
not particularly demanding regarding environmental
issues. They tend to focus on potential legal liabili-
ties of firms, and accord firms considerable discre-
tion in deciding what to report.91 However, certified
firms are free to report their status, and many will
do so. Such information is valuable both to general
analysts assessing the likely profitability of firms
and to green consumers seeking to distinguish be-
tween investment options based on environmental
performance. SEC regulations mandate “generally
accepted accounting principles,” which are largely
established by the profession itself through its own
                                                          
89 42 U.S.C. § § 11022 and 11023.
90 The King and Lennox research on the American Responsible Care
program indicates to potential power of public information reporting in
assessing the effectiveness of certification programs. Andrew King and
Michael Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: The Chemical
Industry's Responsible Care Program, ACAD. OF MGNT. J. (forthcoming).
Copy on file with author.
91 See generally, John W. Bagby, Paula C. Murray, and Eric T. Andrews, So
How Green Was My Balance Sheet?: Corporate Liability and Environ-
mental Disclosure, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 225 (1995).
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private standards setting process.92 While the long
term existence and relative success of this division
of responsibility suggests the potential of environ-
mental certification programs, the immediately
relevant point is that it provides a potential mecha-
nism for incorporating certification status into fi-
nancial reporting. Whether and how this will hap-
pen remains to be seen. An important trend, how-
ever, is that financial reporting standards relating to
environmental performance are currently subject to
increased attention and debate in the U.S.93 The
critique that reporting standards are overly conser-
vative regarding environmental performance ap-
pears to be gaining ground. To the extent that it
prevails, both formally and informally, financial
reporting may become an increasingly important
channel for legal incorporation of environmental
certification in the future.
vi)Trade Law
The U.S. is signatory to a number of international
trade treaties, including the series of agreements
referred to as the General Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade (GATT). The GATT requires,
among other things, that “where technical regula-
tions are required and relevant international stan-
dards exist or their completion is imminent, Mem-
bers shall use them . . . as a basis for technical
regulations.”94 While this provision pushes gov-
ernments to formally incorporate international stan-
dards in their positive laws, the GATT is also likely
to have broader informal incorporation effects over
time. By presumptively privileging international
standards, the GATT may give private international
environmental standard setting programs implicit
legal standing regardless of whether their standards
formally incorporated in state laws. This is espe-
cially so because the World Trade Organization, the
GATT’s primary trade regulation body, has found it
extremely difficult to promulgate rules to date.95
This situation virtually invites private international
standard setting bodies to fill the vacuum as quickly
as possible.
                                                          
92 The standard setting process is organized through the Financial Stan-
dards Accounting Board, which also has an Emerging Issues Task Force
that deals with problems such as those in the changeable field of envi-
ronmental accounting and reporting. Id at 306-7.
93 Id. See also Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197
(1999).
94 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, Basic Documents of Inter-
national Economic Law, 1 B.D.I.E.L. 141 (Commerce Clearing House,
1994).
95 See, e.g., Marco Bronkers, Better Rules for a New Millennium: A Warning
Against Undemocratic Developments in the WTO, 2 J. INT. BUS. L. 547
(1999).
f) Forbearance
What does it mean when state legal systems take no
direct action regarding private certification sys-
tems? Inaction is to be expected when certification
systems are new and government has little experi-
ence with them. After certification programs be-
come better understood, however, government
forbearance may begin to take on meaning. Most
likely it will be taken to indicate tacit approval. It
could even be seen as an implicit delegation of
regulatory authority to the program. In practice, of
course, it might simply be the case that legislatures
and agencies see more pressing needs for scarce
government resources in other areas. Intentionally
or not, however, government forbearance could
grow into a form of tacit delegation over time,
making it increasingly unlikely that government
will significantly expand its regulatory presence in
the areas. Assuming there remains a societal ex-
pectation that some program is necessary, govern-
ment forbearance may thus contribute to the long-
term strengthening of environmental certification
programs. Institutionally oriented scholars would
see them as having been incorporated into the social
control system of which the formal legal system
forms a part. That would have been accomplished
with the assistance of the legal system by its essen-
tially doing nothing!
3 Legal Control of Certification Systems
Legal systems can shape certification systems, and
not merely incorporate them. Indeed, many of the
legal incorporation mechanisms described above
may affect the content and practice of certification
as well. Certification systems are likely to be
shaped in part with an eye to how legal systems
may react.
a) Informal Steering
While government forbearance may be seen as a
tacit form of approval or delegation, it can also be a
tactical strategy for “steering” the development of
certification programs. Regulatory officials and
certification officials are likely to observe each
other’s behavior. Government agencies are likely to
be able to affect the substance and implementation
of certification programs to some extent simply by
how they signal they “might” react to them. Of
course, this is simply the mirror image of certifica-
tion programs trying to steer government policy, but
it is important to note the capacity of government to
affect programs by doing nothing yet giving signals
about what it might do.
Governments might also be able to steer certifica-
tion programs by providing them with technical
expertise, by actively participating in them, or by
supporting research on their performance, all of
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which the U.S. is doing.96 In particular, they could
gather and support the analysis of data regarding the
relative performance of certification programs and
firms within them. Governments can thereby si-
multaneously hedge their policy bets and enhance
the transparency of certification programs. By thus
facilitating increased production and dissemination
of information, they may also increase the learning
capacity of the regulatory system as a whole.
b) Direct Regulation
Should informal steering not suffice, governments
always have the option of regulating certification
programs.97 They might do this in a number of
ways. First, they could redefine the substantive
management standards which must be met by firms
seeking to be certified.98 Of course such an action
would pose a dilemma for certification programs,
particularly global ones, and they would have to
decide whether to remain in business in the juris-
diction, try to get the law changed, ignore it, etc.
Second, governments could impose rules governing
the procedures followed by certification programs --
standard setting processes, certification processes,
enforcement processes, etc. They might, for exam-
ple, require more or different kinds of public par-
ticipation in certification proceedings.99 They might
require the disclosure of information that designers
of certification processes planned not to disclose.
Given the discretion vested in certifiers by many
private certification schemes, governments might
also decide to define minimum qualifications for
certifiers. In fact, governments could go so far as
develop public certification standards for private
certification programs! Note that the Connecticut
law discussed above carries the seeds of such possi-
bilities within it.
There are many more possibilities. Two points
should be kept in mind. First, certification programs
                                                          
96 Shoaf, supra note 38. See also General Accounting Office, “Certification
Requirements: New Guidance Should Encourage Transparency in Agency
Decision Making,” Report to the Chairman, Committee on Small Business,
House of Representatives, GAO/GCD-99-179 (September, 1999).
97 The federal government, for example, has passed a statutory framework
authorizing the U.S. Department of Agriculture to regulate the certification
of organic foods. Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 (OFPA), 7 U.S.C.
§6501 (2000). The department has yet to promulgate final standards un-
der the Act, so many states have enacted their own programs. J. Howard
Beales III, Modification and Consumer Information: Modern Biotechnology
and the Regulation of Information, 55 FOOD AND DRUG L.J. 105, 117
(2000). See e.g. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. 5h-19.004 (2000); IOWA
AMIN. CODE 21-47.1(190C) (2000).
98 It should also be noted that the standards for certified firms could continue
to be different from those for non-certified firms.
99 Indeed, the American anti-trust laws already do so to some degree, by
favoring standard setting processes that are open, balanced, and trans-
parent. See generally, David A. Swankin, How Due Process in the Devel-
opment of Voluntary Consensus Standards Can Reduce the Risk of Anti-
trust Liability, Prepared for the U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Nat’l Inst. Of
Standards and Tech., NIST-GCR-90-571 (1990); Shoaf, supra note 38.
perform public functions, functions which are most
often carried out by government agencies under the
types of rules listed above. Second, such forms of
regulation have been imposed on other private ac-
tors with public responsibilities, such as medical
professionals,100 accountants,101 lawyers, and so on.
There is no reason to assume that environmental
p ofessionals will enjoy permanent immunity.
c) Inhibition of Certification Systems
i) National Trade Regulation
Where industrial firms cooperate to set standards
governing themselves, potentially raising prices for
their products or inhibiting entry into their industry,
national fair trade laws, such as the U.S. anti-trust
laws, are always likely to be an issue. They have
received considerable attention in development of
certification programs to date. Often this attention
has been private, with certification organizations
seeking confidential advice from law firms and
conducting confidential consultations with national
trade authorities.102 Other times it has been public,
sometimes when certification programs explain why
they cannot be more ambitious,103 and sometimes
when they instruct participants on how to avoid
anit-trust problems.104 As noted in Section 2, na-
tional trade laws can impose some constraints, but
do not seem to be a major obstacle to certification
programs at this time.105
ii) International Trade Regulation
The past few years have seen a major expansion in
the power of the international trading institutions,
which have used a series of international treaties to
impose increasingly significant constraints on do-
mestic regulatory programs. The World Trade Or-
ganization is currently responsible for implementing
global trading policy by interpreting and applying
                                                          
100The American health care system, for example, involves a very compli-
cated mix of non-governmental regulation by the Joint Commission on the
Accreditation of Hospitals and detailed regulation of the behavior health
care professionals and specific aspects of health care provision. See, e.g.,
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospi-
tals: Private Regulation of Health Care and the Public Interest, 24 Bos. C.
L. R., 835 (1983) and Steve P. Calandrillo, Physician-Assisted Suicide
Under Managed Care , 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 72 (1998).
101 See, e.g., Daniel L. Goelzer and Susan Ferris Wyderko, Rule 2(E):
Securities and Exchange Commission Discipline of Professionals, 85 NW.
U. L. REV. 652 (1991).
102 E.g., Webb, supra note 69.
103 Meidinger, Private Environmental Regulation supra note 3 (describing the
American Forest & Paper Association’s decision to employ a voluntary
logger training program, rather than a requirement that all suppliers be
trained in sustainable forestry methods).
104 E.g., Swankin, supra note 99.
105 Their primary effects have been on so-called “buyers groups,” which are
groups of wholesalers and retailer who jointly commit to buy only certified
products. These groups have evidently been constrained in various ways
by trade laws, but no published information has been found that explains
how.
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the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and
recent important amendments on “technical barriers
to trade” (TBTs).106 As noted in Section 2, the
GATT system is likely to be an importation mecha-
nism for legal incorporation of certification sys-
tems. It can also pose some problems, however. The
main issue facing private certification systems is
whether they might be classified by the WTO as
TBTs on grounds that they seek to differentiate
among similar products based on how they were
produced. Since the primary targets of the treaties
are states, some observers question whether private
certification organizations should be covered at all.
The TBT amendments do apply to “recognized
bodies,” however, a term not defined in the
treaty.107 Kernaghan Webb concludes that an or-
ganization like the ISO, with its designated national
standards bodies, should be viewed as a recognized
body, but that groups like the Forest Stewardship
Council should not. This makes some sense, but is
also vulnerable based on the analysis of the paper
thus far. “Recognition” could be given either a
broad or a narrow interpretation. On the broad side,
even forbearance from regulating based on an as-
sessment that a certification program is performing
acceptably could be viewed as recognition. On the
narrow side, the WTO could conclude that unless a
state explicitly delegates authority to regulate in a
field to a certification program, it is not a recog-
nized program. This is another area that will bear
watching. The effects of the WTO on domestic
legal incorporation of certification programs could
be quite significant in years to come. And of course,
if the WTO is treated as a form of legal system even
though it is not a nation state, we must ask the
question to what degree it incorporates certification
programs.
4 Conclusions
a) Patterns of Legal Incorporation
Certification programs are natural targets for legal
incorporation because they have elements of for-
mality, continuity, and institutionalization that
other, ostensibly one-shot industry initiatives may
not have, and also because they reduce the costs of
deliberation for legal bodies. Although the incorpo-
ration of certification programs into U.S. law is
only beginning to unfold, the analysis in Sections 2
and 3 suggests that it is occurring, mostly through
indirect legal processes. Yet the process of legal
                                                          
106 GATT, supra note 94.
107 Annex I of the TBT Amendments defines “standard” as a “document
approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated
use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes
and production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory.” GATT,
supra note 94.
incorporation is very difficult to monitor. On the
one hand, it can occur in so many small steps si-
multaneously in so many avenues that it is very
difficult to trace. It can go forward almost unno-
ticed. On the other hand, there is a tension between
the quasi-legal analysis performed above and quan-
titative analysis. The facts that the forms of incorpo-
ration described above can occur, and are occurring,
do not necessarily demonstrate that a widespread
change is taking place. They indicate that larger
ch nges may be occurring, though, and that it is
a propriate to inquire further.
b) Implications
Exactly how to inquire further is not clear. The
problem is not only how to measure change, but
also what change to measure. One of the primary
reasons legal incorporation of certification is inter-
esting is that it may signal larger shifts in social
governance structures. The challenge is to grasp the
dimensions of the change that are likely to most
important. To date, most analysis has focused on
questions such as whether private environmental
programs yield environmental performance better
than would have occurred otherwise, and whether
they improve cost-effectiveness. Although the an-
swers vary with specific cases, they seem to incline
oward a cautious “yes.”108 Provided certain safe-
guards are present, such as transparency and watch-
dog groups with the ability to monitor activities,
nvironmental and efficiency gains can be
achieved.109 And of course, the fact that these gains
are possible may be what impels the establishment
of c rtification systems and other private initiatives
in the first place.
Yet, other dimensions of change may be equally or
more important. For example, the proliferation and
institutionalization of certification systems may
signal a general shift in political power from some
actors to others. Who exactly who is gaining and
losing power? Cutler, Haufler, and Porter, who have
studied the growth of private authority in a number
of sectors, conclude that traditional nation states are
clearly losing ground, while corporate industrial
interests are gaining.110 They argue that this shift is
bringing a diminution of public participation and
accountability.111 In their even more expansive
study, Braithwaite and Drahos agree that many
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states are losing ground to corporations and self-
regulatory organizations in the emerging global
regulatory system.112 They see the system as fluid
and highly variable, however, depending on the
particular area of regulation and problem. Actors
pursue their agendas in significant part by hashing
out guiding principles, and even relatively small-
scale players encounter a surprising number of
strategic opportunities to affect the system. None-
theless, the overall pattern is one of increasing con-
trol by large, powerful actors, working as often
through private governance processes as through
state ones.
The growth of a global regulatory system relying
heavily on private regulation also raises important
questions about the nature of political legitimacy,
and whether it might be changing. Received social
theory holds that to survive governance systems
must establish significant claims to legitimacy with
the public. How do private environmental regula-
tory systems do this? One possibility, of course, is
that people simply do not understand how they
work or how important they are. While this is true
of some systems, which pretend to seek transpar-
ency while thwarting it in practice, it is not true of
all of them. Moreover, the ones reviewed in the
research underlying this paper seem to be moving
on the whole toward increased transparency. Thus,
it seems important to ask whether a new form of
legitimacy may be emerging, one that is not based
on traditional political processes managed by the
state. If so, perhaps it is based on the certification
systems’ peculiar combination of commitments to
laudable but diffuse goals, high expertise, selective
stakeholder participation, and independence from
government. Plausible or not, this kind of hypothe-
sis has received only the most preliminary explor-
tion to date. If private environmental certification
systems flourish, such questions will have to be
addressed.113
Fourth, as suggested above, voluntary agreements,
certification programs, and legal incorporation may
and perhaps should be seen in connection to larger
developments in society. There has been a certain
amount of work attempting to make such linkages
to conventional legal institutions. Some approaches
focus more on discursive processes in society,114
                                                          
112 John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION
(2000). They see the U.S. and the European Union, however, as still the
most powerful actors in the global regulatory system.
113 It should also be noted that the question of legitimacy plagues both
private certification systems and supra-national governmental entities,
such as the WTO and the EU, which also stand in some tension with na-
tion states. See, e.g., Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the
Administrative Character of Supranationalism: the Example of the Euro-
pean Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628 (1999).
114 E.g., Teubner, supra note 13.
while others focus on organizational structures and
patterns of relationships. 115 The next step is to link
the study of the incorporation of private regulatory
systems to those constructs.
Finally, it may be time to revisit the meaning of
“law” and “legal system.” As the discussion of
international trade law suggested, the role of the
nation-state and state-based law is becoming in-
creasingly problematical. It is being challenged
from one side by the growth of a global trading
system with an accompanying legal system, and
from the other by the growth of private, often global
regulatory mechanisms such as the certification
s stems. Yet the two supposedly defining charac-
teristics of certification systems, their privateness
and their voluntariness, are highly contingent. They
are under serious threat as a result of the linkages of
certification systems to national and transnational
legal systems. They could turn into their opposites
before we really notice it. If so, perhaps they were
not what they seemed.
Appendix A. Examples of Forest Stewardship
Council Principles and Standards.
Th  Forest Stewardship Principles and Criteria, applica-
ble around the world, are as follows:
Forest management shall respect all applicable laws of
the country in which they occur, and international treaties
and agreements to which the country is a signatory, and
comply with all FSC Principles and Criteria.
1. Long-term tenure and use rights to the land and
forest resources shall be c early defined, ocumented
and legally established.
2. The legal and customary rights of indigenous peo-
ples to own, use and manage their lands, territories,
and resources shall be recognized and respected.
3. Forest management operations shall maintain or
enhance the long-term social and economic well-
being of forest workers and local communities.
4. Forest management operations shall encourage the
fficient use of the forest's multiple products and
services to ensure economic viability and a wide
range of environmental and social benefits.
5. Forest management shall conserve biological diver-
sity and its associated values, water resources, soils,
and unique and fragile ecosystems and landscapes,
and, by so doing, maintain the ecological functions
and the integrity of the forest.
6. A management plan -- appropriate to the scale and
intensity of the operations -- shall be written, imple-
mented, and kept up to date. The long term objectives
                                                          
115 E.g., David M. Trubek, Yves Dezalay, Ruth Buchanan, and John R.
Davis, Global Restructuring and The Law: Studies of the Internationaliza-
tion of Legal Fields and the Creation of Transnational Arenas, 44 CASE
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of management, and the means of achieving them,
shall be clearly stated.
7. Monitoring shall be conducted -- appropriate to the
scale and intensity of forest management -- to assess
the condition of the forest, yields of forest products,
chain of custody, management activities and their so-
cial and environmental impacts.
8. Management activities in high conservation value
forests shall maintain or enhance the attributes which
define such forests. Decisions regarding high conser-
vation value forests shall always be considered in the
context of a precautionary app oach.
9. Plantations shall be planned and managed in accor-
dance with Principles and Criteria 1 - 9, and Principle
10 and its Criteria. While plantations can provide an
array of social and economic benefits, and can co-
tribute to satisfying the world's needs for forest prod-
ucts, they should complement the management of,
reduce pressures on, and promote the restoration and
conservation of natural forests.
Exemplifying the countless standards and indicators
implementing the principles and criteria are those of the
Canadian Maritime Region regarding biodiversity, which
were promulgated as a regional application of Principle 6
above:
6.2 * Safeguards shall exist which protect rare, threat-
ened, and endangered species and their habitats (e.g.
nesting and feeding areas). Conservation zones and
protection areas, appropriate to the scale and intensity
of forest management and the uniqueness of the af-
fected resources, shall be established. Inappropriate
hunting, fishing, trapping and collecting shall be con-
trolled.
6.2.1 * Threatened and endangered species (listed by
provincial and federal endangered species legislation)
and their habitat must be protected or managed in ac-
cordance with approved recovery plans. Where re-
covery plans are not yet approved, disturbance of
known occurrences of such species is to be avoided
and a cautionary approach taken to protect their
habitat. Forest owner/manager activities must ensure
that species that are rare, vulnerable or under investi-
gation by COSEWIC, or their provincial equivalents
as designated by recognized authorities (e.g. aca-
demic experts, provincial or national museums or
COSEWIC) are not further threatened by timber or
non-timber activities.
Indicators:
Areas are inventoried for such species before harvesting,
stand improvement or road-building activities are car-
ried out (appropriate to the scale and intensity of the
operation).
Protection of such species is addressed in the manage-
ment plan.
Known occurrences of such species and their habitat are
not disturbed.
Forest workers are aware of known occurrences of
such species and are following the management plan
with respect to protecting such species and their
habitat.
Management staff is aware of those species that may
occur locally.
6.2.2 * Old growth stands must not be harvested.
Indi ators:
Inventories are carried out to identify old growth stands
(appropriate to the scale and intensity of the opera-
tion).
Old growth stands are identified on management plan
maps.
No evidence of harvesting old growth stands exists.
Management and forest workers are aware of the charac-
teristics of old growth stands.
6.2.3 Areas with unusually high native species or eco-
system diversity must be identified, and protected or
managed in such a way as to ensure that the diversity
is not lost.
Indicators:
Management has identified areas with unusually high
native species or ecosystem diversity using the latest
regional methodolgy, formulae, and/or techniques
(e.g. those used by WWF, Greater Fundy Ecosystem
R search Group or New Brunswick Nature Trust).
Such areas are identified on management plan maps.
Management plans detail measures to ensure the diversity
of such sites is not lost.
Forest workers are following the management plan meas-
ures to ensure the diversity of such sites is not lost.
Appendix B. The ISO Environmental Management
System Standard’s environmental policy provi-
sion.
4.2 Environmental Policy
Top management shall define the organization’s envi-
ronmental policy and ensure that it
a) is appropriate to the nature, scale and environ-
mental impacts of its activities, products or services;
b) includes a commitment to continual improvement
and prevention of pollution;
c) includes a commitment to comply with relevant
environmental legislation and regulations, and with
other requirements o which the organization sub-
scribes;
d) provides the framework for setting and reviewing
environmental objectives and targe s;
e) is documented, implemented and maintained and
communicated to all employees;
f) is available to the public.116
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Introduction
The structure of society is becoming more and more
like the structure of the Internet. Nobody is the boss
on the Internet, nobody dictates what happens.
Instead, there are nodes, meeting points, and power
centers where specific functions are performed. Any
modern, liberal democratic society already has
several such centers of power. There, players from
different networks meet each other, talk about the
developments they would like to see, discuss the
underlying concept, and make agreements on things
they will have to do jointly. Then these points are
brought up in other forums and worked out among
their own constituencies (Interview, Wijfels, 1999,
p. 25).
The role that is reserved for such meeting places is
increasingly important in the decision-making proc-
esses of modern liberal democratic societies. In fact,
it is changing the architecture of decision-making.
One essential characteristic of that new architecture
is the changing role of governments and private
organizations; their positions are changing at the
same time and in mutual interaction.
The government is retreating to some extent and
slimming down in the meantime. We might say it is
deregulating and privatizing. But those terms have a
sharp edge, having taken on a technocratic conno-
tation. We could also say there is a new role in the
modern architecture, creating the opportunity to
tackle complex public issues more forcefully. That
is, the tasks can be performed more effectively and
more efficiently.
At the same time, however, the private domain –
consisting of civil organizations and the business
community – has been assigned a new role. It is
Voluntary Environmental being held accountable
for its response to public interests and for the way it
applies its problem-solving capacities, which it is
deemed to have. Private organizations are expected
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to share the task of public service. That too is a
fundamental shift in roles.
The points where the parties meet may be called
cooperative regimes or partnerships. Depending on
the intensity of the contact, the interaction may
revolve around sharing ideas, engaging in dialog –
for which the round table is a typical form – , pass-
ing on knowledge, or a concerted effort to make a
social product. Another new intersection is the
voluntary agreement. Yet other examples are part-
nerships among environmental organizations and
companies, regional development contracts, and
participatory projects under the auspices of Local
Agenda 21.
Within the new architecture, voluntary environ-
mental agreements are not just a means of expres-
sion. They are constituent parts of the structure. The
issue of the environment – or looking at it from a
broader perspective, the concept of sustainable
development – is associated with ecological conser-
vation as well as economic development. By co-
sidering how these interests are related, they may be
seen as mutually dependent actors in the same
playing field. To pursue sustainable development,
we have to find a form for that playing field.
The main argument presented in this paper is that
we should not look at voluntary agreements exclu-
sively as instruments of policy. To do so almost
automatically places the phenomenon in a juridical
context. It is more fruitful to look at these agree-
ments from a different angle, as a new type of social
arrangement, consistent with a process of social
change with a wider scope. From that perspective,
other conditions come to the fore. Those conditions
pertain to the structure of the arrangement and the
process that takes place under its umbrella.
Juridical packaging of the instrument
The voluntary environmental agreement was ini-
tially introduced as a new policy instrument. It was
supposed to supplement established instruments
such as regulatory control or financial incentives.
But it was primarily an instrument of last resort. It
was applied arbitrarily to ad hoc problems when
government authorities wanted to do something and
saw no other options to deal with a problem in any
other way (Biekart, 1995).
NEW STEPS IN ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE
Agreements as Institutional Change*
Pieter Glasbergen**
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Under a voluntary agreement, the public and the
private party cooperate of their own volition. The
parties can commit themselves to a greater or lesser
degree. In most instances, they are not bound to do
more than make an effort to achieve a specified
result. Anyone schooled in the classical notion of
government – based on the attitude that the gov-
erning force of environmental policy derives mainly
from the juridical guarantees that can be provided –
would take a dim view of the idea of giving private
parties so much freedom.
From a classical regulatory point of view, a volun-
tary environmental agreement is a risky enterprise –
a sign of the regulatory weakness of the state. The
government is supposed to be alert to the public
interest and play an exclusive role in defending it.
In line with established juridical thinking, it is defi-
nitely unheard of to let private parties in on the task
of setting norms, and it is not common practice to
let private parties help enforce them.
If you try to share the responsibility anyway, you
run a big risk. Two kinds of risk that are often men-
tioned are regulatory capture and commodification
of environmental issues. These risks arise when the
government loses sight of its public responsibilities.
Government may start to define its task along the
same lines as the other stakeholders do. When ne-
gotiating with those stakeholders, the government
may then be able to appreciate their interests better.
Ultimately, however, the agreement would then
serve a private aim. The interests of the environ-
ment would be something to worry about later.
The discussion then soon turns to the value of this
seemingly weak instrument. Shouldn’t it be but-
tressed by a juridical mantle? For instance, why
couldn’t the application of the instrument be
couched in existing environmental legisltion?
The point of departure for this discussion is the
overriding question of how to place the voluntary
environmental agreement within the context of
environmental law. One key question derived from
that concern is how the agreement, being a contract
under private law, relates to environmental regula-
tions that fall under public law. Another derived
question is how a voluntary environmental agree-
ment can be used to create a legally binding con-
tract.
These questions may be seen as an attempt to re-
duce uncertainty. Because the instrument itself
would have to be subject to regulation, it seems that
we are back where we started: at a classical case of
juridical government, albeit somewhat disguised.
Putting the tendency toward ‘juridification’ in
perspective
The discussion on possible legal ramifications has
been useful. But upon closer examination, I believe
that the voluntary environmental agreement has a
value above and beyond its legal status. Let us con-
sider the three questions posed above.
In some countries, notably Belgium and Denmark,
the voluntary environmental agreement has been
given legal status. This entailed fitting new guide-
lines into existing environmental legislation. Other
countries, for instance the Netherlands, made a
deliberate decision not to take that step. In fact,
there would be no reason to do so. A legal regula-
tion would largely cancel out the practical advan-
tages such as flexibility and freedom to design the
agreement to suit the circumstances. Furthermore, a
legal regulation does not necessarily provide any
more certainty about the end result. There is no
reason to believe that voluntary agreements are
more effective when they are embedded in envi-
ronmental legislation. In contrast, couching an
agreement in law seems to make the parties cau-
tious, especially private parties, about entering into
a cooperative arrangement.
The extensive discussion on the question of how the
voluntary environmental agreement – as a private-
law contract – relates to environmental legislation –
which resorts under public law – has not led to
much more than some trivial commentary. It is
abundantly clear that an agreement under private
law does not contravene a prior regulation under
public law. However, a private-law agreement can
be made before that regulation is officially adopted
as law. Or the private-law agreement can elaborate
on the stipulations of the law. Furthermore, volun-
tary environmental agreements are subject to the
legally required evaluation of permit applications
according to the criteria and procedures that apply.
The discussion on the third question – whether
voluntary agreements can or should be legally
binding – has generated some insight, in my opin-
ion. It seems that a legally binding agreement is an
option that parties can choose to pursue, having
talked over the repercussions, but a legal commit-
ment is not imperative. The point of using this in-
strument, from the government’s perspective, is to
stimulate a change in behavior, not to f rce people
to change. In principle, legislation is used to force
change (Alders, 1993). Parties make agreements
voluntarily and may formulate their commitment as
concretely as they may desire and would seem to be
reasonable, from their own point of view. One of
the reasons why this instrument is so valuable is
precisely the fact that the parties can choose not to
enter into a strictly enforceable contract. This fea-
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ture can be important when the government’s policy
is not yet explicit and/or if the problems at hand are
complex and veiled in uncertainty. In such situa-
tions, the parties might choose to make global
agreements. Technically, these might not be firmly
grounded in law. But they may be clearly geared to
working out a desired development within a set
time frame. If this is the case, the value of such
agreements should definitely not be underestimated.
Then the voluntary aspect should be interpreted as a
self-imposed engagement.
Incidentally, the peculiar legal status of the volun-
tary agreement has been the source of widespread
misunderstanding. The international literature
makes numerous references to the legally binding
nature of Dutch environmental covenants (Ingram,
1999, p. 43; Jülich and Falk, 1999, p. 9). The
authors have probably been misled by the usual
wording in the covenants, stating that the agreement
is enforceable under private law. Yes, that’s what it
says. But in order to understand what this means,
one has to take the scope of the agreement into
account too. The parties agree to nothing more than
to make an effort to achieve a specified goal.
Moreover, the parties are free to terminate the
agreement at any time, through certain procedures.
Thus, its legally binding nature is an empty letter –
a token expression of legal status. But to be fair,
how could one convince the judge in a court of law
that certain parties have not done all within their
capacity to try to achieve a goal? Long before it
comes to that, the parties will already have pulled
out of the agreement.
Contrary to what is generally assumed, voluntary
environmental agreements do, in my opinion, make
a contribution to the security of law and clearness
with respect to government policy. The context of
environmental law determines how much room to
maneuver there is when formulating the agreement.
Given that leeway, the voluntary agreement can be
seen as a set of policy rules setting forth a code of
conduct. It refers to the way in which interests are
to be weighed, how facts are to be established, and
how legal regulations should be interpreted. In my
opinion, the pertinent question is not whether or not
voluntary environmental agreements are legally
binding but whether they are considered to be mor-
ally binding.
Voluntary environmental agreements in a
wider context
If there is no guarantee that the agreement is mor-
ally binding, then there is no point in having any
more formal kinds of guarantee (Konijnenbelt,
1992). With respect to a moral obligation, the par-
ties should be explicit about their aims, and their
agreements should be clear. These conditions are
emphasized in the findings of empirical research on
the effect of voluntary environmental agreements.
There is no indication that this instrument is neces-
sarily any less effective or less efficient than tradi-
tional forms of regulation; nor that legal require-
ments play a decisive role in its effect.
One drawback of voluntary agreements is often
pointed out – their targets are said to remain below
technically feasible performance levels (Öko Insti-
tute et al., 1998). The same criticism would also
apply to environmental regulations, however. In the
decision to grant an environmental permit, various
standards may be applied: the ALARA principle
(As Low as Reasonably Achievable); Best Techni-
cal Means; or Best Available Techniques. These are
the standards with which companies could reasona-
bly be expected to comply.
Another drawback concerns the democratic caliber
of voluntary agreements. In bringing up this issue,
the critics usually cite fundamental democratic
values (Enevoldsen, 1998). Incidentally, even the
regulations of the classical school cannot meet these
criteria. In my opinion, with respect to certain pro-
cedural rules, voluntary agreements are actually
more democratic than classical government proce-
dures. The reason is that under voluntary agree-
ments, more parties take joint responsibility for a
public issue.
The problems that arise (questions about enforce-
ment, cooperation with unreliable partners, snags in
coordination within the government) are not exclu-
sively related to the alternative character of the
voluntary environmental agreement. These prob-
lems are just as likely to arise under classical form
of regulation (Eshuis and De Graaf, 1998). That
said, it should also be recognized that the agree-
ments too have been evolving. The modern variants
– such as the Dutch covenants in the target-group
policy and the long-term agreements on energy
efficiency – pertain to highly complex issues, with a
lot of uncertainties, and cover moral obligations of
an entire branch of industry (Glasbergen, 1998a,b;
1999).
The selection of this particular instrument as a
promising alternative was no mere coincidence.
Voluntary environmental agreements thrive where
the limits of government by law have been reached.
The need for an instrument with a longer reach is
connected with changes in the characteristics of
environmental issues. A well-known Dutch anec-
dote illustrates this point admirably.
The anecdote is about a multinational corporation.
One day, the company invites some officials to
come visit the plant. The municipality, the province,
the water board, and three different ministries send
representatives to the office. The director shows
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them the various wish lists that each of these levels
of government had compiled, and explains, “I have
one million euro a year that I can spend on envi-
ronmental measures. Please look over your lists
together and decide today which items we will have
to carry out when, and which ones we can forget
about.”
In the course of time, environmental policy has
become much more comprehensive and intensive. It
is no longer geared to remediation of situations that
pose a direct threat to human health. Rather, the
focus is on livability; the policy envisions a qua-
tum leap in environmental quality. Now, environ-
mental policy covers the whole spectrum of envi-
ronmental impact caused by industry. For the pri-
vate sector, this implies making deep cuts in emis-
sion profiles, rethinking the provision of energy,
managing waste differently, finding new ways to
use resources, and thoroughly evaluating their
products.
There are many forms of regulation coming from
many different government bodies and concerning
many aspects of the environmental problems. In
fact, this situation has created its own monster, as
the anecdote suggests. When a basic level of envi-
ronmental protection has been achieved, the issues
become more complex and the level of uncertainty
rises. At the macro level of the whole society, how-
ever, the aims are becoming even more ambitious.
Then a problem arises that I shall call the macro-
micro opposition. Something that seems attainable
from a macro-economic perspective may not neces-
sarily be within reach when we look at the micro-
economic prospects of a branch of industry or an
individual company. This does not imply that the
parties operating at a micro level couldn’t live up to
the ambitious goals. What it does mean is that they
should get enough ‘policy space’ to be able to join
in at their own pace, which in some respects will be
quicker and in other respects perhaps slower.
The appeal of voluntary environmental agreements
does not lie in their non-binding legal status.
Rather, they are attractive because they can give a
new answer to a new kind of problem. The govern-
ment can no longer handle every problem alone.
Formal social control is becoming too complex.
And to be honest, it is not appropriate to the kind of
problems that arise. Instead of limiting the range of
alternatives for action, the creation of more scope
for policy is an appealing option.
Beyond the instrument
Up to this point, I have aimed the spotlight at the
voluntary environmental agreement as a policy
instrument. By looking at this phenomenon in that
light, our attention is turned almost automatically to
the contract between the public and the private
party and to the requirements that must be placed on
such an arrangement. The contract is an appropriate
form when the relationship is horizontal. It is an
expression of the fact that parties have freely come
to n agreement on certain rules of conduct (De
Beus, 1991). This choice fits in with environmental
policy’s current state of developm nt.
However, the contract itself is no more than a for-
mal point in a process of governance within a spe-
cific type of social arrangement. It establishes the
points on which the parties have reached agreement
at that time. After this pause for reflection, the pro-
cess is resumed, and the structure in which the pro-
c ss is embedded is also continued. Thus, we
should see the voluntary environmental agreement
as a confirmation and reinforcement of the value of
the arrangement.
Rather than focusing on the formal arrangement –
which embraces the nature, content and commit-
ment to the agreement – we should consider the
social arrangement. This is generally called a coop-
rative regime (Lafferty and Meadowcroft, 1996;
Meadowcroft, 1998). A cooperative regime is a
form of social organization consisting of groups
originating in different spheres of social life and
reflecting distinct perspectives and interests. In a
s ruc ured debate and through negotiations, they
attempt to come to a common understanding of a
specific problem. Together, the parties then assume
responsibility for the solution.
Thus, a cooperative regime has several specific
characteristics:
· The parties represent organized interests that
reflect broad areas of social life.
· The relation between the parties is characterized
by discursive consensus formation.
· Each of the parties takes (some of the) responsi-
bility in carrying out an agreed solution or de-
velopment trajectory.
A cooperative regime is based on two social
mechanisms: ‘learning’ through dialog and ‘ex-
change’ through negotiation. The essence of a
learning process is to make uncertainty and com-
plexity comprehensible and thereby manageable.
The process of exchange is preeminently suited to
making trade-offs between opposing social interests
and demands, thereby increasing the likelihood that
solutions will eventually be carried out (Driessen,
1998, p. 254).
Sometimes, cooperative regimes are confused with
neocorporatist regimes. The latter are a structural
component of agricultural policy. The top echelons
of government and agricultural organizations are
found there. Forming a closed circle and a perma-
nent relationship, they isolate themselves from their
surroundings and jointly determine the content of
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policy. For a long time, neocorporatist regimes have
hampered the development of a significant envi-
ronmental policy for agriculture in various Euro-
pean countries (Glasbergen, 1992). The cooperative
regimes are a different story altogether. They are
continually being reinvented in response to the core
issues in a society. They are problem-oriented. Even
the composition of the cooperative regime – that is,
which civil organizations should be involved –
depends on the nature of the issue. After a period of
cooperation, the length of which they determine
themselves, the participants split up again. Groups
or individuals can take part in more than one of
these regimes at the same time with shifting con-
stellations of actors. Thus, cooperative regimes are
highly dynamic and open in nature.
To start such a cooperative regime, three conditions
must be met:
· The parties must agree that the present or antici-
pated situation is fundamentally undesirable,
and that the situation has to be approached in a
goal-oriented way.
· They should understand that they need each
other to achieve their goals.
· They should concede that they are unable to
create favorable conditions for achieving par-
ticular objectives solely by their own power.
Given these conditions, those participating in the
arrangement are better off with ‘a package deal’
that they can influence than with a policy process
that is directed by others and is therefore open to
greater uncertainty (Glasbergen, 1996, p. 192).
Requirements for an effective cooperative
regime
When we look at voluntary environmental agree-
ments from this angle, other requirements besides
the legal ones come into the picture. The combina-
tion of learning and negotiation can only lead to the
free acceptance of a meaningful common goal when
the social arrangement meets certain (verifiable)
requirements. Trust is the starting point and the
finish line. There must be a sense among the parties
that each one of them takes the issue seriously.
They must believe that their partners are serious
about it too and would be willing to tackle the issue
in a businesslike manner. Of course, the parties will
always be dependent on each other, though some-
times to a different degree. Thus, the element of
power, which is embodied in the regime, also war-
rants attention. In view of these considerations, I
have formulated the following four requirements.
Accountability. First and foremost, the parties
should respect one another in their various roles as
equal partners. Therefore, it is important for them to
maintain a certain distance from each other –
omething that we might not expect at first glance
in a cooperative regime. The boundaries between
the public and the private spheres of responsibility
must be clearly marked – and stay that way. Each
party should remain accountable for their own spe-
cifi  tasks. This holds not only for accountability
within their own sphere but also applies with r-
spect to the other parties in the arrangement and to
society at large.
Transparency. Secondly, there should be a shared
and balanced set of interests between the public and
the private parties. When the interests are not of
equal weight, there will generally be an unequal
balance of power, which severely limits the likeli-
hood of openly discussing the trade-offs. Thus, the
underlying power structures should be open to dis-
cussion and amenable to change. One way to fa-
cilitate this is by making all relevant sources of
information available. Sharing the information
creates equal opportunity to challenge the validity
claims of each party, including normative rightness,
and gives open access to data by all interested. In
principle, the relevant actors must be allowed to
enter the regime.
Legitimacy. Thirdly, the parties should have certain
professional capacities with respect to the issue at
the core of the regime. Moreover, the internal
structure and culture of the parties should be demo-
cratic. It should also be clear exactly whom they
represent; they should have a commitment to their
own constituency. Furthermore, the agreement is a
public document and it is liable to external political
approval. Third parties should also have the oppor-
tunity to give their opinion on the document.
Responsibility. Fourthly, it should be possible to
link the agreements that are made within the coop-
erative regime to existing legislation. This is where
the importance of the juridical system comes to the
fore. There must be other ways to deal with free
riders besides appealing to voluntary compliance.
Furthermore, the linkage can keep the private par-
ties alert to what is technically possible. This is the
task of the permit system in environmental law.
Though these are not all of the requirements, in my
opinion they are the crucial ones. Government
bodies play a critical role in monitoring compliance
with these requirements. They are supposed to
maintain a balance of power and keep the power
structures open. Government bodies may also be
expected to determine their role in the regimes on
the grounds of a strategic long-term policy. Their
participation should not be ad hoc.
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Do cooperative regimes work in ‘difficult’
situations?
To work on the basis of trust, the partners must be
reliable. Yet it is conceivable that cooperative re-
gimes might also be desirable in other situations.
That possibility was recently raised by Van de Bunt
and Huisman (1999). They draw attention to the
conditions that seem to foster evasion of environ-
mental regulations.
Research on environmental crime reveals that the
offenders are seldom companies that were set up
expressly to make money by breaking the law.
Usually, they are ‘handy businessmen’ in a ‘nor-
mal’ company. These firms seem to have tuned out
their social surroundings. They take an adversarial
stance toward their external setting and perceive
environmental rules as a threat. In most cases, they
are small family businesses that operate in marginal
sectors of the market.
The market itself also exhibits certain characteris-
tics – criminologists refer to a ‘criminogenic op-
portunity structure’ – that would make it attractive
to dodge the rules. One notorious example is the
market for processing waste. This sector consists of
numerous small companies that work in a niche
market. Their activities are easy to cover up, and
they can make big profits by bending the rules,
which have actually become so complex that they
are hard to enforce.
In this context, a cooperative regime could perform
the task of reinforcing social responsiveness. The
point is that classical forms of regulation do not
generally work here. By getting these companies to
make agreements with government bodies, to make
their own rules and take charge of enforcing them,
misunderstandings can be cleared up and under-
standing can be fostered. In that situation, the re-
gime forms an incentive for developing a sense of
social responsibility and building up the integrity of
companies and their markets.
In my opinion, this idea is not quite as naïve as it
might seem at first glance. There are precedents.
One that comes to mind is in the fisheries sector.
For a long time, that industry was known for its
flagrant breaches of environmental regulations.
More and more detailed rules were made and finan-
cial incentives were offered, to no avail. The
breakthrough came by introducing a cooperative
regime – a system of co-management – that placed
the responsibility squarely on the fishermen them-
selves. That led to a situation that was not only
stable but also more acceptable from an environ-
mental perspective (Dubbink and Van Vliet, 1996).
The voluntary environmental agreement may be
applied as a responsibilization strategy (Garland,
1996). To me, that looks like a promising avenue,
one that certainly warrants further exploration.
Conclusions
In this paper, I have woven my argument out of two
strands. I have tried to connect two trends that we
observe in highly developed liberal democratic
societies. One is the changing character of envi-
ronmental issues. The other is the general direction
of social change. Environmental problems have
become more complex and they are fraught with
uncertainty. Society is rapidly becoming an organi-
zation of organizations. This leads me to conclude
that to an increasing degree, the government can
only give shape to society when it is assured of
cooperation by enough actors in civil society (Van
Gunst ren, 1994, p. 97). In that connection, I see
the voluntary environmental agreement as a meet-
ing point, a business center at the crossroads of this
development. This cooperative regime could serve
as an example of sustainable architecture for the
new decision-making framework in civil society.
Thus, I do not see the voluntary environmental
agreement as a mere extension of negotiated rule-
making. Nor do I see it as an extra model of gov-
ernance alongside regulatory and economic models.
I believe that the development of policy on crucial
social issues will have to be conducted in an in-
creasingly interactive format. It will have to take
place at nodes where public and private parties
engage in a working relationship for some length of
time. One such context is the voluntary environ-
mental agreement. Within that framework, the par-
ties agree on what they will do on their own and
what they will do jointly. In setting up these ar-
rangements, they will also consider the regulatory
implications and the effect on any financial ince-
tives that might be available. Thus, the ‘juridifica-
tion’ of the agreements may be an outcome of the
process of working together; it may be the ‘instru-
ment of choice’. Whereas the juridical aspect was
initially the starting point, it turns out to be the
bottom line. Governments take on a new role when
faced with the challenge of formulating the core
issues. They have to draw up an inspiring long-term
development perspective. And they have to monitor
the cooperative regimes to check for compliance
with the requirements I formulated. As pointed out
at the beginning of this paper, these developments
do not signal an end to the role of government. Nor
do they imply an inherent regulatory weakness in
governance. Rather, they indicate a new opportunity
for the public sector to go from strength to strength
in pursuit of socially sanctio ed goals.
Environmental Law Network International elni 1/2000
93
References
Aalders, M.V.C., Het milieuconvenant wordt ‘salon-fähig’. Convenanten
nieuwe stijl in het milieubeleid, In: J.Th.A. Bressers et al. (red.), Beleidsin-
strumenten bestuurskundig beschouwd, Assen, 1993, pp. 75-92.
Beus, J.W. de, The ecological social contract, In: D.J. Kraan en R.J. in ‘t
Veld (eds), Environmental protection; public or private choice, Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1991, pp. 181-205.
Biekart, J.W., Environmental covenants between government and industry: A
Dutch NGOs experience, Reciel, 4, no. 2, 1995, pp. 141-149.
Bunt, H.G. van de and W. Huisman, Het kan ook anders. Overwegingen bij
de keuze tussen klassiek of alternatief reguleren op milieuterrein, In: P.C.
Gilhuis et al. (red.), De effectiviteit van klassieke en alternatieve reguler-
ingsinstrumenten in milieuhandhaving, WODC, nr. 179, 1999, pp. 29-41.
Driessen, P.P.J., Concluding remarks: the scope of co-operative manage-
ment, In: P. Glasbergen (ed.), Co-operative Environmental Governance;
Public- private agreements as a policy strategy, Kluwer Academic Pub-
lishers, 1998, pp. 251-267.
Dubbink, W. and M. van Vliet, Market regulation versus co-management?
Two perspectives on regulating fisheries compared, Marine Policy, vol. 20,
no. 6, 1996, pp. 499-516.
Enevoldsen, M., Democracy and environmental agreements, In: P. Glasber-
gen (ed.), Co-operative Environmental Governance. Public-private
agreements as a policy Strategy, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998, pp.
201-226.
Eshuis, R.J.J. and E.A.I.M. de Graaf, Misstanden en misverstanden: de
alternatieve instrumentatie van het milieubeleid, Milieu en Recht, 1998,
pp. 226-230.
Garland, D., The limits of the sovereign state; Strategies of crime control in
contemporary society, The British journal of Criminology, 1996, pp. 445-
471.
Glasbergen, P., Agro-environmental policy – trapped in an iron law? A
comparative analysis of agricultural pollution control in the Netherlands,
the United Kingdom and France, Sociologica Ruralis, vol. XXXII, no. 1,
1992, pp. 30-48.
Glasbergen, P., Learning to manage the environment, In: W.M. Lafferty and
J. Meadowcroft (eds.), Democracy and the Environment; Problems and
prospects, Edward Elgar, 1996, pp. 175-193.
Glasbergen, P., Modern environmental agreements; A policy instrument
becomes a management strategy, Journal of Environmental Planning and
Management, 41, no. 6, 1998, pp. 693-709.
Glasbergen, P., Learning to manage energy by voluntary agreement; The
Dutch long-term agreements on energy efficiency improvement, Greener
Management International, 22, 1998, pp. 46-61.
Glasbergen, P., Tailor-made environmental governance: On the relevance of
the covenanting process, European Environment, The Journal of Euro-
pean Environmental Policy, vol. 9, no. 2, 1999, pp. 49-58.
Gunsteren, H. van, Culturen van Besturen, Boom, 1994.
Ingram, V., From sparring partners to bedfellows: joint approaches to
environmental policy-making, European Environment, The Journal of
European Environmental Policy, vol. 9, no. 2, 1999, pp. 41-48.
Jülich, R. and H. Falk, The integration of voluntary approaches into existing
legal systems; Literature Survey, CAVA working paper, no. 99/09/4, 1999.
Konijnenbelt, W., Convenanten met de gemeente; Fluiten in het schemer-
duister, Utrecht, 1992.
Lafferty, W.M., and J. Meadowcroft, Democracy and the environment:
prospects for greater congruence, In: W.M. Lafferty and J. Meadowcroft
(eds.), Democracy and the Environment; Problems and prospects, Ed-
ward Elgar, 1996, pp. 256-272.
Meadowcroft, J., Co-operative regimes: a way forward?, In: P. Glasbergen
(ed.), Co-operative Environmental Governance. Public-private agreements
as a policy strategy, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998,21-42.
Öko-Institut et al., New Instruments for Sustainability; The new contribution
of voluntary agreements to environmental policy, Darmstadt, 1998.













Tel: +49 (0)61 51/81 91-31
Fax: +49 (0)61 51/81 91-33
e-mail: unruh@oeko.de or dette@oeko.de
http://www.oeko.de/elni
Manuscripts should be submitted to the Editors
using an IBM compatible word processing package.
Articles that are not signed are in the responsibility
of the Editors.
The elni Newsletter is the Newsletter of the Envi-
ronmental Law Network International. It is distrib-
uted twice a year to its members at the following
price levels: commercial users (consultants, law
firms, government administrations): DM100/S$60;
private users, students, libraries: DM40/US$25.
Members from Central and Eastern Europe will
receive the lni Newsletter free of charge. Non-
members can order single issues at a fee of DM 10
incl. packaging. The Environmental Law Network
International also welcomes an exchange of publi-
cations as a way of payment. Private members and
libraries who feel that the charge is exceeding their
financial capability can subscribe to the newsletter
at a reduced rate on request.
The elni Newsletter is prepared with the financial
and organisational support of the Öko-Institut e.V.,
a non-profit private research institute. The address
of the main office is: Öko-Institut e.V., P.O. Box 62
26, 79038 Freiburg, Germany, Tel.: +49 (0)761 45
295-0, Fax: +49 (0)761 475437, http://www.oeko.de
Authors of this issue:
Bailey, Patricia, European University Institute,
Florence, Italy; e-mail: pbailey@club-internet.fr
Pieter Glasbergen, Professor at the Department of
Environmental Studies, Utrecht University, Utrecht,
The Netherlands; e-mail: P.Glasbergen@geog.uu.nl
Pim Hazewindus, Researcher at the Center for
Environmental Law of the University of
Amsterdam, the Netherlands; e-mail: hazewin-
dus@jur.uva.nl
Luc Lavrysen, Professor at the Centre for Envi-
ronmental Law, Ghent University, Belgium; e-mail:
luc.lavrysen@rug.ac.be
Errol Meidinger, Professor and Vice Dean of Law,
State University of New York at Buffalo, NY,
USA; .Fulbright Senior Scholar, Institute for Forest
Ec nomics, University of Freiburg, 1999-2000; e-
mail: eemeid@buffalo.edu
Paola Milizia, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
(FEEM), Milano, Italy; e-mail:
milizia.paola@feem.it
Marco Onida, Waste Management Unit, DG Envi-
ronment, European Commission, Brussels, Belgium;
e-mail: Marco.ONIDA@cec.eu.int
Alexandre Paquot, Waste Management Unit, DG
Environment, European Commission, Brussels, Bel-
gium; e-mail: Alexandre.PAQUOT@cec.eu.int
Antonio José Sánchez Sáez, Professor at the Fac-
ultad de Derecho, University of Sevilla, Sevilla,
Spain; e-mail: patroclo@arrakis.es
André Suck, currently research assistant at the
Centre for Economic and Environmental Manage-
ment (CEEM), Ghent University, Belgium; e-mail:
andre.suck@gmx.de
Ichiro Sumikura, Legal Staff, the Environment
Agency of Japan, Currently conducting his research
at Imperial College, the University of London; e-
mail: i.sumikura@ic.ac.uk
Marialuisa Tamborra, Fondazione Eni Enrico




Environmental Law Network International elni 1/2000
What is elni?
The Environmental Law Network International (elni)
is a network of individuals and organisations who
share an interest in environmental law. elni provides
an international forum for the exchange of news,
views, ideas and experiences in environmental law
and in so doing promotes international communica-
tion and cooperation of those working in this field.
elni was set up in 1990 and now has over 300 mem-
bers including legal practitioners and academic
lawyers from all over the world.
Why is elni Necessary?
In many countries lawyers are working on aspects
of environmental law, often with environmental
initiatives and organisations or as legislators, but
without contact with other lawyers abroad. Such
contact and communication is vital for the success-
ful and effective implementation of environmental
law.
How are elni's Objectives Achieved?
elni coordinates a number of different activities to
facilitate the communication and contact of those
interested in environmental law around the world.
1 Studies of the Environmental Law Network Interna-
tional
elni publishes a series of books entitled "Publications
of the Environmental Law Network International".
Each volume contains papers by various authors on
a particular theme in environmental law and in
some cases is based on the proceedings of the an-
nual conference. There are nine volumes to date:
· International Environmental Impact Assess-
ment
· Participation and Litigation Rights of Environ-
mental Associations in Europe,
· Civil Liability for Waste,
· Licensing procedures for Industrial Plants and
the Influence of EC Directives,
· Environmentally Sound Waste Management,
· Dynamic International Regimes,
· Environmental Control of Products and Sub-
stances,
· Environmental Rights - Law, Litigation and Ac-
cess to Justice,
· Voluntary Agreements - The Role of Environ-
mental Agreements
2 elni Newsletter
The elni Coordinating Bureau in Darmstadt, Ger-
many, produces and sends to each member the elni
Newsletter twice a year containing member's reports
on projects, legal cases and developments in envi-
ronmental law. elni  therefore encourages its mem-
bers to submit such articles to be published in the
Newsletter in order to allow the exchange and
sharing of experiences with other members.
3 Annual Conference
The annual conference focuses on a different theme
in nvironmental law and is held at a different
v nue each year. This event allows members to
meet, exchange ideas and plan cooperative projects
as well as being legally informative with talks from
lawyers and others from all over the world.
4 Coordinating Bureau
The Coordinating Bureau is at the Öko-Institut in
Darmstadt, Germany, which is a non-governmental,
non-profit making research institute. The Bureau
acts as an information centre where members can
obtain information about others working in certain
areas thus promoting the development of interna-
tional projects and cooperation.
elni's Board
At the elni annual conference in 1991, the partici-
pating members decided to create a board that as-
sumes partial responsibility for the Network's future
development. Members of the Board are:
Jame  Cameron, barrister, Foundation for Interna-
tional Environmental Law and Development
(FIELD), SOAS, University of London, U.K.
Jerzy Jendroska, lawyer, member of the Research
Group on Environmental Law at the Polish Acad-
emy of Science in Wroclaw, Poland
Sanford Lewis, laywer, director of the Good
Neighbor Project for Sustainable Industries, Wa-
verly, USA
Stefano Nespor, lawyer, editor of the "Rivista
Guiridica dell'Ambiente", Milano, Italy
Nelly Paleologou, member of the board of the
Greek Environmental Law Association, Birdlife
International, Brussels, Belgium.
Marga Robesin, staff lawyer with the Stichting
Natuur en Milieu, Utrecht, the Netherlands
Gerhard Roller, professor of law, Bingen Univer-
sity of Applied Sciences, Bingen, Germany
Nicolas de Sadeleer, lawyer and academic for the
Centre d'étude du droit de l'environnement
(CEDRE) at the facultés universitaires Saint-Louis,
Brussels, Belgium
Todd True, lawyer, Earthjustice Legal Defense
Fund, Seattle, USA
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